Prof. S. Z. Moshensky, D. Sc. (Econ.),

Department of Finances, Zhitomir Technological University,

Zhitomir, Ukraine

 

FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION CYCLES

 

The article analyses the historical aspects of financial globalization and the cyclical nature of globalization processes. On the basis of the concept of the spiral and cyclical development of economic systems, the article examines the emergence of transnational trade networks in the Hellenistic empires that appeared after the conquests of Alexander of Macedon, in ancient Rome, the Arab Caliphate, the ancient empires of China, the empire of Genghis Khan, as well as the European colonial empires in the Spanish- Portuguese, Dutch and British era. The formation of these networks during the periods of economic growth which provided exchange of information, innovative ideas, human and financial resources between different cultures, is a basic feature of the next round of globalization. The article also illustrates the evolution of securities corresponding to each cycle of globalization – from singraphs and chirographs in the Hellenistic era, the Chinese bill of exchange prototypes, Arab hawala and suftaja to European international bonds and modern derivatives. The general trend in the evolution of these financial instruments is to facilitate transnational capital flows.

 

Keywords: financial globalization, globalization cycles, history of globalization.

 

 

The globalization processes which reached a peak of activity during the period of economic growth in the 1990s, slowed down during the world financial crisis of 2008–2009. Opinion has been repeatedly voiced that the project of “global capitalism” failed to materialize and that the era of globalization was something of the past. This point of view is valid only if we visualize the globalization processes and the world financial crisis of 2008–2009 as unique phenomena in history, as something that is typical only for the turn of the 21st century. The author believes that this point of view is basically wrong.

 

Due to the spiral and cyclic nature in the development of the economic systems which are based on market principles, there have been repeated financial crises (the best known is the large-scale crisis of 1929 and the period of the “Great Depression” of the 1930s). There were many other crises of a smaller scale which followed one and the same pattern of development – only in the first half of the 19th century there were three such crises: in 1825–1926, 1837–1838, and 1847–1848.

 

There were also repeated periods of globalization which are typical for phases of economic upsurges. These periods were associated with the active development of international economic ties which promoted the development of a special economic media of a new type – the cosmopolitan and transnational trade networks within which there was an exchange of goods, financial resources, information, technologies and innovative ideas.

 

The appearance of such networks is a major symptom of the advent of another period of activity in globalization trends and the beginning of a new globalization cycle. The adequate appraisal of trends in the present world economic system depends on how we comprehend the regularities in the development of periodic cycles of globalization

 

The cyclic nature of globalization processes came into the limelight in the second half of the 1990s following the publication of a book by Andrew Gunder Frank. The author believes that the ancient forms of globalization processes can be traced back into the history of trade ties between China, India, and other Asian countries [10, 11, p. 52–62; 10]. À. H. Frank based his deductions on research conducted by Jannet Abu-Lughod [1, p. 185–211, 251–316] and Kirti N.Chaudhuri [6, p. 28–54], who studied the history of trade between Asian countries according to the principles developed by Fernan Brodel and his school. The latter provided convincing proof that the trade ties between Eurasia, Africa and other countries in the Indian Ocean basin have a history of long standing and developed over several millennia.

 

The year 1999 saw the publication of the book “Globalization and History” by K. O’Rourke and J. Williamson on the subject of the globalization cycle at the turn of the 20th century associated with the British empire [26].

 

In 2001, A. G. Hopkins [12] edited and published collected articles which brought forth the concept of “archaic globalization”, meaning the mediaeval trade networks which were periodically set up by Arab, Italian, Armenian, and Indian merchants mainly with the purpose of trading in high priced goods (spices, Chinese silk, porcelain, etc.) [13, p. 1–10; 14, 11–46]..

 

C. A. Bayly stressed the fact that non-European cultures were the main participants in the archaic stages of globalization inasmuch as the European economy acquired priority in international trading processes as late as the 19th century. C. A. Bayly also singled out in terms of chronology the next stage of proto-globalization associating it with European colonization of Africa and the development of slave trade [3, p. 47–73; 4, p. 41–47.].

 

Little by little the idea of globalization cycles won growing support [2, p. 141–166; 15, 20, 23, 27]. It is worth mentioning the book “Empire and Globalization. Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, 1850–1914” by G. Magee and A. Thompson [20] which came off the press in 2010.

 

Besides, mention should also be made of such researchers who have contributed to the study of the problem as V. M. Kravets [16, p. 290–295], Z. O. Lutsishin [18, p. 320], B. B. Rubtsov [31], N. Ferguson [8], A. S. Filipenko [9]. The latter author, in particular, examines in great detail the previous cycles of globalization processes – archaic globalization, proto- globalization, “globalization of the modern era” (turn of the 20th century), “post-colonial (integral) globalization” of the second half of the 20th century [9, p. 11, 119–265].

 

Most scientists are in agreement that the first known cycle of globalization activity is associated with the Hellenistic era (middle of the 4th century B.C. to the 1st century A.D.) and the formation of a single political and economic entity stretching from the Mediterranean to the borders of India and China. This followed the conquests of Alexander of Macedon (and the signing in 325 B.C. of a peace accord with the Indian ruler Chandragupta which led to the development of trade contacts between India and the Greek world). Although this empire did not last long as a united state and soon broke down into separate kingdoms, the existence of an economic space in a cosmopolitan culture (possibly the first of its kind in history) based on the Greek language and traditions led to the development of a network of permanent trade ties between Europe and the countries of Asia. The main centers in this network were the big trade cities of the Hellenistic era – Alexandria in Egypt, Antioch in Syria, and Athens in Greece. Among the prototypes of securities of that time we may single out singraphs and chirographs [16, p. 32–34] which were widely used in the 1st century B. C. in Hellenistic Egypt and later adopted by the Roman empire.

 

During its period of heyday from the 1st century B. C. to the 2nd century A. D., the Roman empire (which had absorbed the Hellenistic world and sprawled over a vast territory) maintained trade ties with the kingdom of Parthia and China. In its trade contacts the Roman empire used both the singraphs and chirographs borrowed from Greece and the innovatory mechanism of money transfer – permutatio pecuniae [24, Chapter 3.1]. Besides it was the Roman empire than gave rise to the first prototypes of joint-stock companies (societas publicani) and shares (particulae), and also the organized system of trading securities.

 

It was also the time for the formation of an extensive transnational trade network – the Great Silk Road which encompassed a well developed trade network of caravan and sea routes from China to the borders of the Roman empire. This trade network began to flourish during the rule of the Han dynasty in China (206 B. C. – 220 A. D. and owed much to the territorial expansion of Buddhism which started in the first centuries A. D. and brought together many Asian countries.

 

In the 8th century A. D., during the second period in the rule of the Chinese Tang dynasty (618 – 907 A. D.), the Chinese empire vastly extended its borders and developed into a world empire that controlled half of the Great Silk Road. China’s trade ties embraced the whole of Asia and reached out to Byzantia and Syria. The lengthy period of economic upsurge in China which continued till the rule of the Sun dynasty (960 – 1279 A. D.) served as the basic factor for the further integration of the transnational trading system. As early as the 8th century A. D. China had in use securities called feitsian. During the Sun dynasty there were also similar securities called ziaotsi and ziaoin which were used for the safe transfer of money over big distances [24, Chapter 1.4].

 

When China became part of the Mongol empire following the conquests of Genghis Khan and his successors, this led to the development of trade contacts. The Mongol empire known as Pax Mongolica in its heyday embraced a huge territory from Hungary to the Pacific Ocean. This was a single political space where on the basis of Chinese traditions and technologies an international mailing system was set up. China began using both paper money and Chinese securities. The territory was conducive to the development of a transnational trading network on the basis of the Great Silk Road. It was during this period that well known European and Arab merchants, in particular Marco Polo of Venice, made their historical travels.

 

Yet another trade network of Arab merchants was promoted by the spread of Islam and the prosperity of the Arab Caliphate during the period from the 8th to the 13th centuries. Arab merchants were the main intermediaries between the Mediterranean regions of Europe, China, and the Indian Ocean coastline countries. Among the Arab securities of that time which were used in international trade we may single out checks (saqq) and also such promissory documents as hawala and suftaja. Probably it is these documents that stimulated the appearance of the first promissory notes [24, Chapter 1.5] in Italy in the 11th-13th centuries which were widely used in the international trade network of Italian merchants along with state bonds (prestanze) and the prototypes of shares (sopracorpo and luoghi).

 

All these trade networks dating back to the period of archaic globalization which developed solely within the borders of the Eastern hemisphere. A new stage in the formation of global trade ties began after Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1492. This marked the beginning in the creation of European colonial empires – Spanish and Portuguese territories (16th century) and then Dutch territories (17th-18th centuries). The East Indian and West Indian Dutch companies played an important part in the development of new trade networks. Shares became the main security on the financial market of Amsterdam which provided an exchange of financial resources with the colonies.

 

The next stage in the globalization processes (from 1870 to 1914) was associated with the British colonial empire. The active development of technological innovations in Great Britain allowed the country to accumulate substantial financial resources and come to the fore as the world’s super power of that period. Among the factors conducive to this process were the creation of a transportation infrastructure in the 19th century on the basis of the steam engine and the development of a network of railways, the creation of an international information infrastructure based on the use of the telegraph and telephone in the second half of the 19th century.

 

At that time, particularly towards the end of the 19th century and prior to the beginning of World War One, the globalization processes acquired features similar to those of the present day. Long distance international trade became dominant [23]. From 1870 to 1913, exports in India, Indonesia, Thailand, and China doubled and even tripled. Following the beginning of active industrialization in Japan at the end of the 19th century, exports went up 70 times over and amounted to 7 % of the country’s GDP [26, p. 54; 7].

 

The turn of the 20th century was marked by the development of production specialization on a global scale. This in turn led to a global system of division of labor – Britain and several other industrially developed countries (Belgium, Germany, France) came forth as producers of industrial goods (Britain’s industrial goods accounted for 75% of the country’s export [21, p. 2]), which were sold in the outlying countries and the colonies supplying raw materials.

 

The globalization cycle at the turn of the 20th century may be tagged as “British” (Pax Britannica) and displays many common features with the next “American” (Pax Americana) period of globalization at the end of the 20th century. During that period, the spread of globalization trends was facilitated by the fact that prior to World War One borders and visas were purely symbolic (particularly within the British empire) and people, goods and capital could move around freely almost throughout the entire world [20, p. 64–117].

Statistical data is essential if we are to identify the basic trends in the development of the financial market at the turn of the 20th century. The preceding periods of globalization lacked or had no statistical data on microeconomic development and hence cannot be compared with modern times. By contrast the turn of the 20th century displays a sufficient amount of statistical information [29, p. 87–91] (in particular for identifying the volume of stock market capitalization). This makes it possible to compare with a high degree of precision the specific features in the development of the financial market in the two chronologically separated cycles of globalization (turn of the 20th century) and also to identify the common and specific features of both cycles.

 

Raghuran Rajan and Luiggi Zingales analysed a huge volume of statistical data in their studies aimed at comparing the state of the financial market at the beginning (1913) and the end (1999) of the 20th century. The researchers resorted to four basic indices – the ratio of the volume of bank deposits to the GDP (the banking sphere development index), the ratio of stock market capitalization to the GDP, the ratio of shares issues to gross investments, and the number of companies per one million of the population. The choice of just these indices may be debatable. For instance, the ratio of share issues to gross investments in 1929 (0.38 in the USA, 0.35 in Britain, 0.26 in France, and 0.17 in Germany) was much higher than in the 1990s (0.12 in the USA, 0.09 in Britain, 0.09 in France, 0.06 in Germany) [28, p. 16] for the simple reason that other instruments of the securities market were less developed at the beginning of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the analyzed data provide sufficient grounds for identifying the main trends.

 

The world economic system which appeared just before the outbreak of World War One on the basis of the British colonial empire, displayed a high degree of integration. Many of the pre-war indices of 1913 were on par with those of 1999 – the highest prior to the beginning of the recession in the year 2000. The overall volume of external trade in 1913 amounted to 11.9 % of the aggregate GDP of the economically developed countries (this index was repeated as late as the 1970s) [7].

 

The annual export of capital from Britain (the main financial center of the world economic system of that time) which had a budget surplus of 9% of GDP, was much more active than at the end of the 20th century [17, p. 104]. In the 1980s, when the budgets of Japan and Germany showed a huge surplus, it accounted for 5% of the countries’ GDP. China which has come to the fore in the beginning of the 21st century as the world’s main exporter of financial resources showed a budget surplus growth from +7.2 billion US dollars in 2002 to the maximum value of +249.9 billion in 2006 (thus overtaking Japan which had a budget surplus of +174 billion US dollars in 2006) [5, p. 13–17]. This amounted to only 2.45% of China’s GDP (10,210 billion dollars in 2006, after which the profit surplus began to recede).

 

On the whole, the development level of the financial system in 1913 was exceeded as late as the end of the 1990s. A specific feature in the global economic system at the turn of the 20th century was the fact that in terms of the ratio of the stock market capitalization to the GDP in 1913 Western Europe (Britain – 1.09, Belgium – 0.99, France – 0.78, Germany – 0.44) was ahead of the United States [29] (0.39 in 1913). Not all of those countries which were leaders of the world economic system in 1913 succeeded in retaining their leading positions by 1999. By that time the main leaders were Switzerland – 3.23, Britain – 2.25, the Netherlands – 2.03, Sweden – 1.77, the USA – 1.52, Canada – 1.22, the Republic of South Africa – 1.2, France - 1.17, Australia – 1.13 [28, p. 15].

 

The beginning of the 20th century saw the formation not only of a world financial system but also of a global market of securities with a big number of foreign securities on the European financial markets. During the period from 1870 to 1913, the financial flows were directed mainly from Great Britain (as the center of the world economic system) outward to the peripheral countries where markets were being formed and developed.

It was at this time that the irregularity in the development of the European countries became particularly obvious. This applied in particular to the lagging industrialization process in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. During the period of maximum economic development at the turn of the 20th century, both Russia and the Ukraine received considerable volumes of French, British, and Belgian investments (although in terms of territory the industrialization process was highly irregular and confined mainly to the Urals in Russia, the Donetsk coal basin in the Ukraine, and also the oil fields in the Caspian sea zone and Western Ukraine (Galitsia). Apparently the specific features in the economic development of Eastern Europe stemmed from the foreign investments flowing in during the periods of activity of globalization trends. A similar situation was manifest at the turn of the 21st century till the crisis of 2008–2009. The international sovereign bonds issued by the governments of a number of national states served as the basic instrument of investments into the economy of peripheral markets. The capitalization of the London market of these bonds in 1875 amounted to 3 billion pounds which was 214% of the country’s GDP (1.4 billion pounds). In 1905, the capitalization rose to 4.1 billion pounds, i.e. 185% of the GDP (2.2 billion pounds). Countries with developing markets issued bonds to the sum of 500 million pounds (46% of their aggregate GDP) in 1875 and 1.9 billion pounds (64% of their aggregate GDP) in 1905 [21, p. 4, 12–14.].

 

If we are to compare the practical application of such bonds with modern financing of countries with developing markets we may find that following World War One and till the 1970s, there were insignificant capital flows into these countries. In the 1980s, capital inflow was mainly in the form of bank credits. After a series of default, there was a major shift towards the use of international bonds (the so-called Brady bonds which were nominated in US dollars and were initially issued mainly in the countries of Latin America). In the 1990s, these bonds played an even greater role in financing countries with developing markets.

 

With the activation of globalization processes at the turn of the 20th century, which was associated with the spread of the cosmopolitan ideals of freedom of trade and freedom of capital movement, there began a steady reduction in the regulatory role of national states ( similar trends were displayed at the end of the 20th century). This stimulated a negative reaction to “cosmopolitism”, as globalization was nicknamed in its time, and the resurgence of “state nationalism” in most European countries (the ideas of G. Schmoller and A. Wagner in Germany), as well as the trend towards greater state regulation of the economy.

 

All this led to growing international tension, greater political disintegration, and ultimately to the outbreak of World War One. The currency control coupled with quotas and export limitations ruptured the economic ties between countries and undermined the entire global system of labor division.

 

Attempts were made to restore the world financial system during the postwar period. The 1920s saw a period of economic growth, mainly in the United States where stock market capitalization rose from 0.39 of GDP in 1913 to 0.75 in 1929. In Britain the figures were 1.09 in 1913 and 1.38 in 1929 [28, p. 15].. Following the crisis of 1929 during the Great Depression of the 1930s, there began a period of growing state interference into regulation of financial markets which resulted in growing customs tariffs and greater currency control. Consequently the markets began to be less open which fully destroyed the remnants of the world economic system of the Pax Britannica era. After the Bretton-Wood conference of 1944, an attempt was made to revive what had been achieved in the beginning of the 20th century and this led to the creation of a new system of international relations.

 

The development of the world financial system was slowed down not during the period of the Great Depression of the 1930s but later in the 1950s. The main stimuli for the process were purely political – there was greater state control of financial markets due to the animosity between states which was further aggravated after World War Two. The basic factors hampering the development of financial markets were the political decisions taken to restrict the economic systems in terms of trade and capital flows. Openness for international trade, particularly during those favorable periods when trans-border capital flows are most active, is a decisive factor facilitating the development of globalization processes.

 

The countries which determined international economic policy (the USA first and foremost), were interested in maintaining control over currency exchange rates and rigid regulation of international capital flows with the aim of preserving their political influence. This was true till the 1970s. In 1974, the United States was the first country to launch liberalization of the financial system and relax control of capital flows. In Britain this liberalization took place in 1986. By the end of the 1980s, the process of liberalization had engulfed most West European countries and Japan. It was one of the main reasons for the economic boom of the 1990s and the start of a new cycle of globalization.

 

The history of this globalization cycle which is sometimes called Pax Americana, is well known and the author is not pursuing the task of describing this period. This cycle of globalization processes whose main feature was the use of information technologies and the growing importance of derivatives and securities in assets came to an end with the beginning in 2008 of a global financial crisis which slowed down globalization processes as had been time and again in past history.

 

On the whole an analysis of the history of globalization processes speaks of the fact that a cyclic nature of development is inherent to all market economic systems. It has always identified the periods of economic upsurges and slumps. It is for this reason that the onward advance in the evolution of globalization trends which has been described in broad terms has never been a continuous process. In the 20th and 21st centuries these cycles are clearly visible (in particular during the large-scale crises of 1929 and 2008).This is mainly due to the integration of the world economy. In the past, there was no such integration and so it was the local social and political factors which identified the cycles of upsurges and slumps with no clear-cut chronological boundaries. The periods of economic revival were associated with the formation of new empires (the Chinese empires, the Hellenistic and Roman empires, the Arabian caliphate, the Mongolian empire, the European colonial empires) which led to the creation of a unified economic space over vast territories and the development of new trade networks which brought together remote parts of the world. The periods of economic slump usually coincided with the disintegration of these empires.

 

The evolution of the globalization trends (with a long history dating back to the ancient empires of Asia) also displayed cyclic features. During the periods of economic growth there was a surplus of goods and financial resources which stimulated the search for new markets. If the political forces and other factors of that time were favorable for the development of integrating processes they facilitated the start of a new stage of globalization. On the other hand, if the political forces were of a disintegrating nature there began a period of isolation of countries and whole regions usually resulting in economic recession.

 

The advent of a globalization cycle and the development of transnational trade networks led to the spread of innovatory financial instruments and new types of securities (singraphs and chirographs in the Hellenistic period, money transfers and the prototypes of shares in the Roman empire, Chinese securities fei-tzian and tziao-tzi, Arab hawala and suftaja, promissory notes and bonds in mediaeval Italian city states, shares in the colonial era, international bonds in the British empire at the turn of the 20th century, derivative financial instruments and security based assets at the end of the 20th century).

 

The growing simplification in the movement of financial resources and securities between states constitute a general trend in the evolution of innovatory financial instruments which ensure the functioning of transnational commercial networks during the cycles of the globalization processes.

The authors believes there are no grounds for assertions that following the crisis of 2008–2009. “the project of global capitalism” was a flop. The period of economic recession (whose beginning can be traced back to the year 2000 with the crisis of 2008 as its corollary) led to a recession in most of the countries of the world. This slowed down the development of economic systems and financial markets, disrupted the system of ties between countries and is sometimes called “period of deglobalization”. This period has the potentials to change substantially the financial landscape of the world and the detribution of functions between its participants. This may be illustrated by the growing importance of China not only as the world’s main exporter of goods, but also as the basic source of financial resources which are actively invested on the financial market of the United States, in state bonds in particular. But we know from past experience that the economic recession will hardly change the basic trends of development. Following a period of economic slump we may always expect the beginning of a new globalization cycle which will again bring about the activation of transnational investment flows.

 

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