магистрант Жунисбаева Б.И.

Региональный социально-инновационный университет

Counterfactual worlds in literature

Possible (or counterfactual) worlds is not a new phenomenon in literature. The term possible worlds was first named so by Liebnitz (Ronen 1994: 5). It was initially discussed in terms of basic logic and semantics (Ronen 1994: 11):

Once the label "fiction" has been attributed, conventions dictating the status and proper interpretation of fictional propositions are activated. When a text is considered to be fictional, its set of propositions are read according to fictional world-constructing conventions and it is made to signify by observing the set of fictional world- reconstructing conventions ...

This set of fictional world-reconstructing conventions is described as follows (Ronen 1994: 89-91):

• Fictional propositions (or worlds in the case of fairytales) take on distinctive fictional positions relative to the actual world. This means that a fictional proposition (or world) embodies fictional states which have no direct links with the actual world, e.g. a fictional world is not necessarily controlled by the laws of gravity.

• Fictional propositions are logically constrained by its fictional properties. As such, these properties also constrain the inferences that can be drawn, e.g. people may be able to fly in fictional worlds.

• Fictional propositions or worlds may embody contradictory conditions. Thus, the fictional properties of a specific text may not necessarily be logically consistent, e.g. people may be able to fly in a fictional world even though that world is governed by the laws of gravity (as it is in the real world where people are not able to fly).

• Fictional objects (governed by the fictional propositions set out in a specific fictional text) are undefined and open-ended. They are thus subject to change at any time and are not confined to definite and/or permanent attributes.

• Fictional propositions signify both existents and non-existents. Consequently, the characteristics of fictionalbeings and/or creatures are intermingled with real beings and/or creatures. Note that this is a blend in itself, as properties from the real world are projected (through partial cross-space mappings) onto properties from the fictional world. These may fluctuate in degree as some blends may rely more on properties from the real world, whereas others may rely more on fictional properties.

• All the properties of a fictional world (or objector creature or being) are equally vital to it as they are structurally bound to it. Thus, the fact that a fictional world has a property of the real world, such as gravity, is no less or more important than the fact that one (or more) of its beings (people) can fly, which is a property of the fictional world.

From this discussion we can see what fiction is, how it relates to the world and how it conforms to or discards (or even transcends) real-world logic, boundaries and semantics. But in essence, this only gives us a definition of fiction and what possible worlds are. It explains how these worlds are constructed linguistically, but does not explain how it is possible for us to create these worlds cognitively. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 217) write that people "pretend, imitate, lie, fantasize, deceive, delude, consider alternatives, simulate, make models, and propose hypotheses". Human beings therefore have the ability to "operate mentally on the unreal, and this ability depends on our capacity for advanced conceptual integration".

In other words, it is part of our cognitive make-up to be able to operate cognitively on the level of the unreal. This means that much of our meaning- making is based on counterfactual reasoning. At first glance, it would seem that this simply means making changes in the actual or real world and monitoring the consequences of those changes in the counterfactual world, but Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 218) counter this argument by pointing out that changing any one element opens up complicated questions of what else would need to be changed in order for that one element to differ. Counterfactual scenarios are assembled mentally not by taking full representations of the world and making discrete, finite, known changes to deliver full possible worlds but, instead, by conceptual integration, which can compose schematic blends that suit the conceptual process at hand.

This means that counterfactual reasoning is not based on cause-effect relations as previously thought. For example, in Cinderella, the consideration is not the causal correlation between the real world and the counterfactual world, but is in fact an integration network in which certain elements from both worlds are specified. Reality is not simply the opposite of unreality (or the counterfactual) and as a result, counterfactual or possible worlds may have very authentic and substantial effects on our conceptualisation of the real world, for example in anosognosia patients (a condition that causes patients to believe that they are able to move their paralysed limbs) as described by Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 232).

This can also be seen in the way in which children read and understand fairytales. Most children believe in the existence of the magical creatures and elements found in fairytales and the possible worlds constructed in these stories. This, in turn, influences the way in which they construct meaning and affects the behaviour and expectations of a child. For example, a child who believes in the tooth fairy will behave differently when losing a tooth than a child who does not believe in the tooth fairy. The former child might expect a monetary reward for his/her tooth, whereas the latter child will not expect a reward. It is important to understand that the blends in this chapter are not constructed from the perspective of a child, but from the perspective of an adult. This means that the blends show an understanding (at a meta-level) of the different laws governing the real or actual world and those governing possible or fictional worlds. Be this as it may, it is worth remembering that even though children do believe in many of these magical creatures and events, they do have some sense that these creatures and events belong to a magical world and not to the real world.

There are three important elements to consider when looking at how we construct possible worlds: language, meaning, and the unconscious conceptual work that constructs meaning from language. Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 178) express the view that very little of the rich meanings we construct is inherent in the forms of language itself. This does not, however, mean that language or grammar is worthless, but rather that language is not an end in itself. It points to something else. Our words merely reflect our thought and meaning constructions, but language is not, in fact, the tool we use to construct those thoughts or meanings. That tool is a cognitive ability. Language or grammar prompts us to construct dynamic on-line mental spaces (based on long-term schematic knowledge) that map onto each other in a number of ways (as has been shown earlier) to form blends and provide a structure from which we extricate meaning in a number of ways. It is important to emphasise again that this meaning is available to us immediately through unconscious underlying cognitive processes. Blends are not constructed afterwards, but take place in conjunction with, for example, a conversation or whilst reading.

Literature:

1. Ronen, Ruth. 1994. Possible Worlds in Literary Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2. Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner. 2002. The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and The Mind's Hidden Complexities. New York: Basic Books.