ê.ô.í. Øèíãàðåâà Ì.Þ., ìàãèñòðàíò Àéäàðîâà
À.À.
Ðåãèîíàëüíûé ñîöèàëüíî-èííîâàöèîííûé óíèâåðñèòåò
The dominant theory of color terminology
The history of
color terms starts from the pubication of Basic Color Terms by
Berlin and Kay in 1969..
Broadly speaking, the research after 1969 can be divided into two categories.
•
Research accepting the general basis of the Berlin
and Kay theory.
This research
typically tests the hypothesis on new material or applies new methods to
confirm the theory.
•
Research rejecting the whole premise of the Berlin
and Kay theory.
The
first category is considerably larger.
The privileged
position of Basic Color Terms
should become clear if we describe the prevailing doctrine at the time of its
publication. A cornerstone of post- Saussurean linguistics is that of the
arbitrary nature of meaning. This idea had its sequel in the doctrine of
relativism, the prime example of which is the Sapir- Whorf hypothesis. In
linguistics, it was long argued that the domain of colour was the area par
excellence for illustration of the arbitrary nature of
language. Bloomfield’s (1933:140) statement, cited below, was a commonplace of
the time as we find similar claims made by other authors, including Gleason
(1962) in his classic textbook.
Physicists view the color spectrum as a continuous scale of light waves of different lengths, ranging from 40 to 72 hundred-thousandths of a millimeter, but languages mark off different parts of this scale quite arbitrarily and without precise limits, in the meaning of such color-names as violet, blue, green, yellow, orange, red and the color names of different languages do not embrace the same gradations.
The view
expressed by Bloomfield was widely accepted in linguistics for many decades.
Studies performed in this tradition are, for example, Conklin (1964) and
Lenneberg and Roberts (1956).
It was in fact
the aim of Berlin and Kay (1969) (henceforth B&K) to refute this belief in
relativity. Despite many studies demonstrating that the colour spectrum was
divided in various ways, Berlin and Kay hypothesised that there was an
underlying pattern of universality. They wrote (1969:2): “We suspect that this
allegation of total arbitrariness in the way languages segment the color space
is a gross overstatement.” In order to demonstrate this, they designed an
experiment based on a number of assumptions which were given axiomatic status.
•
Not all colour terms have equal status; there are
basic colour terms (henceforth BCTs), and such a term can be defined by a few
criteria. These criteria are: a) it is monolexemic, i.e. the meaning is not
predictable from its parts; b) its signification is not included in that of any
other colour term; c) its application is not restricted to a narrow class of
objects; d) it must be psychologically salient for the informants - e.g. show a
tendency to occur early in elicited lists, stability of reference across
informants and occasions of use, and occurrence in the idiolects of all
informants. (B&K: 6)
•
There is an internal gradation in colour categories,
which means that it is possible to isolate a focus of the category - a best
example.
•
The denotatum of a colour term is fully described
by the three dimensions hue, lightness and saturation.
Although not
explicitly stated, these axioms were in fact already part of an established
tradition of studies in colour terminology. As far as the first axiom is
concerned, B&K pointed out that the notion of basic colour terms had long
been a working assumption in linguistics and anthropology, although not properly
defined.
The notion
appeared in the work of Lenneberg and his associates (e.g. Brown and Lenneberg
1954; Lenneberg and Roberts 1956) and also in the work of Conklin (1964).
Consequently, as they saw it, their achievement in this respect was only to
give it a “unique operational definition.” Regarding the second axiom,
Lenneberg and Roberts (1956: 16) make the following observation about the
existence of a focus of colour categories:
[I]t appears that some stimuli
are more likely to elicit a given verbal response than others. One can think,
for example, of a color which is more typically yellow than another [...] We shall use
the term focus to describe that cluster of stimuli which has an extremely
high probability of eliciting one distinct verbal response.
Concerning the
third axiom, B&K were well aware that Conklin (1964), for instance, had
demonstrated that there were other dimensions of meaning associated with colour
terms, e.g., succulence and desiccation. However, in their quest for the
underlying pattern they argued that associations of that kind would have to be
ignored. Again, this approach was anticipated by Lenneberg and Roberts
(1956:14) who make similar reservations:
Since we are proposing to use
the three perceptual dimensions as metalanguage in terms of which the referent
of any color term can be described, we might pause to ask to what extent the
coordinate system arising from the use of these dimensions might itself be
culture bound. Two questions are involved: the first is whether the dimensions
(hue, brightness, and saturation) are universally applicable. For the time
being, we may leave the first question unanswered, recognizing, of course, that
there is nothing “natural, logical, or necessary” in these dimensions. For our
purposes, they are measuring sticks which can be conveniently used in
describing cross-cultural similarities or differences.
Although
Lenneberg and Roberts suggest that there is nothing “natural” in the
dimensions, they have been treated exactly in that way since then. B&K
(1969:160, footnote 2), for instance, refer to them as “the three
psychophysical dimensions: hue, saturation, and brightness.” Today, most
researchers seem to treat these dimensions as natural and universal dimensions
grounded in physiological perception.
On the basis of
the above-mentioned axiomatic assumptions, B&K asked native speakers of
twenty languages to map the focal points and outer boundaries of each BCT in
their language on an array of 329 Munsell colour chips. This procedure and
material had been used in an almost identical form in another classic study,
the aforementioned Lenneberg and Roberts (1956). They, however, had used a much
larger inventory of colour terms (52 terms) and did not use achromatic chips
(cf. B&K, p 103.). Subsequent to the empirical study and the analysis of
the results, a third, heavily criticised, step in the study was added - a study
of the literature concerning previously documented colour studies. On the basis
of such studies, combined with studies of various types of lexicons and
dictionaries, B&K established the BCTs of an additional 78 languages,
reaching a total of 98 languages.
In sum, it can
be claimed that B&K’s achievement was not based on novel methodology, nor
on the postulation of radical axioms. Their study was quite traditional, in
these respects, but what was actually new was the wide contrastive approach
and, in particular, the equation of colour category to focus. B&K (1969:
13) write: “[W]henever we speak of colour categories, we
refer to the foci of categories, rather than to their boundaries or total area
... [italics original].” Even though the focal element had been recognised
earlier no one had previously taken this radical step.
The results of
their investigation were revolutionary in at least three respects.
•
First, B&K succeeded in confirming their
hypothesis; they claim that they have been able to show that “color
categorisation is not random and the foci of basic color terms are similar in
all languages.” (1969: 10)
•
Second, which came as a surprise to B&K, there
appears to be a universal process, which stipulates a fixed order in which BCTs
are encoded in a language. B&K suggested that this process could be reduced
to a typology of seven stages (cf. Figure 1 below). They observed that of a
possible 2,048 patterns only twenty-two combinations occurred in their
material.
|
I |
II |
III |
IV |
V |
VI |
VII PURPLE |
|
WHITE |
|
GREEN |
GREEN |
|
|
PINK |
|
and |
RED |
or |
and |
BLUE |
BROWN |
ORANGE |
|
BLACK |
|
YELLOW |
YELLOW |
|
|
GREY |
|
Figure 1.
Berlin and Kay’s 1969 typology of seven stages. |
•
Third, apart from some doubtful cases (notably,
Hungarian and Russian) no language seems to have more than eleven BCTs.
Berlin and
Kay’s (1969: 104) own summary of these results provides us further indication
of what they claimed to have found:
As MacLaury
(1997: 20-21) points out in his summary of Basic Color
Terms, the view of the authors would seem to be that
BCTs are universal “because neurology determines that there is no other way to
see.” The use of the terms psychophysical and
perceptual category above
indicates this. In this view, the illusion of cross- linguistic relativity is
created through the different number of BCTs, which frequently lead to
differences among boundaries. Other elements adding to the perceived picture of
relativism are the presence of non-basic terms and connotations. Instead we
have a theory which could be given the label evolutionary
determinism, since it suggests (cf. the quote
above) that there are universal perceptual colour categories just waiting to be
lexicalised.
Literature:
1. Bloomfield, L. 1933. Language. New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston.
2. Berlin, B. and P. Kay 1969. Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. Berkeley: University of California Press.
3. Lenneberg, E.H. and J.M. Roberts 1956. The Language of Experience: A Study in Methodology. Indiana University Publications in Anthropology and
Linguistics. Memoir 13: supplement to International Journal of American Linguistics, vol. 22, no. 2. Baltimore: Waverley Press Inc.
4. Maclaury, R. 1995.
Vantage Theory. In Taylor, J.R. and R.E. MacLaury (eds.), 231-276.