Jaromír Harvánek
– Karel Schelle
The Faculty of Law of the Masaryk University,
Brno, Czech Republic
Sanction from the point of view
of legal theory and the Czech legal history
1.
Significance of sanctions in the legal system
What is actually the function of law? To arrive at a reasonable answer, we would have to build a picture of the entire complex of human social behaviour. But this is a multi-factored battlefield and we don’t know if anybody has ever seriously attempted to do this.
Therefore we will limit ourselves – for this purpose, although basically with a risk of mistakes – to the interpretation of law as a coercive factor. This means that a human individual during his/her life would like to achieve realization of certain values which he/she embodies out of their empty abstraction into more concrete and tangible goals and subsequently into quite concrete means. In the competition of individuals, the society restricts the use of prohibited means for the achievement of individual goals. The effect of legal norms is very wide as they not only regulate and control but in the end result they also form and intervene in the creation of the scale of values.
Legal norms set the rules of behaviour in a “generally binding” way. This in itself does not guarantee that people will respect them. Then it is necessary to involve the state law enforcement understood in the widest possible scope – as the state care and oversight over the observance of legal norms be it in the form of direct (physical) coercion or even indirect coercion – by means of legal sanctions. To obtain better knowledge of the social significance and function of sanctions, it is necessary to take into consideration especially the legal norm as a basic unit of the legal system, its structure, specific features and the importance of sanctions in the legal norm.
A legal norm represents a basic building block of the legal system – of the law, and it does so both in the concept of objective law as a set of norms effective within a given territory and time as well as in the subjective law as a possibility to realize one’s behaviour on the basis of objective law. That is also why it constitutes one of the basic building blocks of general theoretical considerations regarding the law. Without legal norms the term “law in action” would be unthinkable meaning the fulfillment of its basic regulative functions including its implementation in the factual and theoretical sense.
Gradually, the following concept has developed in the legal system although not exclusively: a norm equals to an imperative, regulation, command. In legal theory, this term also means to authorize, allow, empower or repeal[1].
A norm qualified as a legal norm is one of the
most significant attributes in the mechanism of legal regulation.
A norm as a criterion of behaviour is understood either in the sense of a social rule of behaviour, a fundamental [2]elementary segment of the legal system, still a meaningful unit, a certain imperative, an element providing information or a rule having (or also not having) certain axiological character.
We can remind here that not in all branches of law a legal norm has the same meaning and function. A legal norm can be considered a model of ordered, prohibited or permitted behaviour, of ideal and verbally expressed ideas presented in the form of rules defined by the state (or their community), agreed on or approved, given in a written (printed) or oral form, immediately enforced by sanctions, which are an expression of the state coercion. Succinctly expressed we could say that: “a norm is a judgment on the objective necessity to act - that is an obligation.“[3]
As stated above, also in view of the knowledge
of normative theory, the legal norms are most frequently defined as
correspondingly qualified rules of behaviour and their features are being
distinguished from the material and formal point of view.[4]
Ranking among material characteristics are their:
- normativeness (this is about setting an
example, a rule of behaviour)
- legally binding effect (as the only social norm
it is legally binding)
- generality (towards the subjects and objects as
a general binding effect)
- state coercion and enforcement (state monopoly
or more precisely care and oversight of the observance of legal norms)
Ranking among the formal characteristics are usually:
- authority (when issuing legal norms)
- form (the manner of their outer expression as
printed legal or contractual normative acts)
It is known from the empirical reality, that a
majority (quantitatively the larges amount) of legal relations are effectuated
as if “of their own accord”. The state coercion is present in a latent form
here as a sort of general care and interest of the state in the observance of
legal norms. And only as the last resort, and therefore also in a relatively
small amount of legal relations, if no other possibility is available, it
appears or must be outwardly manifested by way of corresponding tariff-scaled
sanction. But this is in fact only an extreme and the last means which,
however, can not be renounced. Other social norms also have their ways of
enforcement but the state coercion in case of legal norms represents not only
its specific feature but also an expression of its social substance.
1.2
Sanction
It is one of the elements of the internal form of law. The structure represents the composition of a legal norm of its basic elements, constituent units, including their qualities and mutual relations. Probably primarily for pedagogical reason, a typical arrangement of the constituent elements of legal norms is seen as a “three-membered” trichotomic structure of a legal norm, therefore it is termed as the so called “classical” structure of the norms. All basic constituents of the structure are described in it being composed of:
hypothesis - represents the preconditions, conditions, causes, reasons, it is the “conditional” part of a norm. It expresses the descriptive statements i.e. that which is.
disposition - the obligatory rule of behaviour itself, each time a necessary and existing part of a legal norm, it expresses the so called prescriptive statements i.e. that something is, is not supposed to (may, must not) or can be. Hence also the Weyr definition stating that „a norm is an expression of something that is supposed to be“. [6]
In this context, it is necessary to mention that with respect to the relations and connections between the hypothesis and the disposition the concept of the hypothesis of a legal norm can be explained by legal theory but mutual logical connections and links between the hypothesis and disposition can, on the other hand, be explained by logic.[7]
A sanction is understood to mean a detriment of different character which differs according to individual legal branches contained in the classical type of a legal norm. It is only applied in case that the rules of behaviour are violated – as the so called sanction part or a “consequential” part.
Fundamentally, it is necessary to distinguish between the sanctions in public law and civil law. The branch of private law is quite varied in terms of sanctions.
With respect to the above, it is possible to depict, in a clear yet simplified way, the basic parts of the structure of a legal norm:
If certain conditions exist (H),
then the subject (S) has to,
perform an obligation (P).
In legal regulations, diversely composed legal norms appear in
individual cases with respect to their structure, containing in their structure
hypotheses – termed conditional as
well as norms where the hypothesis is absent – termed unconditional. From our point of view, it is necessary to point to
norms containing in their structure the so called perfect sanction unlike the imperfect
ones.
In the Czech general theoretical literature, opinions can be found of one-membered to four-membered structure of a legal norm. In accordance with the opinion stating that a normative sentence can be divided into a conditioning part (the hypothesis) and a conditioned part (the disposition, sanction),[8] we assume that from the legal point of view, each legal norm has a conditional and a consequential part.
There are three cases termed the “leges imperfectae”(literally – imperfect laws or norms, which are understood as incomplete norms with respect to the element of their structure) where sanction can not be found in a legal norm.
These especially refer to situations where a sanction is not contained in a given individual norm of a legal regulation, but the performance or non-performance can be enforced in connection with another legal norm of the same legal regulation or of the same legal branch or, as the case may be, even with another legal branch.
Further this refers to a situation where a sanction can not be found in the legal code – in such a case this really is an incomplete imperfect norm.
The third different situation is a state when it is potentially possible to connect a legal norm with an implicitly expressed sanction. However, the problem is in its real implementation which is so difficult that in fact the sanction is not practically used – this is not an incomplete norm but in fact rather an imperfect one or a state of ineffective action of a legal norm.
The role of sanction is in certain respect crucial in legal regulation. Its functions consist especially in the preventive – educational effect and the repression inevitably related thereto.
It is significant to differentiate between a sanction and state coercion (enforcement). Similarly, it is hardly imaginable to have a law without obligations or obligation without a law. The state coercion is a materially, institutionally and legally ensured possibility and often an obligation to move from a threat to factual coercion and enforcement“[9]. The objective law is unthinkable without state coercion, but an individual particular legal norm must contain a sanction in its structure.
But what should the sanctions be like? Drastic or soft? There is still the risk that too soft sanctions will be ridiculed and drastic ones will create a feeling of togetherness and sympathy with the punished offender instead of identification with the sanctioner which is necessary for efficient functioning of the system. In case of sanctions which have the support of the public opinion, the problem of aequitas (equity) emerges in even stronger way. Then the sanction must be appropriate with respect to both the state interest in the observance of a legal norm as well as to the objective context under which the offence was committed, the subject of legal provisions and the person of the offender.
The law is definitely constructed as a negative motivating factor, above all as an obstacle to an activity in the form of a sanction. Nevertheless it is possible and necessary to hold considerations referring to positive sanctions the existence of which would contribute or does contribute to the preventive effect of law.
At the same time, the sanctions must be adequately tough. Some specific cases, although only isolated ones, of incorrectly set sanctions for certain actions or inconsistencies which the public does not identify with, strongly upset the functionality of the entire system.
Above all it is necessary to state, that too soft sanctions do not contribute to the effectiveness of observance of legal norms and usually result in low prestige of the law.
But it is also equally dangerous or harmful to judge or assess come actions as illegal and to punish them by sanctions if this refers to some situations resulting from the ordinary everyday life or from “excusable absent-mindedness” – negligence (such as some fines resulting from the road traffic).
The opposite of the above situation can be seen in sanctions which are set too tough or in punishing people for actions which are not considered as worthy of retribution in the eyes of the public. This may provoke the following kind of response – if it is punishable then let the degree of my actions be significant, “let it be worth it”
Similarly, a significant moment can be seen in the inevitability, speed and impossibility to avert the sanction to be applied. The effect of sanctions must be inevitable and must definitely be free of any exceptions.
A significant motivating stimulus induced through a positive “sanction” is seen in reasonable setting of the possibility not to apply a sanction in case of averting or even correction of the adverse consequence resulting from the violation of a legal norm, such as those defined for various reasons in the penal code.[10]
In our opinion, a higher degree of effectiveness of the law can also
be achieved through ensuring permanent monitoring and evaluation system, which
will in time expose, motivate correspondingly or, in extreme cases, punishes or
temporarily or permanently eliminates individuals with inappropriate behaviour
– this means properly sanction-motivated
environment.
The awareness of the set parameters of sanction-motivated environment is another significant motivator in the subject’s selection of behaviour.[11]
2. Sanction in the historical
context
If we take a historical look at the issue of sanctions, we come to a slightly more complicated conclusion. While in a modern state the sanctions are elaborated, individualized and differ according to individual branches of law or according to their gradual genesis, in earlier times this was by far not the case.
2.1 Sanctions in pre-legal
systems
Tribalism had a very efficient system regulating its functioning as well as the life of every individual ensuring equality of the tribe’s members an protecting their freedom. Its nature is hard to express by our current established terminology. The main problem lay in the fact that the people of that time did not perceive any differences between the secular and the religious, the public and the private, between the economic, moral, legal or ritual. As is documented by some sources and as can be derived from some of the features of later development, the normative system was quite compact and unified for them. The difference between rituals accompanying each significant decision or important activity of the tribe members, the “legal” rules (such as those providing for the use of land or defining the punishment of an offender against this system), religious norms, moral rules, regular daily regimen in individual seasons of the year, rules governing farming activities during the entire year (ploughing, sowing, harvesting) or the established ways of conducting a fight or a hunt, were not perceived at all at that time. All rules contained in it were perceived as equal and they constituted an inseparable unity. The basic value of this system was seen in the conviction that the ancestors “had ever before” followed these established rules and that these rules protected them from the ever present danger and ensured them the preservation and prosperity of the tribe. Therefore this system can be most aptly depicted as a family tradition.
What caused the above mentioned effectiveness of the normative system in tribalism? Its tremendous strength lay in the fact that people observed it as something supernatural, matter-of-course and permanent and they feared any intervention in the system. Each disruption of the established order, each deviation from the established processes be it caused by natural forces or by individuals, either big or small from our point of view, such as a natural disaster, belated performance of farming work, defiance of an individual against the will of the tribe, non-observance of a set ritual or anything new brought about general uncertainty and was seen as a threat to the entire tribe as well as to each individual. Therefore if somebody disturbed the established order, he/she was facing the entire tribe, all its members. Therefore the entire tribe was the carrier of the sanction imposed on the offender against the family tradition.
2.2 Sanctions in the most
ancient legal systems
The law of the Great Moravian Empire - as well as the law of the Hungarian and Czech state - was created in a long-term, gradual and almost imperceptible process during which the military commanders (the princes) representing the decisive factor of power started to assert themselves and defy the traditional authority of family structures (people's assembly, the patriarchs) which oversaw the observance of traditional family and tribal rules of behaviour, relying on their military troops and appropriating the newly seized land. Increasingly, it was them who imposed penalties - for the violations (which they considered serious) of norms of a compact set of religious, moral, military or economic rules and rituals related to them, still undifferentiated by then. In a situation when this normative system was based on an unwritten tradition, they at the same time thy modified them by their decision-making activities, thus creating new norms of behaviour - as they punished actions previously generally tolerated or contrarily they protected from the tribal authorities the offenders against those traditions which they no more respected. The most pronounced expression of defiance of the princes against the family tradition and at the same time a proof of the prevalence of their power could be seen in our countries in their embracing of Christianity.
In the process of formation of economic and social relations, the unified normative system of the society - the tribal tradition - started to divide internally. The norms the observance of which was enforced by the authorities of the newly formed state power (the prince, his retinue, royal officials), gradually started to be perceived as a separate set of norms - the law. Besides that, a complex of moral rules was being formed, the violation of which was still punished by a very efficient sanction in the form of condemnation on the part of the offender's closest environment (the family and relatives which soon became the basic element of social organization, village etc.). With respect to the close connection between the state power and Christianity, which was manifested, among other things, by the fact that the state promoted Christian principles by means of penal provisions, it was still a long way before it was possible to clearly distinguish between legal and religious norms.
In the Great Moravian Empire, a basically unified law was being applied for the entire population (with various local differences resulting from local customs respected even by the state authorities). Formally, the customary law was prevailing significantly, largely transformed from the family tradition of the pre-state period. It was the ruler who was the lawmaker (legislator) who, still rather sporadically, consciously created new rules of behaviour. His normative acts, the contents of which he consulted with the people surrounding him were announced orally before his retinue or at the assembly of the country’s leaders.[12]
For the sake of simplicity, we will attempt to explain the
development of sanctions in the following evolution of medieval law using above
all the penal law since it is just this branch of law, where the system of
sanctions is best observable.[13]
2.3 Principles and
institutes of the medieval law
The penal law arose from the ancient institute of self-power (self-help), which reflected a situation when attacks on life, health, honour and property had to be punished by the affected person himself or by the people immediately surrounding him. In the spirit of this approach, the early medieval centralized state protected its representatives through repression, or they personally protected their privately perceived interests and newly promoted ideology – the Christianity. The penalty for other offences further remained an issue of private activities of the affected party. Regarding the actions taken against the offenders, the cultivating influence of Christian morality was perceptible here.
Only later, as the functions of the state were extended, its representatives attempted to limit self-power and to transfer the administration of justice to their own hands. Initially, they only offered the injured party a chance, if the party saw it as more convenient, to ask the public authorities for the punishment of the offender. As the administrative apparatus was growing stronger and the network of judicial authorities expanded, the medieval state strived to also penalize all private offences therefore it limited and banned the self-power i.e. the extrajudicial use of violence against an offender. From the 14th century the use of self-power itself became a punishable offence of aggression and power. At the same time, the royal officials started, on behalf of the state and official initiative (ex offo, ex officio) i.e. without waiting for a private suit of the injured party, to penalize and punish also the offenders who committed offences affecting first of all individuals and were not immediately directed against the state and other public institutions. It is remarkable, but quite logical in the spirit of medieval logic, that as early as in the 12th century the public interest in the punishment of the offender was demonstrated in the offence of theft and robbery, while killing of a person started to be prosecuted as an official duty much later on. That, on the one hand, demonstrates the importance attributed to the new proprietary relations and on the other hand it documents how small a value was attributed to human life by the medieval society.
In the decisions of Czech medieval courts, we can find a whole range of very diverse sanctions – punishments. The way of punishing people was basically decided on the basis of discretion and according to the demands of the suing party. The cruelty of the punishments applied testifies to the fact that they were a tool a revenge, intimidation and discouragement of other possible offenders. Very often, the courts imposed the death penalty in a very “inventive way” (by decapitation, hanging, burning at the stake, burying alive, quartering), which were made even more severe by previous torture or crippling. The perpetrators having committed minor offences were sentenced to crippling and corporeal punishments (beating, whipping), also complemented in a variety of ways. Also proprietary punishments were used from fines of different amounts to confiscation of the entire property. Especially in earlier times, collective punishments were common (of all villagers in a village where a crime had been committed and the perpetrator of which was not found) and also collective execution of the sentences were practiced (the entire village stoning the perpetrator). The Czech law also used an equivalent of German wergeld (penance, repentance). The Decrees of Bretislav issued in the 11th century introduced the punishment of expulsion from the country instead of selling into slavery. Gradually, the sentence of temporary or life imprisonment and penal servitude became widely used, which had been quite uncommon until then. Some of the punishments were also connected with public humiliation (pillorying, branding, cutting the hair etc.). Other ones continued to contain the element of personal revenge since under certain conditions the self-power was admissible (for example a husband who caught his wife being unfaithful, was also allowed to kill her lover). Some of the punishments were related to the character or manner of the offences committed: an arsonist was burned, a blasphemer‘s tongue was torn out, the hand of a person drawing a sword in a public office was cut off and the like. We can see the symbolism of the punishment here. The extent and level of punishment also clearly illustrates the differences in the social status of individuals. Let’s demonstrate this on the offence of insult by slap in the face. If a nobleman insulted another nobleman of equal rank in front of the king or in the country court, such offender was punished in the spirit of revenge by being left at the mercy of the insulted one. Koldín attempted to introduce a certain system in the punishments. According to their origin, he classified the punishments set by law (poenae ordinariae) and the punishments imposed according to the discretion of the judge (poenae extraordinariae). He classified the punishments according to their kind as follows: the death penalty, proprietary punishments, loss of honour, expulsion and temporary of life imprisonment.[14]
The punishment of perpetrators at large running away
from justice was ensured by outlawing. A person who was known to commit
proprietary crimes or to pose a threat to the public order was declared an
outlaw thus losing any protection from the part of public power. The immovable
property of such person was therefore forfeited and passed to the king, the
movables were left at the disposal of anybody, anybody was allowed to kill this
person, also the marital and family relations were cancelled.[15]
2.4 Penal
sanctions after the battle of Bílá hora
In the early absolutist era, similarly to the previous
periods, the penal law was provided for by the regulations applicable for
individual social classes. The urban law still relied on the Koldín’s
legal code. In the municipal law, the change of regime enforced new
codification in the form of Restored provincial establishments. Solidification
of the relations regarding the land and nobility was reflected in the newly
adopted peasant rules and in the instructions for the nobility officials.
Naturally, in the Restored establishments, above all
the provisions regarding political offences were changed. A novelty, which
immediately captures our attention when reading through their penal provisions,
is the promotion of the ruler to the post of the only representative of the
state and increased protection of his person. As the representative of the
state, he was protected by the provisions regarding the insult of the ruler in
which, besides other things, the actions posing a threat to the ruler’s new
prerogatives (arrogating the ruler’s rights, calling the assembly without his
approval, proposing laws). Severe punishments were also applicable for the
participants of rebellions or uprisings against the ruler as well as for those
who refused to provide help to him. In the penal proceedings the principle of
official duty was applied, which means that the state authorities had an
official duty to prosecute and penalize the perpetrators without waiting for a
private suit to be filed. The oral judicial proceedings were replaced by a
written form.
A crucial turn in the development of the outer form of
penal law applied in our territory (the sources of penal law) occurred in the
early 1800’s when Joseph I issued a penal code for the Czech countries
(1707/1708, Constitutio criminalis Josephina). Constitutio criminalis Josephina
was the first separate penal code issued in the Czech countries (Austria had
its separate penal code since the half of the 17th century). It
unified the Czech penal law both in the territorial and personal sense. In
terms of its contents, it was based on the earlier domestic tradition (the
spirit of the provisions of the penal law did not start to change substantially
until under the rule of Joseph II).
The codification of Joseph I and the older Austrian
provisions were replaced by a single Austro-Bohemian legal code of Maria
Theresa (1768/1769, Constitutio criminalis Theresiana). Its provisions applied, for the last time, the
medieval concept of material and procedural penal law. Its creator was also
inspired by the renowned legal code of Charles V issued after the peasant
uprising in Germany (Constitutio criminalis Carolina). The state of facts
constituting crimes was often formulated very vaguely by the authors. They
perceived the punishments as a means of retaliation and discouragement,
therefore the perpetrators were facing cruel penalties which were often
symbolically related to the way the offences were committed and the punishments
were ostentatiously executed in public. Very frequently, the death penalty was
imposed being executed similarly to medieval times, in varied ways and
accompanied by cruel aggravations still using crippling and corporeal
punishments.[16]
The medieval institutes of the Terezian legal code
were provoking displeasure and resistance in a society increasingly influenced
by the concepts of natural law. Therefore Maria Theresa strived to eliminate at
least the most blatant excesses: she reserved the right to be presented with
all cases of charges of witchcraft and prevented the use of torture (1773
internally, 1776 officially).
2.5
Beginnings of the new concept of sanctions
The modern era of penal law and penal procedure
started by the legislation of Joseph II. His General legal code regarding
crimes and punishments issued in 1787 was based on the principle of lawfulness
(nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege). Since that moment on, it was
possible to prosecute only those actions which were explicitly specified in the
law as punishable and it was only possible to impose a punishment which a
corresponding law prescribed or anticipated. The legal code did not allow to
impose a death penalty in the regular proceedings. Among its advantages were
its completeness, legislative and technical refinement, briefness and clarity,
among the shortcomings were cruel corporeal punishments and long-term
imprisonments moreover served in inhumane conditions (in a way paradoxically
given by the new perception of punishment as a correctional means).
The positive features of the legal code of Joseph II
became the basis for the Code on crimes and serious police offences issued in
1803 providing for the material law and penal process. A death penalty (by
hanging) or jailing (of 6 months to 20 years), imprisonment for offences (24
hours to 6 months), loss of rights, pecuniary penalties, forfeiture of an
asset, beating, fasting or as the case could be also banishment after the
execution of punishments were imposed. Once again we must mention that the legal
code also contained procedural rules.
We see the issuing of the legal code in 1803 as the
crucial moment on the way to the definitive legal provisions of Austrian penal
material law applied in the Czech countries also in the first half of the 20th
century. The penal code issued in 1852 which was then in effect for almost one
hundred years was nothing more but a mildly altered modernization of the
previous legal code.
2.6 Sanctions in
the modern penal law
The roots of the modern penal material law, similarly to the roots of private law, can be traced back to the absolutist era. The development of the modern concept of penal law was started by the law on crimes and their punishments by Joseph II and continued in the form of penal code issued in 1803 regarding crimes and serious police offences.
By the revision of material legal provisions of the law from 1803, the penal code (No. 117) was created in 1852, which remained in effect throughout the entire following period and was later applied also in Czechoslovakia until 1950.
The severest punishment in the system of punishments was the death penalty executed by hanging. A very severe punishment imposed as well as the death penalty, for serious crimes was the jail sentence. According to the conditions under which the sentence was served, two degrees were distinguished while the second degree (penal servitude) was served with shackles on the legs and in solitary confinement. Imprisonment was divided, according to the duration, to temporary (6 months to 20 years) and life imprisonment. The sentence was served in the municipal jails, the buildings of some of them are still being used for correctional purposes. The jails were located in Bory near Pilsen, in Kartouzy (Valdice) near Jicin, in Mírov in the north of Moravia, in Prague (St. Wenceslaus prison) and in Řepy u Prahy. The misdemeanours and minor offences were punished by fines, forfeiture of an asset, loss of rights and permissions, by imprisonment, corporeal punishments (beating or scourge, banned from 1867) or by expulsion or expatriation from the lands of the crown. Foreigners could be punished by expulsion from all countries of the federation. Imprisonment imposed by the court could last from 24 hours to 6 months and was served in regional jails. According to the conditions under which the sentence was served there were again two degrees of jail. Under the second one, the prisoners were fasted, forced to work and kept in solitary confinement.[17]
As we have mentioned before, the penal law codified in 1852 did undergo certain development but in its substance it became outdated only in the era of socialism, when it was done away with within the so called legal two-year plan.
[1] Compare Kelsen, H.: Všeobecná teorie norem. Brno, Masaryk University 2000, s. 16
[2] Grahn, W.: Die Rechtsnorm. Leipzig, 1979, s. 6
[3] Chytil, V.: Norma a postulát. Sborník prací k narozeninám Karla Engliše. Barvič&Novotný, Brno a Orbis, Praha 1930, s. 508
[4] Knapp, V. a kol.: Teoretické otázky tvorby československého práva. Praha, Academia, 1983, s. 26
[5] Gerloch, A.: Teorie práva. Plzeň, Aleš Čeněk, 2007, s. 32
[6] Weyr, F.: Teorie práva. Praha – Brno, Orbis 1936, s. 34
[7] Holländer, P.: Poznámky ke struktuře a pojmu právní normy, Právník, 7/1993, s. 575
[8] Weinberger, O.: Norma a instituce (Úvod do teorie práva). Brno 1995, s. 46
[9] Hungr, P. - Prusák, J.: Objektivní a subjektivní právo. Brno, UJEP 1983, s. 65
[10] As provided for by the provision of art. 163 of law No. 140/1961. of the Penal Code as subsequently amended: The punishability of bribery (art 161) and indirect bribery (art 162) expires if the offender gave or promised a bribe only because he/she was asked to do so and immediately informed the public prosecutor or a police autority.
[11] Srov. Budský, R. – Kohout: Projekt TWIST (System of training and examination of drivers, youth training in the area of road traffic and motivating environment in European countries), AZIN CZ, Praha 2008 striving, besides other things, to point to the significance, role and effectiveness of sanctions in road traffic.
[12] Compare. Kizlink, K.: Právo Velké Moravy, Právnické štúdie, XVII, 1969
[13] For more to this see especially Francek, J.: Zločin a trest v českých dějinách, Praha 1999
[14] Compare. Malý, K.: K českému trestnímu právu 15. – 16. století, Praha 1962; Malý, K.: Trestní právo v Čechách v 15. – 16. století, Praha 1979
[15] Compare Vlček, E.: Dějiny trestního práva v českých zemích a v Československu, Brno, Masarykova univerzita 1993
[16] For more to this see especially Pinz, J.: Trest smrti v pohledu historickém a přirozenoprávním, Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi, 2, 1994, č. 1, s. 64 – 72.
[17] Compare for example Slavíček, J.: Úvod ve studium trestního hmotného práva, Praha 1866