The Theoretical Foundations of Nuclear Terrorism

Anush Sarkisian

Donetsk National University

The Theoretical Foundations of Nuclear Terrorism

Nuclear terrorism is often downplayed by scholars and experts as a minimal threat to international security. This sense of complacency derives, in part, from the historical absence of a nuclear terrorist incident. Further resistance to the notion of nuclear terrorism may also stem from wishful thinking. That is, the hope to avoid the fear and anxiety generated by nuclear terrorism may lead to its being cast aside as highly unlikely. Critics of those who propose the plausibility of nuclear terrorism often argue that the use of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with or disproportionate to terrorist goals.

The theoretical framework assumes for heuristic purposes that terrorists are rational actors. The application of the rational actor model is accomplished with full appreciation for the debate surrounding the concept. No attempt is made to assess or interpret pure rational or irrational behavior. Similar to those who adopt variations of the rational actor model, this study does not view rationality as a one-dimensional concept that moves from the irrational to rational.[i] Rather, rationality is employed in the sense that systemic actors are sensitive to costs in decision-making.[ii] The application of the rational actor model to terrorists will lead to a challenge to those who suggest that the spread of nuclear weapons may promote stability.[iii] These advocates maintain that new proliferators will be encouraged to behave cautiously once a nuclear capability is achieved. This proposal is flawed, however, in that it fails to address the issue of deterrence failure. It is important to recognize that the rational actor model helps to predict how actors should act, not how they will act. Too often the issue of nuclear interaction is approached with a false certainty. In reality, it is arguably plagued by uncertainty.

a. rational actor model

The assumption of rationality asserts that systemic actors have externally driven preference and choice options. Accordingly, actors seek to optimize preferences with respect to the choices of other actors. Variation in outcomes is a function of differing opportunities. Actors usually have options in the course of decision-making, each of which has different costs and benefits. Importantly, however, these decisions are often made under conditions of uncertainty.[iv] Access to complete information about alternatives and resources is elusive, thereby prohibiting the review of all possible courses of action. When actions are based on poor decisions, there is an inherent cost that may cause one to fare badly relative to other actors.[v] Therefore, the assumption of rationality integrates the time and information constraints of bounded rationality, which stresses the importance of reaching a satisfactory solution, and, elements of limited rationality, which strive to connect ends with means under conditions of uncertainty. [vi]

Survival is a prerequisite for achieving any goal, short of self-destruction, and plays a fundamental role in the calculations of cost-sensitive actors.[vii] Terrorist organizations, like states, seek to ensure their own survival. This does not preclude, however, risking survival in an attempt to secure a particular goal. Ultimately, the expected benefits may outweigh expected costs, even if these costs may risk survival. In nuclear terms, risk acceptance was illustrated with the Cuban missile crisis. The Kennedy administration risked a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union by imposing a naval blockade and by demanding the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Cuba. By contrast, risk avoidance is delineated by the recent American agreement with North Korea. The accord outlines a 10-year timetable for dismantling North Korean nuclear facilities and halts inspections of those facilities for the next five years.[viii] Despite a Halted capability at best, the United States chose a strategy of accommodation rather than the acceptance of risk.

b. structural realism

Given the assumption of terrorist rationality, a structural level of analysis readily facilitates the integration of terrorists, nation-states, and nuclear strategy. Hence, like state actors, terrorists are analyzed in terms of ordering principles, specifications of functions between differentiated units, and the distribution of capabilities across units.[ix] Grievances advanced by terrorists are a function of the environment in which they exist. The goals and strategies of terrorists are constrained or facilitated by systemic factors. Perceived success or failure is contingent upon interaction with other systemic actors.

The decision to adopt the structural approach does not discount the utility of organizational or other levels of analysis. The comprehensive analysis of any political interaction will typically involve a synthesis of unit, organizational, and structural levels. Yet, it seems prudent to analyze first the influences of the international system prior to investigating peculiarities relevant to individual organizations or units. This logic is supported by Kenneth Waltz in his discussion of political structures. Waltz argues that structural analysis protects research from becoming skewed by actor personality, behavior, and interaction, thereby permitting a purely positional picture of society. From this assertion he advances three hypotheses. First, structures may persist while personality, behavior, and interaction vary. Second, given certain modifications, structural definitions can be applied to substantially different medium, provided that the arrangement of parts is similar. Finally, the reality of the first two propositions allows for theoretical application between different types of structures."

The theoretical framework, therefore, controls for incentives, characteristics, and interaction of specific organizations and individuals. It facilitates a means to analyze terrorism and nuclear strategy, and to evaluate the implications for strategic interaction. It readily accommodates the integration of non-state actors and state actors into one of the accepted theories of international relations.