Филологические науки/ 7. Язык. Речь. Речевая коммуникация

Doctor of Philological Science Kudryashov I.A.

Southern Federal University, Russia

On pragmatic contexts of commissive speech act functioning

The investigation of actually commisive speech acts realization conditions displayed that they are functioning as the means of achieving various social aims depending from their pragmatic contexts which are revealed on the basis of the following criteria: 1) affiliation of illocutive indicators either to proactive or reactive interlocutor; 2) motivation character; 3) utterance ultimate purpose; 4) dialogue pragmatic structure. The communication involving commissives is realized in two types of pragmatic contexts: 1) the mandatory assistance context and 2) the pre-contract and contract commitment context. In the context of the first type the commissives according to their perlocutive parameter could be used in two ways: to cause expectation and additionally 1) convincing of the intention sincerity and 2) calming down / convincing not to worry.

The commitment-assistance context is typical for the situation of «prompting – adoption of the action» where the initiative interlocutor with a directive speech act expresses interest in the action sought and the addressee fixates his / her attitude to the directive act with the help of commissive means (the requested commitment). Sometimes in structural terms the commissive means are used initiatively (the non-requested commitment). In this case the interlocutor making a commitment presupposes or knows about the partner’s wish relative to performing the corresponding action. From the point of view of interlocutors’ behavior motivational conditionality this kind of situation could also be related to the commitment – assistance context. As an illustration we’ll display the commissives functioning as a promise and oath in the commitment-assistance context.

The promise having paradigm organizing status in the commissives system is represented in the commitment-assistance context with the following subtypes: 1) neutral promise; 2) promise-assurance; 3) promise-concession. The neutral promise as well as promise-assurance could be both requested and non-requested. The promise-concession is always requested.

The following dialogue chunk between a dad and his son contains the son’s requested neutral promise, exactly a promise in reply to the dad’s request-moralizing note:

(1) “Mr. Shaw: Good-bye, love, and a bit less of that joking. Andrew: Aye, aye, I promise that. Good-bye, Dad…” (Storey D. In Celebration).

The non-requested neutral promise as a reaction to a more or less wide situation which semantically condensing becomes the presupposition defining the dialogic actualization of taking a commitment is represented in the example (2). Reardon, the Shows’ neighbor, requests a permission to pay a visit to them knowing that Mr. and Mrs. Show’s sons are leaving in the morning and presupposing that there will be a chance to cancel the departure:

(2) “Reardon: I shall pop in, if I may, in the morning, and say my farewells. Andrew: Aye, We’ll have one more before we go. Reardon: Now there’s a promise I’ll not forget…” (Storey D. In Celebration).

The aim of the promise-assurance is to convince the interlocutor in the sincerity of one’s intention of committing the future action. The assurance in fulfilling the future action is the promise which is aimed simultaneously at changing the interlocutor’s current emotional and psychological state that is doubts in speaker’s sincerity, disturbance, emotional arousal, resentment, grievance and disappointment. In the initiative replica of the example (3) we witness the elements of doubts in the fact that after the parting Emily, George’s beloved girl, will remember about him and write letters to him. This is certified by both the interrogative request construction and the clause of condition which predetermines the reactive requested promise-assurance:

(3) “George: Emily, if I go away to State Agriculture College next year, will you write me a letter once in a while? Emily: I certainly will. I certainly will, George…” (Wilder T. Our Town).

The promise-concession occupies the intermediate position between the commitment-assistance context and the pre-contract and contract commitment context. With the first context type it is connected through the concession semantics as the commitment-assistance. This subtype of promise indeed functions in the conditions when initiative interlocutor persuades the addressee that he / she should fulfill the action in his / her interests. On persuading the addressee the interlocutor is eager to secure the addressee’s commitment. The example (4) represents the dialogue chunk which contains a demand not to fulfill an action expressed with to be to, an equivalent of the modal verb must, and a request about a promise. The reactive interlocutor goes on concession and males a promise:

(4) “Anite: Norman, look. I’m going to say something. But you’re not to look at me while I’m saying it… do you promise?.. Norman: …Won’t look… (Ayckbourn A. Round and Round the Garden).

The oath is a solemn taking commitment which fulfills the pragmatic functions similar with the promise and differs from the promise by its semantic load. In the commitment-assistance context the oath is represented with the following subtypes: 1) oath promise-assurance; 2) oath promise-concession; 3) mutual oath. For example, the oath promise-assurance follows the answers on the initiative replicas which in addition to imperative semantics contain the semantics of doubt, disturbance, distrust and mild rebuke. Cf.:

(5) “Lady C.: … Come back once more, you promised! John: I’ll come back. I swear it” (S. Beauman. Dark Angel).

In the pre-contract and contract commitment context the promise is used by an asking non-authoritarian person who in case of refusal, hesitation, doubts or with preventive aims reinforces his / her request with condition-commitment, the basic purpose of which is to interest the interlocutor in committing the action requested, that is to strike a balance of mutual interests. This is the situation of persuading / convincing, but of the pre-contract or contract type. In the example (6) the utterance with the verb promise which accompanies Dangerfield’s request to lend him money is interpreted as a conventional promise with the reasoning to provide debt return in the precisely specified time. The request about the promise is implicit in this case, but it is conventionally presupposed. That is why the asking interlocutor declares about it himself. Cf.:

(6) “Dangerfield: Look, Kenneth, I know this is rather an impromptu request, but could you possibly let me have ten quid. O’Keffe: I’m getting out of here. Dangerfield: Beg you, Kenneth, stay. Don’t let me drive you like this out of my little oasis of refreshment and joy. Kenneth, ten quid, promise to have it to you in four days, be right here when you arrive. No questions about that. Airtight loan. My father’s sending me a hundred quid Tuesday…” (King F. The Firewalkers).

The observation of the speech act realization conditions in such important communication sphere as guaranteeing the fulfillment of the future action with the application of interactional parameter displays that the commissives in the commitment-assistance context function as real commitments, and in the pre-contract and contract commitment context as conditional commitments. Thus, different pragmatic contexts define their different semantics. The interactional analysis also states that commissive illocutionary acts are the means of achieving social and communicative aim of convincing. Real commitments are taken for convincing intention sincerity, conditional commitments are taken for persuading that the interlocutor should do something.