Экономические науки/2. Внешнеэкономическая деятельность

к.э.н. Масакова С.С.

старший преподаватель Исмагулова А.А.

Университет «Нархоз», Казахстан

к.э.н. Читанова С.О.

Казахский государственный университет международных отношений и мировых языков имени Абылай хана, Казахстан

ECONOMIC SECURITY PROBLEMS OF KAZAKH-CHINESE RELATIONS

Directly connected with the economic security of the relations between Kazakhstan and China is the problem the Chinese labor migration to Kazakhstan, as well as "settling" of Chinese citizens in the country. Labor migration is quite natural consequence of the process of economic globalization. The conclusion to be drawn from this: the Chinese labor migration is the objective reality to be reckoned with. At the same time it is necessary to create the possibility of obtaining legal status to those Chinese citizens who invest in the country's economy are highly qualified professionals in various fields, actually contribute to the development of not only economic, but also cultural and educational ties between the two countries.

Likewise is the situation with the Chinese presence in the oil and gas sector of Kazakhstan. Indeed, the indisputable fact is that to date, Chinese companies control about 35% of oil production in Kazakhstan. And though, at first, it does not go to any comparison with the share of foreign companies in the oil and gas sector of the country. Secondly, the mining contracts signed with the Chinese side, on the order of magnitude better than signed with Western companies. Third, all the volumes of crude oil to China Kazakhstan will go to the oil pipeline "Atasu - Alashankou", which is quite an impressive amount for transit. Finally, China has gained in the offshore registered private companies on a rather favorable conditions for their owners, and the first question should be: how and under what conditions these assets are in private hands.

The current labor law in Kazakhstan requires the MNC to employ a certain percentage of local staff during the implementation of their energy projects. One item of labor law, for example, requires the MNC to employ 70% of top management in Kazakhstan of local staff; 90% of skilled workers (eg engineers) must also be from Kazakhstan; and 100% of laborers hired to work in the oil and gas fields, must have the citizenship of Kazakhstan. Due to the fact that finding skilled workers for highly technical Kashagan and Tengiz fields to the growing and Karaganchak very difficult, the performance of all three of these positions has been delayed until 2015. A Chinese NOCs continued to employ a lot more of their own, the Chinese employees, rather than local.

The content of local laws and regulates the acquisition of equipment for power projects in Kazakhstan. Subsoil Act of 2010 requires subsoil users to buy a certain percentage of their equipment in Kazakhstan producers. For example, if the subsoil user violates this law, the government has the right to terminate the contract on subsoil use. Chinese NOCs have found ways to circumvent this law, for example, when purchasing equipment from Chinese companies, bypassing customs controls by importing equipment disassembled and labeling him "The equipment for Kazakhstan", and then collecting the equipment on arrival in Kazakhstan.

The lack of public information and the ability to predict how the government of Kazakhstan will respond to changing conditions, will predict how will be affected MNCs interests. Western oil companies are likely to retain their position in relation to the prevailing Chinese NOCs in Kazakhstan's oil production for a long time, but this fact does not exclude the possibility that MNCs will face more stringent regulatory environment.

China faces energy security problem associated with the rapid growth of domestic demand for oil, the rate of decline in oil production in the country, and over-reliance on oil imports from politically unstable regions. In order to ensure an uninterrupted supply of energy resources, the Chinese government has adopted two energy strategies.

   First of all, the government called national oil companies to expand investment in production on a global scale, either through equity participation in the concession agreements, either through cooperation with international and local companies in the field of mining. The second strategy has served as a gradual increase in China's influence in the world, in addition to its access to oil supplies from producer countries. Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank) has granted a number of "loans-for-oil" - soft loans with low interest rates - in exchange for oil deliveries under the contract or share in oil assets in repayment. The volume of these loans and their conditions are often better and cheaper than the loans that may be offered by Western or Russian Bank for Development.

   Since the economic downturn, China has provided a number of large "loans-for-oil", including one - in Kazakhstan, providing him the ownership of the assets of the energy sector in 2009. China Eximbank has provided the state Development Bank of Kazakhstan (DBK) to $ 5 billion, while China National Petroleum Corporation ('s CNPC), has provided an additional $ 5 billion loan "KazMunayGas" (KMG) for the financing of a number of oil projects. CNPC Loans secured a Chinese oil company a 50 percent stake in the "Mangistaumunaigas" (MMG), the largest at that time a private oil and gas company in Kazakhstan. In addition to this,'s CNPC won the right to half of the oil produced MMG, while the remaining 50% of battered "KazMunayGas". According to the US Energy Information Service (EIA), the total amount of "loans-for-oil" is more than $ 90 billion worldwide.

   Since 2008, China enjoys a key advantage over its competitors in the global oil and gas acquisitions of assets: an unprecedented foreign exchange reserves. As soon as the global asset prices have decreased after the recession in 2008, China took advantage of an increase in the purchasing power of its currency reserves to increase the acquisition of assets abroad. These leading national oil companies (NOCs) as CNPC and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 50-100% stake in fifteen energy companies were purchased in Kazakhstan. Today, run by Chinese companies is around 25-30% of production in Kazakhstan, they are active in twenty joint ventures, five of which - with the "KazMunayGas" and hold the stock refinery in Atyrau and Shymkent.

As for the future, then it is possible to speak only in thesis. It is certain that in the short-term alternative to the presence of the Chinese commodity is not visible in Kazakhstan, therefore, economic and trade cooperation will continue to gain momentum. The program for the foreseeable future in this area - bringing order to the structure of trade and economic exchange in the upward part of the production; harmonization of customs legislation and accounting practices of the foreign trade turnover of Kazakhstan and China; reduction in corruption component in foreign trade operations.

It is obvious that China will continue to increase its presence in the oil and gas sector of the country.

Necessary to develop measures to neutralize the possible manifestations of China's expansionist policies and the involvement of other weighty players to ensure regional security. In this regard, within the next five years, more work is needed to address the following strategic objectives:

First. Limitation of the presence of Chinese companies in strategic sectors of the economy of Kazakhstan.

Given that in the medium term, the main instrument of China's policy in Central Asia will remain the economic expansion, it is necessary to limit the penetration of Chinese capital in strategically important branches of economy of Kazakhstan. It will take a thorough analysis of the structure and the intended accumulated in investing Chinese capital in the country for businesses, industries, regions. The development of relations with China, the main emphasis should be placed on the development of bilateral cooperation in the sphere of innovations. It is advisable to use the Chinese experience in the creation of technology parks, innovation centers, free economic zones, etc. Furthermore, it should encourage the direction of Chinese investment in this area.

Second. Control of demographic expansion.

Analysis of immigration from China indicates translational "quiet expansion", controlled China at the state level. Obviously, the gradual formation of the Chinese diaspora will continue, including the possible formation of "Chinatown." In this context, it seems appropriate to take measures to strengthen the legal framework for legal immigration with a simultaneous tightening of liability for violations of immigration laws. It is necessary to strengthen the infrastructure of the Kazakh-Chinese border, improvement of migration control of entry and residence on the territory of Kazakhstan, a clear distribution of powers and responsibilities of the relevant state bodies in this sphere.

Third. The diversification of bilateral trade structure.

Chinese goods exert serious pressure on the Kazakh market and hinder the development of domestic producers. In this connection, it should significantly improve control of the quality and volume of imported products from China, to limit imports of low-technology products, in particular, does not meet sanitary standards. To this end, it is necessary to fully exploit the potential of the Kazakh-Chinese intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in quality assurance and mutual certification of import-export goods. At the same time Kazakhstan should move away from the raw material orientation of exports and trade structure to achieve diversification.

Fourth. The active participation of Kazakhstan in the program of development of the western regions of China.

Kazakhstan on the eve of the transformation of Xinjiang in the conductor of the Chinese economic expansion should be considered Xinjiang, as a major regional market sales of Kazakh products. The priority element of Kazakhstan's policy in relation to China's Xinjiang is the water issue. This subject should be present in all the negotiations of the Kazakh side with Chinese partners. Measures should be taken to strengthen cooperation with the Kazakh Diaspora of Xinjiang, especially among managers and businessmen.

Fifth. Cooperation in the field of security.

It wanted to avoid broad involvement of the Chinese partner in Kazakhstan's security affairs. It is necessary to take into account the likelihood of pressure build-up by China at a military direction.

To sum up, in Kazakhstan, the foreign economic activity was carried out without regard for the public interest based on personal income. According to the above-mentioned materials, there are positive and negative sides that general foreign trade and cross-border trade between two countries brought to each other.

References:

1. Shlyindov A. V. Podnebesnayavyistavlyaetrubezhi // Nezavisimoevoennoeobozrenie, #42, 2011 g. S. 8.

2. Sarsekeev M. Natsionalnyie interesy I vneshnyaya politika Kazahstana//Evraziyskoe soobschestvo. 2002.#1. s. 13