Kalinina Larisa E

In the science of law the term "competition" is considered as the necessary element of the free market assuming the rivalry of entities. There was also the concept from Latin concurrere "face", "rival", which means a struggle in any field. Intraspecific selection is seen as a positive phenomenon, which allows to develop the most auspicious signs.

Unlike the biological competition, where the selection occurs according to the laws of nature, and strong-willed intervention of the person is not supposed to intervene, the economic competition implies the establishment of the general and transparent rules for each entity that independent actions of each of them is excluded or limited to the possibility of each of them to affect unilaterally the general terms of circulation of commodities in the relevant goods market[i].

In the constitutional state such rules are offered by the state in which the management is implemented by mastering, to interfere with the relationship in the market by increasing the share of one of the entities. What are the requirements for the arbitrator of social relations? May he "have" the same issue, as managed objects?

The established modern state and administrative relations in the Russian Federation are characterized by unbalance, lack of system communications and, in this regard, low efficiency of operating influence. Thus, it is impossible to implement a complex effect on the public relation. The gap between the state and the society increases from year to year, evoking distrust in society toward the state administration.

The original element is the state as the political superstructure of society. In the certain territory occupied by various groups, the state can be only one, and its policy and activity should be determined by the needs and interests of the population. The state through the bodies governing performs socially important functions.

The state administration is exercised by all state institutions. The constitution of the Russian Federation consolidates the separation of powers, thus reinforcing the independence of branches of government, therefore it is necessary to speak about system linkages between the legislative, executive and judicial power. Moreover, the very existence of system linkages is managerial.

The legislature, as an element of the democratic state, should be formed by society and bears responsibility before it for decisions made by the state. The executive power must be responsible before the legislature for the realization or non-realization of the accepted standards. The weakness of the legislative branch is caused not only by the weak development of the political system in the Russian Federation, but also by the absence of a clear installation that lawmaking is a professional activity. The result is low-quality laws, which mean the ability of either evasion of the norm implementation or its distortion in the process of the realization or the possibility of interpreting the rule with the other branches of government (administrative and judicial discretion).

It leads to the fact that operational activity of the state is not legislatively regulated and, the historically formed strong executive power gravitating to monopolization of the power, acquires new bodies and functions.

The judicial authority also yields in competitive fight to executive power. Thus, there is the redistribution of administrative functions under the idea of the principle of the protection of human rights and freedoms. For example: the executive authority does not wish to make the concrete decision that is the basis for an appeal to the court where the judge, in fact, establishing the need for this decision, carries out administrative functions. Therefore, the executive power imposes its functions on the judicial authority. Furthermore, if we take into account that the trial is financially more expensive, than administrative, more budgetary funds are used for the concrete social result. Strengthening of the executive power is promoted also by merging the institute of the President with it. As a matter of fact, there was a competition between the presidency and the head of the government institutes. This situation is promoted by standards of the statutory Constitution of the Russian Federation which, for example, vests the right of the President of the Russian Federation to preside over meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation (p. "с" of Art. 83), to annul decrees and orders of the Government of the Russian Federation (p. 3 of Art. 115 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation)[ii]. Due to the fact that the practical side of the functions of the Government Chairman of the Russian Federation by the President of the Russian Federation, the procedure of action, the distribution of powers between the President and the Prime Minister at the joint meetings are not legally regulated, shifting administrative functions towards the President of the Russian Federation. Not in favor of balance in state administration is said that the multilevel managerial links are built by by-laws. Thus, the regulations of the Government of the Russian Federation, providing for the Government of the Russian Federation the orders and instructions of the President of the Russian Federation[iii], makes it possible to assume that the Russian President has such authority. However, this conclusion is not supported by the legislatively established norms on the Presidency.

The system of state organs isn't limited to authorities. According to, art. 129 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation fixes prosecutor's office existence, as centralized system of the bodies supervising on behalf of the Russian Federation the observance of the Russian Constitution and the execution of laws[iv]. The very supervision is a management function. Unfortunately, there is no clear separation between control and supervision functions in the Russian management and its legal regulation. The analysis of the Federal law of 17 January 1992 No 2202-1 does not allow to identify the essence of the supervising activity: what is the observation, the checking?

The inadmissibility of intervention of public authorities in prosecutor's office activities (Art. 5 of the Federal law of 17 January 1992 No 2202-1) is unbalanced by certain restrictions. Requirements about the transparency of administrative processes do not apply to the prosecutor's office which is not a body of power. From this position, outside the legal framework there are test actions of the prosecutor's office of public authorities.

From this position, actions of the public prosecution checking public authorities are found outside the legal framework. According to, p. 2 art. 21 of the Federal Law of 17 January 1992 No 2202-1 checks of the law execution are carried out on the basis of the prosecutorial authorities receiving information about violations of laws that require the prosecution to take action[v]. However, the procedure of obtaining such information, the activity definition on the elicited facts are not legislatively settled. Besides, recently there was a situation that public prosecutor's supervision was exercised without a binding to the concrete facts of violation of laws, test actions representing a continuous control of activity (for example, for calendar year). In a difficult situation there were territorial bodies of the federal authority which exercised powers in two and more subjects. They experienced the supervising influence of prosecutors of territorial subjects of the Russian Federation where powers are realized, and also departments of the Prosecutor General's office in the federal districts coordinating plans of test actions. The activities can be carried out on the same basis.

In the administrative sphere it is possible to allocate the following reasons of the competition.

Firstly, there is a weak legal basis of state and administrative activity. Secondly, there is the historically developed distortion in favor of executive power.

Thirdly, one of the main reasons is the redistribution of public flows of funds. For any state organ funds are appropriated. From this point of view, the system of state bodies became similar to a financial pyramid.

In view of the aforementioned points it is possible to draw the following conclusions.

Firstly, the norms of the Constitution of state administration should be reviewed in terms of the system linkages.

Secondly, the recognition of the competition within the state administration system as existing, but unacceptable, will require decision-making for the problem elimination.

Thirdly, the operational and administrative activity in the country should not depend on the policy, and should be directed towards the organization of social life.