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 Polyakov E.M.*, Panchenko E.K.**

 

Voronezh State University, Russia

*PhD in Political Science; **Student of Political Science

 

Event analysis of the political conflict in Ukraine
(November 2013 - February 2014)

Political conflict in Ukraine began as a reaction of the population to an abrupt change in the course of the government and the president. Series of actions and miscalculations parties to the conflict have contributed to its deployment and escalation, which eventually led to many casualties, protracted multidimensional crisis and complicate the situation in the country.

For this conflict is typical diversity and multiplicity of actions of actors that need to organize, to assess the situation, identify the overall dynamics of the conflict, to follow the laws of its development and the styles of conflict behavior of the parties. To perform the above steps, we have used the method of event analysis, because it can help to systematize the behavior of conflict’s parties.

Confrontation of forces within the political system was a factor that influenced the development of warfare on the streets of Kiev and other Ukrainian cities. Thus, the subjects of the conflict were the presidency, as well as change or retain the constitutional rules of the political game.

During this event analysis was the action of two opposing parties, conventionally called the “authority” and “opposition” under consideration. Select the category name can be explained, revealing the main actors of these parties. The category of “authority” included: President Viktor Yanukovych, the Ukrainian government (including individual agencies), the Party of Regions (hereinafter – PR) as well as the Communist Party of Ukraine (hereinafter – CPU).

In the category of “opposition” includes: the opposition parties of the Verkhovna Rada (“Bat’kivshina”, “Udar”, “Svoboda”), as the main actors in intra-conflict (along with the President, the Government and the Party of Regions), as well as social structure “Maidan”, “Right sector” and many other members of the opposition presidential power during the study period. It is obvious that the executive branch, with an impressive support in parliament (PR, CPU), is concentrated in the hands of the parties to the conflict, included in the first category.

The chronological terms of this issue (21 November 2013 – 22 February 2014) due to key events in the studied conflict: 21 February, the government suspended the preparations for the signing of the Agreement with EU, which was the direct reason for the start of protests on 22 February PR and CPU went into opposition “new power”, and disappeared from the conflict one of its main subjects – Viktor Yanukovych. Thus, the objects of study are the opposing sides of the conflict, and the subject – attacks of the parties over the study period. Actions of the both sides are classified into physical and verbal, are also split into hostile, neutral and cooperation actions with respect towards each other.

It is important to note that during the analysis did not consider Ukrainian news sources, due to the situation, the information counter in a country where the media are distributed among interested in different outcomes conflict owners. The overall dynamics of the conflict can be represented graphically in the form of time series of indicators of physical shares hostile parties as a direct manifestation of the conflict.

Figure 1. Dynamics physical hostile actions “authority” and opposition”.
 

Given in Figure 1. Dynamics allows to empirically determine the beginning of the conflict escalation and radicalization (from 19 February), which contributed to the onset of the president's policy (January 16 adoption law toughening responsibility for illegal mass actions), and the actions of the opposition of a number of radicals.

Bivariate correlation coefficient of performance schedule is 0.51, suggesting that the average power of direct communication. We can therefore conclude that, despite the close relationship of action, physical hostile actions were not always in response to the opponent's actions, which can be clearly seen in the graph.

Table 1. The results of the event analysis.

From the above table shows the prevalence of verbal actions by the “authority” is especially interesting that the total number of shares aimed at cooperation in virtually equal to the number of hostile. From this we can conclude the apparent indecision “Udar” party to the conflict, as well as the lack of a clear plan of action. At the same time, shares of verbal “opposition” have the double advantage of hostile actions. Moreover, the number of shares of hostile verbal grew during each month.

Among verbal shares “authority” dominated neutral. This distribution can be explained by numerous verbal procedures (applications, references, etc.) the president and his supporters, both parties to the conflict, and in the process of executing a job (Ministerial Declaration, the President's address, etc.). Neutral verbal action “opposition” prevailed during December and January, giving primacy hostile shares in February, when the conflict radicalized.

Analyzing stocks Cooperation (verbal and physical) parties to the conflict, it should be noted a clear superiority of such actions on the part of the “authority”. It clearly says that in the process of deepening contradictions and escalating tensions (January-February), the president's supporters tried to broaden the dialogue to find a compromise with the “opposition”. In January, the opposition supporters as actively moving toward cooperation with the president and his supporters, in February this trend is changing towards demonstrate greater activity and interest in the de-escalation, resulting in a compromise reached on February 21. Considering the overall “contribution’ of the two main parties to the conflict, optimally present it graphically. Visualization of time series of indicators facilitate comparison.

Histogram 1. Cumulative index shares the president's supporters.

Histogram 2. The aggregate shares of opposition supporters.

From the above histograms obvious increase hostile actions of the parties, however, while the “opposition” continued to increase the number of hostile actions, the president's supporters reduced him. Also evident in the graphs above argument about the growth potential of cooperation in opposition, but set a maximum aggregate hostile actions that can be attributed to a split among the opposition forces, in particular the non-recognition of the armistice the president and opposition factions nationalist organization “Right sector”, which was mobilized during considerable period (January-February).

Comparing the figures of hostility and cooperation of the both side of conflict, represented in the Histogram 1 and 2, we can see, that the growth of tension and deepening contradictions (as a consequence of the strengthening of the forces of the opposition) supporters of the president increasingly reluctant to cooperate. This trend actually ends in January, when the hostile actions of the parties reach parity, suggesting that the work of the above patterns in the opposite direction, leading to an increase in the tendency to cooperate in the “opposition”.

Taking into account that the figures do not reflect the histograms in the balance of power should be considered a convention of such a law. Despite the large number of hostile actions “opposition” in February, it should be remembered that the security forces, which had long been in a state of defense, periodically go on the offensive to recapture that often failed to opposition forces. In many ways, this factor, namely the real power factor, played a role in the growth index of cooperation “opposition”.

Thus, on February 22 after fleeing Yanukovych and the balance of forces of the opposing sides, the conflict appeared extinguished, keeping a dangerous potential for future deployment. Actually, the current events in Ukraine are also a consequence of unresolved conflict.

Based on the identified conflict behavior style of opposition supporters, can be considered a natural methods new central government (the former opposition) to resolve the contradictions in the south-east of Ukraine at the moment, as well as determination and lack of alternative views on the current problematic situation, which was awarded after the escalation of the conflict in January-February 2014.

 

References:

1. N. Zinets, P.Polityk. Khronologiya – Ukrainskiy “Evromaidan” (Chronology – the Ukrainian “Euromaidan”). http://ru.reuters.com/article/topNews/idRUMSE9BG03Q 20131217?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true.– Date Views: 25.04.14

2. Tekushie sobytia na Ukraine (Current events in Ukraine). http://www.gazeta.ru/subjects/ukraina_es.shtml.– Date Views: 27.04.14

3. Krisis na Ukraine (Crisis in Ukraine). http://itar-tass.com/krizis-na-ukraine.– Date Views: 15.04.14