Политология/2. Политическая конфликтология

PhD in Political Science Polyakov E.M.

Voronezh State University, Russia

The role of political Islam in contemporary Russia.

The Islamic population in the Russian Federation is concentrated into two main areas: The Volga-Urals region, i.e. Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Chuvashia, Mari-El, and pockets in Ulyanovsk, Samara, Astrakhan, Perm, Nizhniy Novgorod, Yekaterinburg oblasts. The other Moslem area is the Northern Caucasus where the total number of compactly settled (but ethnically fragmented) Moslems is about 4.5 million [1]. Although there has never been any single all-Russian Moslem community or umma, the Moslems in Russia are organized into Spiritual Boards. Since the mid-1990s at least five centers have been competing to become central institutions, representative of all Moslems of Russia. The most influence of them has two: the Central Spiritual Board of the Moslems of Russia and the European States of CIS and the Council of Muftis [2].

The rebirth of Islam has been largely confined to the religious and cultural spheres, rather than to the political sphere. For the majority of Moslems in the Russian Federation, their political orientation is not linked to their faith. The situation is different in the Northern Caucasus, but Islamic movements there are primarily concerned with North Caucasus issues rather than all-Russian ones.

Islam in Tatarstan constitutes a model of “Euro-Islam”, namely a moderate non-political force that poses no threat to the constitutional order in Russia. However, although Islam in the Volga-Urals region is in the main moderate, and does not pose a threat to the system, there is concern that the state has not done enough to develop a dialogue with Islam in order to ensure that any possible future politicization will not develop in a militant direction.

During the 2000s, most Russian analysts are of the opinion that the influence of extremist Islam outside parts of the Northern Caucasus is limited. But the weakness of the state and of the current Russian elite is enabling radical Moslem elements to increase their influence. It is true that there have been acts of violence committed by Moslem groups in the Volga region [3, 6-7].

If the Moslem proportion of the Russian Federation population increases, and comes to constitute more than 20 per cent, then it is likely that there will be a major political shift in the country. In the long term, if current demographic trends in the Russian Federation continue, it will be impossible to keep Moslem political representation at its current low level.

The Caucasus region remains one of the most vulnerable spaces in Eurasia. In the Caucasus region, the first precedent of a revision of borders between the former Soviet republics was established. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, ethnic separatism in the Russian Caucasus was a particularly topical issue for a long period of time. The popularity of ethnic nationalism reached its peak in the first half of the 1990s. The rise of ethnic nationalism in the early 1990s was fuelled not only by the “weakness of the state,” but also by objective circumstances. Religiousness was prohibited, while ethnicity was cultivated.

In the beginning of the 1990s, there were simply no skillful preachers of “pure Islam” in the region. This is why in the early 1990s the movement of Islamic “radicals” emerged in the North Caucasus, in an effort to combine religious rhetoric with ethnic nationalism. In time, the popularity of ethnic nationalism and ethnic separatism started to falter and decline because of different reasons. First of all, it is necessary to point out that the persistent ethnic nationalism (and separatism as its ultimate phase) is fraught with conflicts [see: 4, 3].

The ideologists of “pure Islam” also skillfully used psychological methods of influence – appealing to disenchanted sections of the young population who were deprived of opportunities for career growth or quality education. The radical Islamists also have claimed moral superiority. As a result, radical Islam started to spread not only across the eastern part of the region (i.e., Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia), but also across its western part, where the religiousness of the population had traditionally been less strong. The activities of today’s Caucasian Salafites clearly include an element of extremism. As a rule, Salafites in Russia are the ones who organize and carry out terrorist acts.

Islam in the Volga region exhibits a different character. Although Salafis are active in the Volga region, the area is a remote periphery where several well-known international Islamist groups – such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, the Tablighi Jamaat and the Fethullahcilar movement – extend their influence, as do various sects of local origin that are unrelated to popular and well-known international Islamic organizations. The Volga region includes six national republics and is home to about 40 percent of Russia’s Muslim population. Muslims constitute a majority in seven Russian constituencies, two of which are located in the Volga region: Bashkortostan with 54.5 percent and Tatarstan with 54 percent. Some other territories of the region are home to a significant percentage of Muslims, even if they don’t constitute a majority of the population [see: 5, 3-4].

In fact, in the Volga region there still has not been any experience comparable to the creation of a de facto independent Chechen state (1991–1994 and 1996–1999) or of the permanent extensive terrorist network of the “Caucasus Emirate.” Moscow and Kazan managed to avoid ethnic conflict. Moreover, the Volga region produced such potentially attractive concepts as “Euro-Islam,” which aimed to develop the religion in accordance with contemporary realities and interreligious dialogue.

The first manifestations of politicized Islam – initially timid – took place in the Volga region in the early 1990s. In 1990 Astrakhan hosted the first congress of the Islamic Revival Party (IRP). The IRP as an organization, however, desired to consolidate all of the Muslims of the Soviet Union in pursuit of the right to live in accordance with the rules of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.

The Russian state has been faced with an Islamist threat both inside the country in the North Caucasus and, to a lesser extent, in the Volga region, and outside, as it was involved in the five-year civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997). Yet even in 1999, terrorism was beginning in the Volga region [5, 11].

The Islamic rise in the Volga region is a deeply complex phenomenon. It has been driven by the results of internal socio-political and religious dynamics, by religious globalization, and by the penetration of radicals into new territories. Unlike the North Caucasus, the Volga region has not yet become a territory where suicide bombings, acts of sabotage, and military strikes are commonplace. Nevertheless, recent years have brought with them a number of very alarming signs.

First, the Russian leadership needs to learn its lessons from the experience of instability in the North Caucasus. The Islamic rise in the Volga region cannot be controlled through military or police operations. Of course, radicals who overstep the bounds of the law must be held accountable. Still, any attempt to minimize the Islamist threat will be ineffective if it does not incorporate an understanding of social and ideological issues.

Second, policymakers should support policies that would strengthen traditional Russian Islam, which is linked to the history and culture of the country as a whole and the Volga region in particular. Moscow has to recognize the growing role of religion in the political and social life of the country, but it also needs to counter the radicals that provoke militant insurgency and instability. It must also include active and consistent promotion of a pan-Russian, supra-ethnic political identity.

Third, it will require colossal effort to differentiate between terrorists and those who would be amenable to pledge their political loyalty to the state. The important task for Russia is to engage in pragmatic cooperation with the West. Unlike the Caucasus, the Volga Federal District is to a much lesser extent involved in the international agenda. However, this status quo is likely to change quite soon, with the Volga region becoming increasingly important to a host of international actors.

In summary, it would seem that there are three main scenarios for the development of Moslem-Russian relations within the Russian Federation as the Moslem component of the Russian population grows:

1. Russia therefore becomes more Moslem, with Moslems occupying a greater proportion of the political leadership. A relatively harmonious synthesis is formed with the Slavic component of the population, along the lines advocated by some Eurasianist geopolitical theorists.

2. Russian elites hinder the full emergence of Moslem elites, and the Moslem elements of the population become more restive.

3. Russian elites and society fear the emergence of an “Islamic threat” from non-ethnic Russian, supported by outside Islamic powers. This leads to the emergence of a more overtly Russian nationalist regime [3, 11].

References:

1. For more information you may see various papers by C.W.Blandy. Date Views 16.08.2013 http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/caucasus/.

2. The Council of Muftis website. Date Views 16.08.2013 http://www.Moslem.ru/.

3. Smith M.A. 2006. Islam in the Russian Federation, Conflict Studies Research Centre Russian Series, 06/53.

4. Markedonov S. Radical Islam in the North Caucasus: Evolving Threats, Challenges, and Prospects. A Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. November 2010.

5. Markedonov S. The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Groups in Russia’s Volga Region. A Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia program, January 2013.