Sansyzbay Chukhanov, Kairat Kurmanbayev
Sansyzbay Chukhanov, Ph.D Student, Faculty of Islamic
Studies, Egypt University of Islamic Culture Nur Mubarak, Kazakhstan.
Kairat Kurmanbayev, Ph.D
doctor of Egypt University of Islamic Culture Nur Mubarak. 050040, Kazakhstan.
Introduction
One of the most important branches of usul
al-fiqh is the study of language. Linguistics includes principles relating to
the way in which words convey their meanings, and to the clarity and ambiguity
of words and their interpretation. The knowledge of these principles is
essential to the proper understanding of the authoritative texts from which the
legal rulings of Islamic law are deduced. Unless these texts are correctly understood
no ruling can be deduced from them Linguistic principles are especially
important when a given text is not self-evident, or when an apparent conflict
between texts appears. From these principles a mujtahid may distinguish the
speculative from the definitive texts and categorise clear and unclear texts
(meanings). In cases of disagreement, the preference is for clearer or less
ambiguous texts (meaning). Therefore, understanding the rules of grammar and
their application is one use of the Arabic language in Usul al-Fiqh.
The need to understand
Arabic language in order to understand Islamic law basics
As read from the verse of the
renowned linguist al-Kisa’i, “Grammar is the singular element upon which all
sciences depend,” [1, Al-Maruazi, 1982, 53]. It is difficult to imagine Islamic
science without Arabic language. Like experts in Quran, tafsir, or exogenesis, and Muslim theologians, the scholars who study
Islamic law exert great effort toward perfecting their understanding of their
field of study. They adopt Arabic grammar principles and norms as the basis of
their investigation in order to clearly perceive the words presented in the
Quran, because this holy book, which has served as the fundamental source for
all Islamic sciences, was revealed in that language. The sunnah, or “well-trodden path” (tradition), for
understanding the words transmitted by the Prophet requires reading them in the
language in which they were given to him.
The Arab speakers who have mastered
even the most ancient literature developed from the Quran, the pinnacle of
Muslim oratory, naturally developed a strong command of linguistics, grammar,
and oratory to accompany their religious studies. It would not be an exaggeration
to call Islamic culture a “language-based culture.”
However, the study of Arabic
linguistics as a separate subject from the Quran and Islamic sciences was
established only in recent centuries. Scholars like the renowned Persians Abd
al-Qahir al-Jurjani and al-Zamakhshari, both of whom were recognized as early
experts in Arabic linguistics, learned the language by poring over numerous
religious documents. Indeed, many significant scholars of that time, the fifth
century by the Islamic calendar, in such fields as tafsir (interpretation),
hadith (prophetic traditions), and fiqh (jurisprudence), were also significant
contributors to the understanding of Arabic linguistics.
Pronouncing a verdict or defining
legal precedent based on the content of religious texts naturally requires cognizance
of those texts. This requires investigating not only the words, but the
structure and the way of narrating. For this reason, all works covering the
subject of Islamic law basics (“usul
al-fiqh”), or the methods of legal interpretation and analysis of divine
law, address linguistic topics. These basic studies range from simple Arabic
grammar to more advanced linguistic matters that have not been fully studied by
earlier linguists. Being described as an expert in this field insinuates an
ability to bring into use the delicate linguistic concepts, not normally
included in grammatical research, the type that requires special investigative
means that apply logic and the scientific method. If logic is the grammar of
thinking, then grammar is the logic of language.
As such, it has been the general
consensus of all scholars of Islam that it is not possible to come up with any
legal verdict without knowing the morphological, lexical-semantic structures of
linguistic units (words, word combinations, sentences, etc.) found in religious
texts.
The impact of
linguistics on legal attitudes
The essence of religious texts is
the hukm shar’ai, or divine rule and
guidance from Allah as transmitted through the Prophet. Legal interpretations
of this, or verdicts, are called akham
(plural of hukm) fiqhi, and these are issued according to the understanding and
principles of persons engaged in study of the hukm shar’ai. The divine law incorporates the essential semantics
of the will of Allah, while a legal verdict provides meaning or human
understanding as comprehended by legal experts taken by observing the
linguistic and legal principles involved.
The method for legal interpretation
was summarized by Imam Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, a prominent Andalusian (Islamic
Spanish) legal scholar in the 14th century CE (8th century by the Islamic
calendar), who gave impetus to “usul
al-fiqh” by considering semantics from two perspectives: the main semantics
that are common to all languages and complementary semantics that are specific
to a particular language. Main semantics are the basic, root meanings given to
a certain word. Complimentary semantics are the connotative, figurative meaning
of that word. According to Shatibi, problems with consolidating a particular
verdict generally don’t appear when considering main semantics. The main issue
generally lies in meanings imposed by the complimentary semantic elements, and
the verdicts that are made based on them [2, Al-Shatibi, 1997, 2/163] Therefore,
it is a logical expectation that there will be different opinions concerning
any particular legal matter resulting in discrepancies in the body of akham fiqhi, or legal verdicts. Whereas
the hukm shar’ai is immutable, the akham fiqhi are subject to potential variations
resulting from the imperfection of human understanding of the will of Allah.
The difference in viewpoints seen in
legal verdicts results from the fact that religious texts do not provide
concrete and precise meaning to all potential legal matters, and that some
verdicts are made not from religious texts, but by ijtihad or best professional judgment. Verdicts can be enunciated
precisely and concretely, or inexplicitly, without precision. Everything
depends on the text used and its semantics. There could be cases where both the
text and the implied (semantic) meaning are implicit or indirect (“zanni” or speculative), or cases where
the text is explicit (clear-cut) but implicit in terms of semantics.
In general, when the meaning of the
text, be it Quranic verse or mutawatir
hadith (a saying conveyed by successive narrators, generally accepted as a
“truth”), is explicit and precise, the use of ijtihad is not warranted. Quranic verses and hadiths (sayings) attributed to the Prophet account for the
majority of cases of explicit texts with implicit semantics. As the majority of
religious texts contain meanings, content, and semantics that are
multi-layered, they are perceived and interpreted differently between scholars,
because direct meaning, derived meaning, figurative meaning, polysemy (ability
to have more than one meaning), main meaning, secondary meaning, general and
concrete meaning, as well as lexical-phraseological semantics are inherent to a
language structure and content-structural system.
A good example of this is the fact
that it is quite difficult to decipher and determine the figurative,
connotative, symbolic, hidden, and implied meanings found in belles-lettres,
because the method, way, and approach used to interpret them are not
theoretically systematized. That is why each researcher, each reader, and each
recipient perceives both the explicit meaning and implicit meaning in
belles-lettres differently according to their knowledge and world view. The
means for reception (recognition, comprehension, and awareness) of a piece of
art was first theoretically reasoned by Aristotle. Since that time, different
theories and trends have been developed. This includes the consolidation by
Muslim legal experts and Quranic exegetics experts of a methodological basis
for understanding religious texts that have multi-faceted semantic meanings and
concepts, in order to use them to render verdicts.
The similarities between
the basics of Islamic law and linguistics
The principles of linguistics
correspond with those of Islamic jurisprudence in the following ways:
1. Common authors. Imam al-Shafi’i, the Shaykh al-Islam,
referred in his renowned book on the principles of jurisprudence “Al-Risala,”
to the works of influential linguists like Sibawayh. Sibawayh’s “Al-Kitab” or “The Book” is regarded as
the first book on Arabic grammar ever written, and as such it is the most
highly regarded source for linguistic rules in that language. Similarly,
Al-Risala is described as the first valuable book written for the study of usul al-fiqh. Influential legal scholars
like the rationalist theologian Fakhruddin Razi, Quranic exegete al-Zarkashi, and
prolific hadith researcher al-Nawawi were guided in linguistic matters by works
of renowned linguists like Sibawayh, grammarians Niftawayh and Ibn Jinni, philologist
al-Zajjaj, and the early and enigmatic writer al-Ahfash.
2. Common topics. Legal and
linguistic students review many of the same subjects. A good example of this is
the fact that topics like command (or order), prohibition (“nahi”), truth (“haqiqa”),
metaphor (“majaz”), homonym, synonym,
etymology, and semantics are emphasized in the study of both fields.
3. Common terms. There are a number
of scientific terms that are widely used in both fields of study. Linguists
consider language concepts similar to those of legal scholars: taufiqi (divine commandment), ijtihadi (best judgment), naqli (a study topic learned only by
revelation), and qiyas (analogy), are
handed down from early documents. Hadiths
of both categories, mutawatir
(successive) and ahaad (unity), are
likewise examined by both, albeit in separation. Linguists frequently use words
like uajip (imperative), and
forbidden, good, and bad, in terms of linguistic solutions, and these area are also
used by legal scholars in reference to verdicts.
4. Common source references. Linguists,
as with legal scholars, refer to the Quran,
hadith (sayings), ijma (expressions of consensus), istishab (presumption of continuity),
and istishan (preferences) as their
sources. Cited frequently are such books as as-Suyuti’s “al-Iqtirah,” Ibn
Jinni’s “al-Khasa’is,” and the works of Sibawayh and Ibn al-Anbari.
Further evidence of common source
references include qira’at
(recitations) of mutawatir readings,
or qira’at readings such as “Ahaad”
and “As-Shaz” made by linguists [3, Al-Suyuti 1994, 76]. Taking into
consideration that most of the hadiths
represent original content, linguists generally do not refer to such sayings
that are not taken verbatim from an original source. The medieval author
as-Suyuti wrote on the subject, “The Prophet’s hadiths are usable as evidence if they are narrated word-for-word,
but such hadiths are scarcely
encountered,” [3, 89] Abu al-Hasan ibn ad-Dayig supported this thought, “The
fact that hadiths come only with a
preserved meaning causes me to refer to the Quran for linguistic matters, and
not to refer to hadiths like those of
Sibawayh and other linguists.”
The reason for this disregard for hadiths is that not all those who
delivered hadiths were native Arab
speakers. Legal scholars presenting topics related to usul al-fiqh note that in order for the information in a hadith to be accepted as meaningful, the
deliverer must be faqih (an expert in
fiqh, or law), and proficient in
Arabic. Linguists refer to ijma as
consensus reached by scholars from both the Kufa and Basra schools in the field
of Arabic language studies. “The ijma
(consensus) of Arabs serves as a form of evidence,” written by as-Suyuti [3, 193]. It is obvious that ijma reached in the field of usul al-fiqh is, like verdicts,
consolidated from religious texts.
Linguists act similarly to legal
scholars when referring to the use of qiyas
(analogy). In this respect, Ibn al-Anbari was influenced by the work of Shirazi,
“Kitab al-Luma' fi usul al-fiqh” (“The Book of Heaven illuminating the
foundations of understanding law”) when he wrote his “Lumagu al-adilla fi usuli
al-fiqh” (“Illumination of evidence in the study of grammar basics”). Linguists
have also provided their own definition of qiyas
and talked about specific types of analogies and their conditions.
5. In the same way that there are
similarities between the fields of usul
al-fiqh and the basics of Arabic language, the names of some frequently
used books are also identical. There are many such similarities between the two
subjects.
Comparing the legal-linguistic views of legal schools
The legal basics established during
the period of as-Sahabah (“the
companions,” referring to those who accompanied the Prophet Muhammad) came from
unwritten principles that were scientifically systemized by mujtahid imams, knowledgeable scholars
that devised legal rulings through the use of ijtihad, and were further developed by the Hanafiyya and Shafiyya
schools of Islamic law. What differentiated these two schools was that the
Hanafiyya school applied induction methods to determine legal norms, while the mutakallim scholars, students of kalam (a science of discourse
established to defend the Islamic faith from doubters and detractors), prioritized
rational logical principles and referred to the method of deduction. Among the
latter were such great kalam scholars as Baqillani, Qadi Abduljabbar,
al-Juaini, al-Gazali, and ar-Razi.
The methodology of the Hanafiyya
school extracted and adapted legal basics to its branches of legal thought in a
way that reflects such Kazakh principles as, “A sea is known through its
drops.” This idea is summarized by the well-established rule that the integral
is known through the non-integral. It would not be a mistake to say that there
is an important philosophical concept in this idea of getting to know a sea
from its drops and knowing the value of a single drop from the characteristics
displayed by the sea it came from. The essence of the main principles taken
from the late and early history of hermeneutical theory is contained in the
scope of this singular piece of wisdom upheld by the Kazakh people.
According to this and other major
characteristics, other differences in legal system basics can be determined
between the two schools. Both make verdicts, though, through the use of
linguistics basics and principles taken from religious texts that were
consolidated and established.
Hanafiyya scholars went beyond the
work of the mutakallim in determining
whether a word applied an explicit meaning, or if it had a hidden or implied
meaning. A good example of this is that the mutakallim
divided words into two categories, “nass”
(textual) and “zahir” (manifest),
while Hanafiyya scholars divided them
into four categories: “zahir,” “nass,”
“mufassar” (enunciated), and “muhkam” (concrete).
Zahir
represents a word with a clear meaning that is open to
interpretation. Nass represents a
word that is not only clear, but also in harmony with its context. As an
example, the “zahir” meaning of the ayat (verse), “Allah made trade
permitted, but made usury forbidden,” is unambiguous – trading is acceptable,
but credit is forbidden. Its context was also given in the full text, providing
information about the reason for the ayat
by highlighting the fact that trade and usury are not the same. It answers the mushriks (non-believers) who regarded
trade and usury as identical.
Even though the works of Imam
al-Shafi’I regarded the above-mentioned word types together, the mutakallim students that followed him
considered them separately, as had the Hanafiyya scholars. However, the two groups
disagreed whether a zahir
meaning and a nass meaning can serve
as evidence. Hanafiyya scholars found the meaning of both categories of words worthy
of defense if they were supported by religious texts. Meanwhile, scholars like
those of the Mu’tazili, a kalam
school that regarded reason as the final arbiter in distinguishing right from
wrong (“what is obligatory in religion is only obligatory by virtue of
reason”), did not find the meaning unequivocal, and kept open the question of
whether such verses could be used as evidence.
If a word or a text from the period
of the Prophet could be negated, but could not be rationalized or solidified,
and led to a specific verdict under consideration, it would be categorized as mufassar, or unequivocal. Mufassar text is not subject to
interpretation, and as such it is more powerful than ideas categorized as nass or zahir.
Sometimes, text fails to provide an
assigned meaning, or an inexplicable word blurs the meaning of a sentence. This
meaning ambiguity is one of the characteristics of the language. Such literary
rhetoric is often found in ancient literature, though it is also used in modern
literature. William Empson conducted comprehensive studies in this aspect of
linguistics and gave several examples in his book, titled, “Seven Types of
Ambiguity.” He noted that the ambiguity of a meaning in a poem is reflected in
the use of a certain word in an unexpected way, or the use of a word for two or
more meanings to attract the listeners’ attention – this is usually by design [4,
Empson, 1949, 192].
Drawing a listeners’ attention is an
oratorical technique. There were even some poets who stopped writing prose and
poetry after having been taken aback in encountering the rhetorical perfection
of the Quran. The oratory of the Quran is reflected by its ayats, which come in a variety of hidden, ambiguous, implied and
collective meanings. Kalam scholars categorized
such religious text as either mujmal
(collective) or mutashabih (fuzzy),
while Hanafiyya scholars divided such thoughts as hafi (hidden), mushkil
(difficult), mujmal, and mutashabih. These categories were used
to analyze each from the perspective of semantics and law.
The classifications used by the
Hanafiyya scholars is noteworthy in being more precise about whether an idea is
ambiguous rather than the classifications used by the kallam scholars. This is
because the Hanafiyya took into account the word’s semantics, whether it was
concrete or assumptive, general or specific, and other characteristics that
facilitate its delimitation more clearly by defining meanings, in case
contradictions arise. That, in turn, leads to defining a more solid verdict.
However, if taking into account the
word “Ayn” (eye) in Arabic, its use in text can easily mean different things.
The semantics of some words with ambiguous meanings can only be deciphered from
their context. As an example, in a sentence like “the spring well/eye
(resource) has been found in the desert,” and “someone’s eye was filled with
tears,” the word “eye” clearly has an ambiguous meaning.
Additional controversial viewpoints
were established between these two schools about whether the semantics of the
above-mentioned texts were clear or implicit, in harmony with the context or
not. Consider the case in which a member of both schools contradicted each
other in their view concerning the concept of a general and exact meaning,
which caused different verdicts to be rendered in different legal matters, the
mutakallim scholar considered the meaning of general words to be “presumptive,”
while the Hanafiyya scholar recognized the words as “concrete evidence.”
According to the mutakallim principle, “Every general statement is clear,” and
as a result of studying the words involved with words that have general
meanings in text, every general meaning is like to be made clear as clear is
invariably implied in a general statement. However, when this is possible,
exactness vanishes [5, Al-Mahalli 2005, 317].
Hanafiyya scholars replied, “If
every word is assigned to a particular meaning, the general meaning is assigned
to a certain word as well. The word and its general meaning remain integral
until evidence appears that separates the word with its meaning. This means
that the general meaning remains firm proof until there comes more clear and
precise evidence,” [6, Al-Taftazani, 1995, 1/384].
Imam al-Bazdaui wrote, “The general
(amm) in our doctrine (mazhab) makes a clear verdict a single (hass) imperative,” (Author’s name [7,
Al-Signaki, 2001, 2/659]. Hanafiyya scholars said the possible verdict the
other school had been discussing was related to the assumptive character they
assigned to general statements, which regarded such statements as clear.
As a result of these viewpoints,
contradictory opinions arise regarding evidence that renders clear a general (amm) text with semantics and text both
exact. Thus, the majority of scholars who considered the general (amm) meaning as assumptive (zanni) evidence said that it
could be made clear using assumptive evidence, but Hanafiyya scholars who regarded
it as clear put forth the opinion that it could not be made clear by assumptive
evidence. Al-Sarahsi wrote, “It is not right that Quranic verses and mutawatir sunnah which enunciate a general meaning that is exact both
textually and semantically are made clear with assumptive evidences like ahad, hadith, and qiyas,” [8, Al-Sarahsi,
1993, 1/142].
Likewise, if there is any evidence
that the word with an unambiguous meaning (hass)
implies a presumed meaning, that is if there is any evidence that another
meaning is implied other than the first meaning of the unambiguous word, the
unambiguous word is explained by its implied meaning. For example, Hanafiyya
scholars interpret the word “sheep” as “sheep itself” or “sheep’s value.” According
to this position, just as “sheep itself” is given as zakat (tithe), “sheep’s value” could be given instead. In
accordance with the Hanafiyya scholars’ view, Allah wanted to satisfy the needs
of the poor by ordering the giving of zakat.
It could be accomplished by giving “sheep itself” the same as giving “sheep’s value”
for religion-obligatory charity.
Likewise, such opinions arose
concerning the absolute meaning (mutlaq)
and the meaning limiting it (muqayad)
as well.
It cannot be said that a certain
meaning always corresponds to a certain sense or that a certain sense stands
for a certain meaning. Though, it must be noted that the practice of conveying of
several senses by one meaning has existed from ancient times in oratory. Linguistic
methods of conveying one sense also differ. If some texts provide the shades of
several meanings and a streak of several senses, a complex metaphorical meaning
is formed from the unity of many-sided semantic meanings. The concepts of “metaphor”
(majaz) and truth (haqiqa) in Islamic law and theology,
which turned to religious texts with metaphorical content, caused different
legal verdicts and positions to appear.
The above-mentioned words were
called according to their peculiarities in conveying lexical-semantic meanings
and were classified by members of the two schools of Islamic law. Whether semantics
of religious texts become clear or connotatively fuzzy, they could be
classified into muhkam and mutashabih categories referring to the ayat of the holy Quran: "He is Allah who sent down the Quran for you.
It has ayats with clear meanings (muhkam). They are the foundation of the book.
And there are others with similar meanings (mutashabih),” (surah “Ali Imran,”
year, pp. 7). It means the concepts like zahir,
nass, mufassar, and haqiqa, whose
meanings came clear and exact, could be classified into muhkam text, while words like mushkil,
mubham, mujmal, and hafi stand
for hidden, connotative, fuzzy, ambiguous, and indirect meanings in mutashabih texts.
The lexical semantics is like raw
material; it needs refinement. It is implemented by making systematic logical
conclusions that could cover all the semantics of a word. In this direction, we
must apply particular semantic methods in researching linguistic meanings using
as a guideline-rich resource of Arabic in lexical semantics produced by Arabic
linguists. For the understanding of the content of sharii text, the main meaning is determined by using explanatory
dictionaries of Arabic, applying induction method. In cases where no reason
exists to shift from the linguistic meaning to sharii meaning, linguistic semantics of a word or a text might be
the main meaning assigned by shariat,
because in order to understand the meaning of words in religious texts, the
following principle applies, “If there is no reason or evidence pointing to the
application of indirect meaning of a certain word in Arabic, its main meaning
that is established by Arabs will be taken.”
Ibn Hazym wrote, “Reason or evidence
has two types: ‘natural’ and ‘sharii’: natural reason is the mind's
demand to shift from the word's main meaning to another meaning. For instance,
the word ‘people’ in the ayat “Allazina qala lahum an-nasu qad jamaguu lakum) or
“The people said to them: the nation
summoned for you,” (“Ali Imran”,173). is perceived by our mind without
evidence. As for shariat reason, taking the word's indirect meaning is advised by
the Quran, sunnah or ijma. This means that whether the
indirect meaning of a certain text will be taken is determined by another
religious text or consensus of scholars,” [9, Ibn Hazm, 3/137].
In order to access the main meaning
of the noble aims of the shariat, features
of an individual and the society must be taken into account when the text imposes
lexical semantics. If this principle is observed when controversies take place
between texts, the assigned meaning of the text will be clearly accessed.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it needs to be said
that linguistics is imperative in acquiring an understanding of Islamic law
basics, just as Arabic language is important in understanding Quranic verses,
the hadiths of the Prophet, and access
to the sciences rooted from these two sources. In accordance with the principle,
“Ma laa yatimmu al-uajibu illa bihi fahua uajib” or “The compliment to uajib (obligatory) is also uajib,” of utmost importance is knowing Islamic
legal verdicts that are meant to advocate welfare of humanity and knowing the
sources of those verdicts and the ways of consolidating them from religious
texts is also mandatory. It is already a known fact that the undying sources of
Islamic legal verdicts are the Quran and sunnah.
For certain, no one could understand these two foundations without knowing Arabic.
If comprehending verdicts requires understanding its basics, knowing these
basics requires knowledge of the Arabic lexis, grammar, and morphology.
References
1.
Abu Ubaidullah Muhammad bin Imran
al-Maruazi. Mugjam al-Shugara. Beirut: Dar Al-Kotob Al-Ilmiyah. – 1982; 284.
2.
Abu Iskhaq Al-Shatibi. Al-Muafaqat.
Egypt: Dar Ibn Affan. – 1997; (7)
3.
Jalaluddin Al-Suyuti. Al-Iqtrah fi
Usul al-Nahu. Egypt: Dar al-Magarif al-Jamgiyah. – 1994; 481.
4.
William Empson. Seven Types of
Ambiguity. London: Chatto and Windus. – 1949; 259
5.
Jalaluddin Al-Mahalli. Al-Badr
al-Talig. Beirut: Muassasa al-Risalah (Resalah Publishers). – 2005; (2).
6.
Sagduddin Al-Taftazani. Sharh
al-Taluih ala al-Taudih. Egypt: Maktabatu Sabih. – 1995.
7.
Husamuddin al- Signaki. Al-Kafi.
Al-Riyad: Maktabat al-Rushd. – 2001; (5).
8.
Ahmad Abu Sahl al-Sarahsi. Usul
al-Sarahsi. Beirut: Dar Al-Kotob Al-Ilmiyah. – 1993; (2)
9.
Ibn Hazm al-Zahiri. Al-Ihkam fi Usul
al-Ahkam. Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadidah. – 2001; (8)