PhD Piotr Masiukiewicz

Warsaw School of Economics

Crises in banks versus state intervention

The risk of system failure in this day, have arose very quickly and spread to global scale. Well, it is not possible to exclude crises. Management of crises have to cope with time pressure and financial system globalization, than the influence of private business on financial system regulations lost important role – because crises management will have most powerful position.[1]

Implementation of secure elements in the financial systems which includes deposits guarantee was the result of common character of banking services, and the important role of banks for efficiency and development of economy.

Euro-American crisis on subprime credit market have renewal discussion about banks public status. The questions have appeared, if banks are ordinary market business, or public good? Should a bank ask for the state support in crisis situation and what should be the limit of this support? There is a common uniformity, that banks are public trust institutions and stability of financial system is public good.

In the opinion of the author, banks activity have the attributes of public good, so the state aid in crisis situation is justifiable; than the author try to prove this thesis.

The bank crisis according to G. Kaufman definition is characterized by banks run, bankruptcy of financial institutions, government large scale –intervention and also high level of safety threat of another institutions.[2]

Analysis of system risk on the pre-crisis stage may bring appeasement of crisis effects and better prepare anti crisis instruments. Parallel, clear principles of game in the crisis time, let the banks to define in the sanitation plan what they can expect, don’t lost valuable time for make-believe game.[3]

1. The role of financial stability and trust versus crisis

Banks can enlarge the income only with risk growth today; it demands growth of equity capital. It isn’t always possible therefore, there is continuous seek of innovation financial products with high risk – as a result of shareholders pressure for profit and management motivation systems.

Financial safety net (FSN) are build in high development countries, including EU. FSN are the set of regulations and institutions which have to reduce the loses of customers in case of the bank insolvent.[4] M. Iwanicz-Drozdowska have opinion, that in majority countries there aren’t clear principles for responsibility and competence in management crisis area today; so the key role have public authority, which is responsible for financial support for sanitation activities.[5]

Safety of the financial market have both an economic, and a social meaning. This is the result of cost of public aid for financial stability restoring (for example: aid from state budget for bank sanitation or costs of safety net) and availability of financial services.[6]

Financial stability is defined as situation without any financial crisis, it means that mechanism of source allocation and financial risk management is efficient.[7] Crises of banks caused instability of financial system. In L. Summers (Harvard) opinion, absolute priority for state regulators have to be regulation of activity of each financial institution, which can to be the source of system risk.[8]

IMF define bank crises as real or potential run of banks or bank bankruptcy, which caused suspension of recover their obligations by these institutions or require a high level aid of state, for avoiding the run or bankruptcy.[9] In this definition two elements are exposed – panic and government aid.

System risk and menace of panic epidemic, in opinion S. Hefernan, there are principal causes that the state have inclination for special treatment of banks and for serve trough central bank as “lender of last resort” (LoLR) or supplier of “lifeboat rescue operation”.[10]

Public trust is one of main market pillar of banks, and lost of the trust is inseparable cost of crisis.[11]

2. State aid versus crises history

Historical analysis of many authors showed that the state aid is the permanent element of solving banks crises.[12] The bank crisis can force the state intervention to give a significant aid to bank sector in the opinion of J. K. Solarz.[13]

There were a lot of cases in history of crises when the central banks or other n regulators made intervention to help single bank or banks group – to secure other financial system institutions.[14]

Crises not only in USA, but in other countries (for ex.: France, Japan, Mexico, Scandinavian countries) showed – how far can go the governments to prevent the banks failures and how wide can be applied doctrines “to big to fail” and “to important to fail”.[15]

The experiences of polish bank crisis in 90. ties unquestionable showed, that without subvention (restore obligation) and reduction of taxes - a lot of banks don’t survive the crisis.

The last subprime crisis caused very strong financial committal of governments and central banks in USA and Europe. The example of subprime crisis second wave (III Q of 2008) and wide however selected at first stage, aid of USA government and FED for bank-financial groups and investment banks in troubles as well as receiving Panic Panacea Act by USA Congress (H. Paulson plan worth 700 bln USD) – confirmed the argument of intervention necessity.

There are some opinion in literature that, the transfer from one level of macro-balance to new one isn’t commit only with the help of “invisible market hand”. The necessary element of going back to balance after crises is the “visible hand” of the state and trust infrastructure between market and the state. The space for dialog about public goods in financial market replace the dictatorship of market or the state.[16] J. Stiglitz said: “Where, the information is incomplete and, that is always, the invisible hand of Adam Smith which should secure the effective management of economy is really partly invisible, because it doesn’t exist”.[17]

3. Sanitation instruments applied by state institutions

The management of process of get off from crisis stage is an urgent necessity as well for international systems as for the single bank. Taking into account the subprime crisis in USA arose questions concerning: effectiveness of supervisory of banks, credibility of rating firms evaluations, effectiveness of models of bankruptcy warning, the role of LoLR, costs of trust loss of clients as crises result.[18] All should draw conclusions from the current crisis.[19]

Panic in credit institution, as the highest development stage of crisis, confront many banks with helplessness situation. This is the result of the specific balance dependents (the highest financial leverage among different sectors) and the limitation of liquidity volume too (crisis reserves). The bank isn’t directly responsible for panic; the acceleration of panic depends of many external factors. Well, the question arise, if the saving of such a bank by state institutions is justifiable and which of institution can do this.

This role is attribute to the central banks in models of management of system risk.

Financial national and international safety nets (FSN). are built to prevent crisis. State institutions have aid instruments for banks in crisis: financial, coordination, pressure on bank sector and information instruments. It is important to notice, that existence of FSN can’t be treat as quarantine of stability, because state policy have only the goal to support market discipline and limit threats and reduce crises costs.

Why FSN are made? The specific character of banks (include its public function) and present treatment of the financial stability as public good is the answer.[20]

E. P. Gardener and P. Molyneux proved, that of importance for system risk, some banks (for example: strategic) deserved for aid of state (include nationalization). therefore doctrines TBTF (too big too fail) and TITF (too important too fail) became generally accepted practice.[21] Another authors maintain, that the certain, that the state will provide aid for banks, lead to intensification of moral hazard, which is practice by top bank managers.

Financial safety net in Poland include authorization and responsibility of many institutions, such as: ministry of finance, National Bank of Poland, Counsel of Monetary Politics, Commission of Financial Supervisory, Banking Guaranty Fund and new – Committee of Financial Stability. There are some doubts if we have in Poland procedures for rescue a lot of banks in system crisis conditions, who should coordinate the process, what financial leverages for bank sanitation can be set and under which criteria’s, and finally for how many big banks in crisis the funds will be sufficient. There will be the question too, what will be the scenario of cooperation with EU in crisis situation in global bank? The discussion about crisis solution, when we have one is late and the process is more expensive.[22]

Whether banking supervisory have moral and justice obligation for early information about threat for deponents, this is the next dilemma. It is difficult to define, when some information should stay common; that is the experience of commissary management of some banks which fails. The information about bank situation, could be hide theoretically by the bank management as well as by the supervisory bodies.

When the bank release the information about the crisis only two solutions will be possible - bankruptcy or sanitation. Financial leverage is necessary for effective sanitation this is the conclusion from last time crises in Poland and another countries. The question arise, who has LoLR function in national system? Institution of LoLR; one of the oldest function of the central bank, isn’t clearly describe in polish law.[23] Lender of last resort could be National Bank of Poland.

The financial support from NBP could be received as “Lombard credit” which was expensive and require first-class security.

The expensive credits from central bank don’t solve the problem, for example EFD and ECB to solve subprime crisis, offered credits with lower prices. In A. Greenspan opinion, function of LoLR was and is necessary, because “markets work, but from time to time crashed. When this occurred, state intervention is necessary to secure the stability, which is public good.” [24]

Since a long time the arguments for build international lender of last resort are advanced.

Two leverages for sanitation polish banks were accessible in the last years:

- first, loans from Banking Guarantee Fund, but after acceptation of sanitation program,

- second, investment capitals of new investors (or bank purchase & assumption this sanitation bank , following banking supervisory decision).

Intervention of state institutions during credit subprime crisis in 2007-2008 period (crisis was exported to Europe), was of different types. After shock stage, when everybody want to help but the action wasn’t coordinated, banks (even these which go to bankruptcy – Northern Rock, Bear Stearns) obtained financial leverages - weapon for crisis, however finally were absorbed by another banks.

Important instruments of fight with subprime crisis were:

- commercial banks had possibility of using “discount window” (USA),

- it was enabled for investment banks to sell investment security papers (include mortgage security) thanks to loans of low interest rate of FED, the logic of this loans line is to secure all banks from, loss of short time cash flow (USA), as it was in the case of Bear Stearns,[25]

- superfund was establish to withdraw toxics assets from investment funds (USA),

- application of taxes reduction for financial sector (USA),

- lock-up changes of mortgage credits interest rates (USA),[26]

- introduction of swap lines to supply European banks in dollars (ECB, National Bank of Swiss combined with FED),

- central banks offered loans to improve liquidity of banks with reduced security level (a lot of countries),

- unlimited loan funds under market rates from international funds were offered (ECB in framework of special operation, which have to reduce the threat of liquidity loss in European banks), [27]

- the nationalization of some credit institutions was realized through “bailout” (f.ex.: Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac in USA, Fortis Bank in EU), [28]

- leverage buyout of banks which went to bankruptcy was applied,

- state blank guaranties for money funds (USA) were applied,

- state guaranties of 100% deposits of clients for single banks (USA) or for all sector (Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Germany) were applied, European Commission recommended to increase the guarantee amount for deponents in EU to 50 thousand euro,

- transfer of bad assets – toxics debts were bought by states (a lot of countries).[29]

In D. Strauss-Kahn (IMF) opinion “the necessity of public intervention is more and more certain. State intervention – independent on stock market, mortgage market or the bank sector – will play the role of “third defense line” to support fiscal and monetary policy. (…) It is necessary to concentrate on credits reconstruction. If capital securities will be not improve quickly enough by private sector, one can consider engagement of public funds.” [30]

Discussion about guarantee system for deponents in global banks was raised in EU again.[31] EU countries have the idea of strong financial supervisory; the EU agreement plan to make transnational stability groups, such as voluntary structures connected supervisory, central banks and financial ministries to monitor large international financial corporations.[32]

In J. Canals opinion, financial authority responsible for banking supervisory always have to face with contradictory goals. First they have to assure of solvency system (security of savings). On the other hand they have encourage activity for growth of competition in the way, which wasn’t always compatible with the first goal. Dilemma of choice between regulation and effectiveness is classical case in the process of economy state intervention.[33]

4. Bank as public good

Public goods could have local, regional, national, international and global character. Classical example of global public good is stability (safety) of international financial system. “When the system works efficiently all have profits; when it is inefficient, all earlier or later will learn it.”[34] Strong currency and stable prices are the good example of public good, however rarely the banking system is describe public good in literature. One should notice, that integration of financial markets in European Union won’t lead automatically to growth of public goods and private goods in the particular member country. A special consensus between politicians and economists, is necessary to achieve agreement considering financial security as public good.

4.1. Social costs of bankruptcy

Social costs of bankruptcy of banks have always been. Generally one emphases consequences for housekeeping and for small and medium business too. In the framework of social costs of bankruptcy can consist of two chains of losses:

a) chain of banks (contagion effect); which will make crises in next banks because of lost assets in the failure bank,

b) chain of corporations, which can make crises in next enterprises.

The social costs of bankruptcy includes following elements:

1) costs of National Bank of Poland (include don’t back credits for banks),

2) costs of Banking Guarantee Fund,

3) costs of government institutions (taxes loss, aid for unemployment, obligation for restructures’ and another),

4) costs of local authorities (f.ex. taxes loss) and they loses as bank clients,

5) costs of another banks (loss of interbank loans, loss of settlement and currency transaction, costs of pay into account of Banking Guarantee Fund for payment guarantee amounts),

6) loses of retail clients (loses own guarantee amount and payment from budget of syndic),

7) loses of corporate clients (loses own guarantee amount and payment from budget of syndic, possible inefficient of payment system),

8) loses of another financial institution which made transaction with bankrupt bank,

9) loses of banking system as effect of lost of public trust and partly transfer deposits to another sectors (f. ex. to security papers market, to mutual fund),

10) costs of management of sanitation or bankruptcy process by state

institutions,

11) another costs (for example: loss choice of social function realize of foundation and social associates).

Complete cost analysis is difficult to prepare and everybody based on rough estimation. In the opinion of National Bank of Poland president: “ banking crises costs, if s crisis will be real, can rise up to 20-40% GDP – such figures were for example: in Japan (1991), South Korea (1997), Turkey (2000).” [35]

Because bank pay additional costs of sanitation and social costs of bankruptcy have been paid, the bank - as public good – should have possibility in crisis situation for financial leverage, which is assure by Financial Safety Net. Searches of Ch. James showed that liquidation of insolvency banks is more expensive than sanitation, absorption by health bank or nationalization.[36]

4.2. Public conditions and functions of banking

Following functions of banks, have public character:

- assure cash flow of business enterprises, self-government institutions and household of retail clients,

- realization of national and international settlement (include obligatory settlement enterprises through banks in order with law),

- credits to develop of economy (banks estimate of reliability of enterprises),

- absorb a part of risk from borrowers,

- allocation money from national and international monetary market to credits,

- security savings and increase capital of bank clients,

- using commercial banks for realization monetary policy of central bank,

- offering information of risk level (risk of economy, sectors and another),

- assure bank secret of all financial operation.

The large number of factors make, bank sector more sensible to crises then another sectors. Banks are characterized by high financial leverage, they are expose for large liquidity gap, their activity based on large number of settlements and credit connections and in crisis they can to stay on market at any price. There is a pressure of shareholders for growth of bank value and annual dividend, and the growth of income can be achieve only through higher risk.[37] Start of the crisis can be caused by credit expansion of another banks (vide subprime crisis in USA), shortage of information and behavioral factors (run of bank can be consequent “sociable activity” of deponents – this is psychological effect). Law and supervisory of banks restrictions can be factors of crisis escalation (f. ex.: trouble with competitiveness, trouble with diversification of products and price strategies). The crisis can be import (for example contagion effect).

Bank crisis bring emergency contagion. Effect of domino can be the result of many reasons; clients reaction on the heuristic ground (what describe behavioral finance), are difficult to forecast and connections between financial institutions, determine net of small transparency (vide crisis in the subprime market).

Analyze of law regulation of banking showed, that they are wider than in another sectors, and part of these regulations are the effect of EU directives implementation. Barriers of competition arise. There are too much regulations’ on polish market, for example the price policy were describe in 45 act (include maximum price for consume credits),[38] special regulations are for license of banks, risk and reserves, shareholders structure and details information’s and reports system for banking supervisory. Banks have to pay obligatory charges for guarantee deposits system, charge for financial supervisory institution and another. Financial supervisory decided de facto, who can be the president of bank. During the crisis stage financial supervisory can decided about credit limit, top interest rate for deposits and prohibition of advertising.

The ground conditions of functioning of banking market are determined by the decisions of the central bank, which fix reference interest rate, interest of obligatory reserve, supply of money, and another. Maybe, a part of responsibility for crises in a few banks are the effects of faulty policy of this state institutions? Such opinions can be found in literature.[39]

Treatment of bank as public trust institution and realize public functions caused the necessity of interference of sector functioning and forcing some limitations. Special treatment of banks and defense of banking sector stability is a rule which put special assignments to the state.

5. Conclusions

The basic arguments for the treatment the banks as a public good are as follows:

- functions of banks, having the character of public good,

- specific legal regulations of banking activity (including number of restrictions),

- determination of many market parameters for banks by the state (the reference rates, reserve rates, the maximum price of consumer credits and others),

- special powers of banking supervision to sanitation banks,

- implementation of functions commissioned by the state to some banks,

- public trust as an attribute of activity (institutionally strengthened by the state),

- transparency of activity, access of the media to information - which may be used against the bank,

- special sensitivity of banks to crises,

- contagion effect spreading the risk (the possible impact on the destabilization of the entire financial system),

- finally customers bear the costs of maintaining the financial security of the system (through taxes and costs contained in the prices of services, such as contributions to financial supervision), and the social costs of bankruptcy are bore by the taxpayers too.

It is possible also to put forward number of contrary arguments, among others:

- private structure of ownership of most banks,

- the functioning on the free market,

- freedom to choose the bank by customers,

- nationalization of some banks which don’t support efficiency and market behavior,

- prohibition in UE countries of public aid for private enterprises,

- possible political pressure concerning the scope and structure of public aid for banks,

- management moral hazard.

A high degree of regulation and supervision by the state over banks and public nature of banking services, justifying their recognition as an important public good.

M. Wolf set dilemma: “either the banking sector should be treated as a public utility industry and its profits should be regulated, either as a normal business, which operates according to the laws of the market and simply bankrupt when loss its solvency. If we're not able to accept the second, then I suspect that we will be forced to accept the first”[40].

The history of crises, confirms the need to recognize the status of banks as a public good, and pronouncements and opinions in the media during the last crisis in the Subprime market show that this is also expected by a substantial part of the public.

The recognition of the banks as a public good creates an ethical basis for:

- strengthen public trust to banks,

- application of the legal instruments of supervision and regulation of the market and deposit guarantee,

- creation of a national system of financial security and assistance to banks in a crisis situation (i.e. the possibility of applying of financial leverage of bank sanitation),

- establishment of an international network of financial security.

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