Политология/2. Политическая конфликтология

PhD in Political Science Polyakov E.M.

Voronezh State University, Russia

Policy design in the formation of national identity

(on example of modern Rwanda)

More than 20 years ago, in the spring of 1994 Rwanda survive a genocide. Post-conflict reconstruction was delayed for many years, since its successful completion is necessary to break down traditional boundaries of ethnical identity and design of the Public national identity that does not permit Rwandan opposition to each other. The most difficult problem is the division of responsibility between all parties and the use of special, traditional mechanisms for civil harmony that does not fit with the modern law.

Government of national reconciliation (hereinafter – GNR), formed in 1995, uses a rather fuzzy phrase “legacy of genocide”, in which are included the so-called “cachots” – camps for former participants in the genocide. They are in fact excluded from society and have little opportunity for re-socialization, especially when compared with ordinary criminals [1, 32-33].

The problem is exacerbated by some the features of the legal system in Rwanda. First, intra-elite cleaning, arranged Hutus led to the fact that in the country there are not more than a dozen lawyers – the rest fled or were killed. Secondly, the legal framework was formed very slowly, only at the beginning of the 2000s. the judicial system has been restored to a sufficient level to start the first process. Secondly, for obvious reasons, some witnesses have already lost the opportunity to act in the courts (who had died, others had forgotten the details, others have left the country, etc.). Moreover, it has been applied a kind of pre-trial practice of reconciliation of the parties, the so-called “gacaca courts”, which allowed part of the accused to escape punishment [2, 73-89].

These unique mediation institutions, which occur every week victims of genocide and their rapists for the purpose of self-expression and reconciliation in order to heal the split within the nation. However, this system can produce an effect on the condition that reveals detailed information about the crime, its content and data partners. The “amnesty” of gacaca applies only to direct “the defendants”. This means that the conditions to trigger vendetta [3, 5].

Realizing this fact, and the fact that many judges are under pressure from the executive branch of government and public opinion, in March 1999, the NTC has established a Commission on the National Accord and Reconciliation. Its activities are focused on the direct participants in the genocide and civil war. Were created the so-called “ingandos” – a special “solidarity camps” where people during 6-8 weeks listening special courses [4, 62].

Another difficulty is that the GNR needs legitimation of their actions. It is especially important to solve the problem of non-repetition of the events in April 1994: indeed, genocide happens only when the legitimacy of the status quo is in question. To overcome this threat GNR launched a campaign to promote in the mass consciousness the idea of “Banyarwanda”, “united people of Rwanda”, which should have help overcome mutual exclusion of Hutu and Tutsi, tribalism and small-town thinking. However, in fact, it turned out a little differently. Adopted on 18 December 2001, the Law “On discrimination and regionalism” is inaccurate in terms, and opened up opportunities for a broad interpretation of its provisions in law enforcement (resemblance to the Russian anti-extremism law). It also significantly limits the ability of political competition, which was clearly shown during the 2003 elections [3, 7].

As a result, a few years later, the imposition of “Banyarwanda” identity let Tutsi occupy a disproportionate share of the higher echelons of power and leadership position in the economy (accounting for 15% of the population). After 10 years after the genocide, political influence concentrated in the hands of a small clique of so-called “Ugandans”, that is, those who grew up in refugee camps in Uganda and the Tutsi closely related individuals [1, 44-45].

The latter is the problem of collective guilt of Hutus. After the formation of the GNR, formed a very specific image of Rwanda before and during the genocide, painted in black and white tone. Any alternative point of view, and even more so, the denial of officialdom, automatically falls under the ban. At the moment, formed a number of requirements for assessing the events of twenty years ago, consisting of five items: as “returnees” are only considered Tutsi, which creates problems for returning Hutu refugees in obtaining of help; refugees may or those who left the country before the events of 1994 (mostly Tutsis), or only those who have fled since 1994 (mostly Hutu). Fled Rwanda during the genocide refugees are not considered; victims are Tutsis and moderate Hutus (assuming that all moderate Hutus were killed). Consequently, refugees after 1994 are not considered either as victims or as survivors; survivors - only Tutsi therefore considered only as a Hutu members of genocide; finally, the partners - almost all living Hutus. The logic is simple: the Hutus, who opposed the genocide, were destroyed. Hence, all the remaining – or participated in the massacre, or tacitly approved it.

References:
1. Zorbas E. Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda // African Journal of Legal Studies, 2004. – Vol.1. – No.1.

2. Corey A., Joireman S.F. Retributive Justice: The Gagaca Courts in Rwanda // African Affairs, 2004. – Vol.103.

3. Rapport final sur l'election presidentielle et les election legeslatives / Mission d'Observation Electorele de l'Union Europeene Rwanda, 2003.

4. Reyntjens F. Rwanda, ten years on: From Genocide to dictatorship // African Affairs, 2004. – Vol.103.