Phd psyh. Nikolskaya A.V.

Moscow State University of Desigh and Techmologies, Russia

University of Wasington, WA, USA

Mid-term Trend or “Temporary” Lull?

This is the psychological part of the report by CSR in review of political trends in the Russian society. It is based on the studies conducted with financial support of the Kudrin Foundation and the Institute for Social Design (ISD).

In many cases we do not attempt to offer justified explanation of the unfolding events. Instead, we focus on orderly presentation of facts collected during the latest round of psychological studies.

1. Survey Methodology

Psychological testing

Psychological testing was run in three cities: Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod and Krasnodar. It was a pilot exercise intended to assess the relevance and explanatory capacity of this methodology.

In each city, 200 persons were interviewed. Three techniques were employed in the course of the testing:

· Bass-Darki test to measure aggression;

· Spielberger test to measure anxiety (the part measuring situational anxiety);

· Projective test specifically designed for the purposes of the political study.

Aggression and anxiety tests were used as quantitative techniques; projective test was used as a quantitative-qualitative technique.

An abridged version of quantitative questionnaire was added to psychological tests. Since psychological interviews were taken over a limited sample, the data from that questionnaire are somewhat limitedly representative.

The use of personality and projective tests in quantitative surveys has a long tradition in academic and applied research. The example may be tthe Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Despite wide-spread reservations, projective tests are extensively employed not only in qualitative (focus groups) but also in quantitative surveys, especially in applied ones (E. Noel). As for the Russian politological surveys, projective tests were used by A. Asmolov, E. Egorova, E. Shestopal.

Bass-Darki and Spielberger tests are commonly known and require no additional description. Both tests are widely used for individual diagnostics and retrieval as well as for comparison of average characteristics of different social groups (Buss, A.H., & Perry, M.P., 1992; Cassady, J. & Johnson, R.,2001).

Projective test which we use in this Report is a technique developed by the authors. It contains a set of drawings presenting different environments (a university, a hospital, oil rigs, etc.) and an abstract image of a human (devoid of any identifying features). The respondents were told that the image represented the President of the Russian Federation, and then asked to describe what he might be thinking and feeling while looking at a given picture. In addition, respondents were asked to define their own feelings.

The qualitative version of that test was offered to respondents of 6 focus groups (60 individuals in total) who completed it as a quantitative test with a follow-up discussion. The remaining 540 respondents were surveyed using a quantitative approach. The qualitative stage preceded the quantitative one, and the former was used both to obtain meaningful data and to pilot the technique.

Situations in the drawings are divided into 6 groups (two pictures per group, 12 pictures in total), each presenting a certain function performed by the President:

1) President and the national economy (President against the background of oil rigs, President against the background of a field with a tractor);

2) President and foreign policy (President against the background of a world map, President against the background of the UN building);

3) President and social policy (President against the background of a hospital – health care, President against the background of the Moscow State University - education);

4) President and security forces (President against the background of a military parade; President against the background of a riot police unit);

5) President and domestic policy (President against the background of a manifestation; President speaking to a large audience);

6) President and his known hobby (in our case – President against the background of a forest where animals and birds can be seen, and President at a soccer game).

In all the pictures the figure of the President is identical, static, his face a simple featureless outline, emotionless.

The set of statements “The President feels…” includes a list of 20 emotions plus the statement “feels nothing.” R. Plutchik bases the list on primary and secondary emotions.

The set of statements “The President thinks…” includes a list of 30 statements. The structure of cognitive-behavioral act was used to develop the list: assessing the situation, deciding to act (not to act), acting and evaluating the outcomes (P. Anokhin, 1980). Respective statements were selected to describe assessment of the situation, decision-making, action and evaluation of the outcomes. Language for the statements was borrowed from the actual presidential speeches with only minor editing - primarily to make them succinct and clear outside their initial context.

The survey data were used to identify predominant thoughts and feelings selected by the majority of respondents. They are summarized in a table 1.

The “impenetrable floor” and the “ceiling” of ratings in the context of psychological focus groups

Perceptions of the President’s image by the population were studied in psychological focus groups using a projective methodology to get a deeper view of the latent factors that support the President’s ratings and/or contribute to their decline.

Focus groups participants were asked to comment on 12 pictures showing a depersonalized “abstract” President of Russia not identifiable with any specific leader . For each of the situations with President’s participation respondents were supposed to formulate their vision on three topics:

· What does the President think about this?

· How does the President feel?

· What does the respondent feel?

Outcomes are summarized in Table 1.

Тable 1. Construct of the President in projective tests

No	Picture	The President thinks…	The President feels…	I feel…
1	President and the military parade	It helps to strengthen the authorities. I can be proud of my people. I will not yield.	Approval	Approval
2	President and the Moscow State University	It helps to strengthen the authorities. Everyone should stick to one’s own field and everyone shall.	Optimism	Optimism
3	President and the forest	I can save this country and I must do it.	Joy, awe	Joy, awe
4	President and the oil rigs	This will improve the condition of the people.	Optimism	Disappointment
5	President and a game of soccer	It helps to strengthen the authority of power. We should watch the events developing.	Enthusiasm, optimism	Irritation, disappointment
6	President and people working in the field	This will improve the condition of the people. I can be proud of my people.	Joy, approval	Offence, disappointment
7	President and the riot police	If I go, there will be a crisis in the country. I will not yield. Nagging at the slightest pretext must not be allowed in this country.	Approal	Apprehension, disgust
8	President and a hospital	The country has systemic problems	Apprehen-sion, irritation	Sadness
9	President and the map of the world	Enemies surround us. I will not yield. I am fully aware of what I am doing.	Doubt, apprehen-sion, disdain	Disappointment
10	President and the UN building	There is no one I can trust. I will not yield. We are open, we are ready for cooperation.	Disappoint-ment	No feelings
11	President speaks to a large audience	They do not want anything. If I go, there will be a crisis in the country. I will not yield.	Boredom	No feelings
12	President and a manifestation	They do not understand what they are doing. I will not yield. Nagging at the slightest pretext must not be allowed in this country.	Irritation, anger, offence	Optimism, doubt

Thus, Putin keeps the leftovers of state might (territorial integrity of Russia, prevention of civil war) but he does not ensure the rule of law and does not rebuild economy. All that triggers a fear of the future; and that fear produces the following feeling in its turn: “The state where I live has some might still, but I am not happy here.” Therefore, a bivalent demand for social and patriotic components is generated. However, the share of social demands has apparently grown tangibly larger, compared to the times of the USSR.

Despite significant discontent with the way things are going in the country (decline of the economy and agriculture, corruption, faltering reforms in education and health care), people still claim that there is no alternative to Putin in the current political situation. It points to a certain charisma that Putin has, which helps him retain his electorate for the last 13 years.

An ideal presidential candidate should not only promise social and economic benefits, but should also be seen as a true patriot who understands where the country is heading, emotional empathic with his people, ready to share all the difficulties with them and unselfish by his nature.

People do not see such a candidate in the present political array. Even protesters have no clear guidelines, do not understand what they want and fail to take up a common position. They are often attracted to the rallies by personal psychological deficiencies and private self-interested motivations. While Putin’s proponents are integrated by the concept of inviolability of the country borders and stability (absence of ethnic conflicts), i.e. a concept of patriotism, however limited, his opponents are fragmented and remain a shapeless mass devoid of a clear unifying idea. Although the protesters speak consciously about social demands and the rule of law without mentioning strong government, they feel unilateral approval of the image of a military parade in the projective test - just like the President. Therefore, this protective patriotic component is meaningful for them as well.

The secret of Putin’s charisma is that he embodies the demand for patriotism (at least partially), while people are already disillusioned with him as far as social demands go. But the opposition does not suggest any alternative to Putin in terms of patriotism.

This situation may change if a clear political ideology appears, but so far none is to be seen.

The demand for a positive idea is clearly evident in psychological focus groups. As people see it, neither the government, nor the opposition is able to meet such demand. The state ideology of building a strong state and fighting against terrorism presented by Putin in the beginning of his rule was understandable and was supported by the majority of the population (the so called pro-Putin’s majority).. However, the majority of respondents believed that creating a strong state failed in a broad sense, but the state has become strong enough to present a danger for its own citizens.

As a result, we see a situation where the demand for ideology is still strong (the essence of such ideology is a different issue), but credibility to existing leader as its potential proponent is gradually weakening. People express discontent with the continued decline of industry and agriculture, ineffective laws, inflation, price growth, poor reforms in education and health care. While recognizing Putin’s achievements in protecting state borders and maintaining peace in the country, people believe that the concept of a strong state is not implemented in its other aspects.

People feel unhappy in a state that the President is seeking to make stronger still. It is no coincidence that when describing the President’s thoughts and feelings on various aspects of the state, respondents believe that he is optimistic and enthusiastic while they are disappointed and sad (see below).

The concept of a strong state where people live very poor lives and suffer injustice for the sake of a bright future is no longer sufficient in modern Russia. People want to be happy in their strong state and to have real reasons to be proud of it.

The authorities promised to meet that demand but never coped with the task. As for the opposition, it fails to understand this demand, even now. Opposition leaders tell people how good their lives will be when they defeat corruption, rebuild industry, implement social reforms but never utter a word to suggest that people will live in a strong state.

Thus, there are people in the country who seek to protest against the authorities, but currently their only uniting motto is “fair elections instead of unfair ones.” It does not produce enough motivation because it lacks a positive component. Opposition’s actions often shock people and are regarded as opportunistic and double-tongued. That is because the opposition attempts to act on the basis of people’s demands that it does not fully understand: they interpret those demands primarily as social and perhaps as legal. The population, however, has a strong demand for patriotism.

Challenges faced by the opposition in building state ideologies mostly result from the fact that social demands find much better reflection. The social component fills public opinion focus groups and mass-scale opinion polls. The patriotic component of public demand is not reflected that well, it is almost never mentioned spontaneously in focus groups and only in-depth probing allowed us to bring it to the foreground.

Putin does not fully correspond to this concept, and hopes for successful future development of the country are linked with him more and more seldom. However, there is no politician in the current political arena that would embody patriotic features better than him. Perhaps this is even more important reason for the lack of alternatives to Putin, than the regular weeding out of his potential political rivals.

Analyzing results from our focus groups helps to formulate two concepts: the “Russian dream” and the “Russian nightmare.” The Russian dream is the best, the fairest, the most humane state in the world, a model for other countries and nations, where no one offends the other, where the best science, health care, industry in the world exist and the Russian army is so strong that it insures peace around the world. The Russian nightmare is a country ruined by economic decline, swarming with invaders and constant in-fights.

Note that statements on this topic were fragmented, thus the language used here is a plausible reconstruction of respondents’ opinions, not their precise rendition. This is particularly relevant to the “Russian dream” which is not well-articulated but can still be traced in the respondents’ statements.

It is significant that the concept of the “Russian dream” extracted from respondents’ statements manifests a strong idea of the messianic role of the Russian state. The concept is very close to the concept of upholding the truth, as put forth by the authors of the ideology of “Third Rome” and developed further by the Slavophils. The Bolsheviks also adhered to the messianic role of the Russian state transforming the old concept in their own way.

The above ideological constructs help to better formulate Putin’s patriotism: most probably respondents believe that he is not bringing Russia closer to the “Russian dream,” but at the same time prevents the “Russian nightmare.” Putin is regarded as a politician protecting the national borders and preventing the country’s disintegration from within, and in that sense he does not betray national interests.

There are reasons to believe that a non-patriotic politician in today’s Russia stands no chance to become truly popular. Except Putin, respondents see no other politician that could be regarded a patriot at least partially. However, we cannot rule out such figures in the future, especially if the downtrend in Putin’s ratings resumes later.

As we may see, psychological testing helped to present in a more concentrated form those electoral motivations that prevent further decline of Putin’s ratings. However, their full potential in compensating decline of the ratings became obvious only after the ratings themselves consolidated in a new equilibrium. The importance of these key support factors stayed obscure because some of them remain latent in standard public opinion studies, either quantitative or qualitative.

Thus, going by the results of psychological testing, we may specify key factors that create the “impenetrable floor” for the ratings:

· strong leader’s charisma (he is able to protect his country and has no replacement at present);

· ‘reduced’ patriotism (expressed not as pride in the country’s successes and achievements but as a high priority of protecting it from external threats and internal conflicts).

In turn, the factors that may serve as the “ceiling” for ratings include:

· loss of hope (disillusionment in capability of the authorities and the leader to ensure successful development of the country);

· fear of excessive state power (the authorities are ready to use force against the citizens but are not listening to their demands).

These factors are widely reflected in mass subconscious. Their existential nature makes them sustainable and perhaps enables them to prevail over more pragmatic and rational motives which push the ratings up or down.

Currently the combined impact of these factors creates quite a narrow corridor for the movements of the ratings.

Anxiety, aggression and their social manifestations

Aggression

The Russian society as a whole cannot be considered aggressive. According to the Bass-Darki test, 16% of respondents demonstrated weak level of aggression, 74% were average and 10% – high. Demographic and city-to-city differences appeared to be insignificant.

Meanwhile, the data obtained indicate that persons manifesting higher aggression tend to have higher protest potential. In other words, there is a noticeable concentration of individuals with higher level of aggression in the protesting segment of the society.

At the same time answers “Yes” and “No” to the question: “If elections were to be held now, would you vote for V.Putin?” are distributed approximately equally among the respondents with low to average levels of aggression (see Table 2), while three quarters (74%) of respondents with high level of aggression choose the answer “No.” Similar percentages are found for respondents with different levels of aggression when answering the question “Do you trust V.Putin?”

Similarly, respondents with low and average level of aggression gave approximately equal shares of positive and negative answers to the question “Have you lately felt frustration with the authorities?,” while respondents with high aggression yielded 74% of positive answers and only 22% of negative.

Persons with higher level of aggression have higher tendency to act in protest. In particular, 19% of persons with higher aggression expressed their readiness to take part in acts of protest (11% when averaged across the array). Another 21% declared they would not go to a rally but would speak up against the authorities (12% when averaged across the array). On the contrary, the share of those who would speak up in support of the authorities in that segment appears depleted (6% across the sample), while only 2% would join the rally in support of the authorities (6% across the sample).

The concentration of persons with higher level of aggression in the opposition may seem self-apparent. However, this is not the only possible outcome. In their time fascist regimes managed to bring the aggressive part of the society on their side. One may also expect that in countries with stable democracy highly aggressive persons may be distributed more or less evenly among the various political forces thus maintaining political balance.

The conservative state policies in Russia have attracted considerable part of the elite; however they failed to attract the aggressive part of the society now concentrated in its protest segment.

Table 2. Manifestation of aggression vs. political preferences

	Total	Manifestation of aggression
		Low	Average	High
A. Voting for V.Putin
Vote for V.Putin	46	51	47	26
Do not vote for V.Putin	54	49	53	74
B. Have you felt frustrated with the authorities lately?
No	47	56	52	22
Yes	53	44	48	78
C. Readiness to take part in rallies, demonstrations
Would support neither opponents, nor proponents of the current authorities	61	71	58	52
Would go to a rally, demonstration against the authorities	11	7	12	19
Would speak up against the authorities but would not go to a rally	12	2	13	21
Would speak up in favor of the authorities but would not go to a rally	10	14	10	6
Would go to a rally in favor of the authorities	6	4	7	2

Anxiety

As we know, anxiety is a diffuse, prolonged and unclear fear with respect to future events. In contrast to causes of apparent fear, causes of anxiety usually remain outside one’s awareness. Anxiety may stimulate one to act to increase probability of a positive outcome of the events. (Major Psychological Dictionary. Eds. B.G.Mescheryakov,V.P.Zinchenko. M..: 2009).

In contrast to aggression the index of anxiety in the Russian society appeared to be extremely high. Measurements of the situational anxiety with the use of C. Spielberger test (http://psylab.info) yielded the following results: low situational anxiety was manifested by 11% of respondents, average by 24% and high by 65%. The age aspect of anxiety appeared insignificant, while its territorial aspect was extremely strong: Moscow had the share of respondents with high situational anxiety equal to 84%.

The indicators of anxiety yielded by C. Spielberger test exceeded by far similar figures from quantitative sociological polls based on direct questions. However, manifestations of anxiety became quite clear in focus groups (see below). The principal source of anxiety is ambiguity of the future of the country, of one’s own future and that of one’s children, as felt by the respondents.

As for the protesting sentiment, the indicators of situational anxiety are less expressed but show similar trends.

For example, 58% of respondents with low and 43% of those with high anxiety are ready to vote for Putin. Frustration with the authorities never emerged among 51% of the respondents with low and 39% of those with high anxiety. Claims were expressed by 28% of the respondents with low and 42% of those with high anxiety, respectively.

Readiness to demonstrate against the authorities was expressed by 7% of respondents with low and 14% of those with high anxiety. Seven per cent of respondents with low and 17% of those with high anxiety would not join rallies but would speak up against the authorities. Passive attitude towards the authorities would be taken by 70% of respondents with low and 56% of those with high anxiety.

Thus persons featuring low level of situational anxiety demonstrate higher acceptance of the situation, as a rule. They need stronger stimuli to activity than those manifesting high situational anxiety. Conversely, our study shows that high situational anxiety may form opposing and protesting sentiments in the people. With less confidence in the future, situational anxiety of the population would deepen, and that might result in a stronger protest sentiment and greater passion of the population (the mob).

When assessing the protest potential formed by aggression and anxiety one should keep in mind that anxiety is a much more massive feature. High aggression is typical for only 10% of the population, while high anxiety is featured by 65% of it.

Redirecting aggression

Objects of redirected aggression

Personalized impulses of anxiety and aggression may take organized form or the form of non-controlled bursts of violence when triggered by the situation. Social movements based on some positive mobilizing idea may be more massive. They may induce passion into wide strata of the population. Rational dialogue is possible with such movements.

Lack of a positive mobilizing idea aggravates spontaneous bursts of aggression making social dialogue more difficult. As a rule, outbursts of violence, not shaped into any idea, that originate from the so-called primary calls are irrational. The targets of redirected aggression set their vector.

Fear and anxiety keep building up in the current Russian situation due to common frustration with the state of affairs and stronger repressive character of the state that respondents tend more and more to ‘size unto themselves’, while suffering negative emotions. Meanwhile the state seems to be too strong and dangerous an opponent for the population to direct its accumulated aggression onto it. Subconsciously respondents try to redirect their aggression and frustration towards personally less dangerous opponents.

Data from focus groups in Russia make it possible to identify three principal objects of redirected aggression: the US, bureaucrats, and ethnic migrants. The new round of psychological studies has clearly identified stronger negative attitude of respondents to all these targets.

The US has transformed into an “enemy number one” in popular perception, due to the official propaganda mostly. However, it does not fit well the role of target for redirected aggression of the population: possibilities of any direct interaction between the Russians and representatives of that country are too limited. In most cases the US may only serve an object of verbal aggression for Russian citizens.

On the contrary, both other targets are within immediate social reach, so they may face multiple manifestations of aggression.

Within the context of hated corruption, negative attitude to bureaucrats has found a much stronger expression in our latest study compared to previous rounds. Practically all the respondents believe that officers of state in Russia are set beyond the control of authorities or law enforcement; they steal with impunity and abuse the law. Note that this is the opinion of the population that may not fully correspond to reality.

Unprecedented is that the dislike of bureaucrats is so intense that it has practically displaced negative emotions towards business oligarchs; in the preceding rounds of our study the latter were mentioned negatively almost as frequently as bureaucrats. More and more often, this dislike of bureaucrats transforms into uncontrolled hatred accompanied by demands of cruel reprisals against the corrupt.

Bureaucrats seem to be a relatively safe target to our respondents. Under certain circumstances one may fearlessly express verbal indignation, complain and appeal, sue them in court, even protest openly, e.g. in the format of street action.

Conclusion

Our new findings reveal an imbalanced and contradictory state of minds of Russians. Despite the indications of a new electoral equilibrium, one can get an impression that since early 2010s the Russian society was torn off its political anchors and thrown into the troubled waters that keep tossing it back and forth.

Rapid and contradictory changes make one believe that social transformation of Russia has barely started and is far from being over. The wave-like nature of demand for democracy and protest sentiments in Moscow and beyond indicate the unsteady character of the occurring changes and the possibility of ever more sudden swings in the future.

Provided the new electoral equilibrium has indeed been established and supported the powerful factors of mass subconscious (as indicated by the psychological part of our study), it may sustain for quite a while. With his electoral ratings still nearing 50% and the political field having been weeded out of potential competitors, Vladimir Putin may long remain a no-alternative guarantor of stability and protection against external and internal threats. That could insure him mass support for at least the nearest few years. Such a course of events seems quite feasible, in case the economy avoids a new crisis or prolonged stagnation.

However, a possible protest reaction of the society to a halt in the economy makes the new electoral equilibrium rather fragile. Higher priority of current consumption outside Moscow may easily trigger mass street actions in province if incomes decline. Contrary to economic protests of 2010 which were focused on local issues and did not resonated in Moscow. Despite receding somewhat, the protest potential of Moscow is still considerable. This time Moscow, given a sheer size of its protester’s pool, may play a role in consolidating diffused protest activity in the regions and in giving it a political momentum.

References

1. Анохин П.К. Узловые вопросы теории функциональной системы, М., 1980/ Anokhin P.K. Core questions of the functional system theory

2. Большой психологический словарь. Под редакцией Б.Г.Мещерякова, В.П. Зинченко. М.:2009./ The Major Psychological Dictionary. Eds. B.G.Mescheryakov,V.P.Zinchenko. M..: 2009.

3. Buss, A.H., & Perry, M.P., 1992. The aggression questionnaire. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 452-459.

4. Cassady, J. & Johnson, R. (2001). Cognitive test anxiety and academic performance. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 27, 270-295.

5. C.Spielberger Source: http://psylab.info.