PhD student of Armenian
State Pedagogical University after Khachatur Abovyan
Khachatryan T. M
WESTERN ARMENIA IN P.ROHRBACH’S “THE WAR AND GERMANY’S
POLICY” CONCEPT
In the Middle
Eastern policy of the German Empire a special place was given to the military,
strategic, economic and political importance of Western Armenia. However,
Armenian historiography has paid little attention to this fact so far.
Particularly beginning from the last quarter of the 19th century,
different representatives of German governmental, military, political circles
were developing special concepts, which aimed to make the German Empire a world
power and to achieve victory against the Russian Empire in the expected war. In
their analyses they mainly relied on the studies done by the German
orientalists and military figures beginning from the 19th century
30s, where the Western Armenia was being overviewed as a State of special
importance (Taking the works of German scientists- orientalists as a base, P.
Rohrbach gives special importance to the strategic importance of Western
Armenia in the expected struggle against Russia. From those works he considered
more important particularly the
following orientalists’ works:
L.Ross, Kleinasien und Deutschland,
Halle, 1850, A. Sprenger, Babylonie, das reiche Land der Vorzeit und das
Lohnendste Kolonisationsfeld für die Gegenwart,Heidelberg, 1886) [1].
In the beginning
of the 20th century, taking as a base the studies of German
orientalists, P. Rohrbach [2] developed a special concept
with the aim to secure Germany’s advancement and victory in the expected war.
In it Rohrbach highlights the strategic importance of Western Armenia in the
struggle against the Tsardom of Russia. “The one who dominates on Armenia, is
invariably dominating in Eastern part of Asian Minor, as well as in
Mesopotamia. Armenia is a mountainous
country. Two really big roads connect the East with the West. The Southern
boundary begins from Persia demarcating the Armenian- Iranian mountainous
region turning from Doğubayazıt and Gharakilisa to Erzurum, serving
as a key to Asia Minor and then to the West Valley of Euphrates to Erzincan. A
passageway opens to Anatolian plateau from here. Another way starts from the
Lake Van basin, which is connected to Iranian plateau with various mountains
and continues along the East coast of the Euphates - Mush, Kharberd and
Malatya. In their turn, these regions have dominant position in the roads of the
Middle and Southern Anatolia like Erzurum and Erzincan on the Northern roads.
More obvious is the dominant position of Armenia over the South in the
direction of Mesopotamia. The mountainous part of Bitlis paves a way to Tigris
valley and from there down the river to Mosul and the Argan-Modena Ridge [3] to Diyarbekir,
which in its turn has a dominant position in the direction of the South Eastern
road and extends up to Musol. And in the South-West it extends to the Middle
Euphrates and Aleppo" [4].
Russia's
aspirations to conquer the Mediterranean sea became obvious when in June of
1913 Russia was preparing to raid to Turkish Armenia. In
this way Russia was to pressure on Turkey, so that the least would agree to the
conditions which were proposed by the allied
for concluding an armistice. Though, it was not so important for Russia
to achieve the pliability of the Turkish side, than to do a firm step towards
its progress in the direction of the Asian Turkey. The occupation of Western
Armenia (our note- T. Kh.) by Russia would mean an end for Turkey, and by
this reason the actions carried out by the Russian side could not be left
unreciprocated by us. The geographical and physical position of Armenia is so
unique, that in both the political and military relations Turkey will lose its
vitality, if it loses Armenià for the benefit of Russia [5].
Under
Russia's dominance railways should be constructed in Armenia at once-
Kars-Erzurum-Erzinkan and the second direction along the western shore of Lake
Van from Yerevan to Bitlis, from which possible branches to Kharberd and Malatya. From that moment Russia would
achieve a fully dominant position in Anatolia
and Messopotamia, it would become a powerful castle for Armenia. It is
impossible to attack Armenia with the army from the South or the West. The
achievement of the latter from the sides or
bypassing the Russian positions could not be performed by the reason that the
Taurus and Pontic Mountains are impervious to the regular troops. Russia would
have an undisputed strong position and could carry out an attack in a
convenient occasion [6].
Losing
Armenia, Turkey would be absolutely unable to centralize in those defensive
corridors, through which Russia could invade to South and West. To think about
attacking Russian Armenia, which is equipped with castles and railroads is on
the whole meaningless. If once the Turkish dominion limits with Anatolia
peninsula and the Mesopotamia, even if the Taurus Mountains become English,
then the Russian positions will serve as the most serious danger from the
perspective of the safety of England and Turkey. In that case Russia would
dominate in the whole Western Asia from the Persian Gulf up to the
Mediterranean Sea. It is impossible to imagine a more serious influence on the
East Asia than Armenia's, Transcaucasia's and
the Northern Persia's juncture to Russia. By
that reason, if there's a need to preserve Turkey, then Armenia should stay
under the domination of Turkey. As we need to assist Turkey as long as it is
possible, because we shouldn't let Armenia to pass under Russian domination [7].
By
that reason, when in 1913 Russia had almost made a decision to invade into Armenia, the German government had nothing else to
do, than to warn Russia that its step would bring to disruption of peace with
Europe. It was like the repetition of the events of 1909 when we hindered
Russia, informing them that case of possible intrusions in the Middle East, we
would undertake an armed attack against them. At that time Russia was not able
to enter into struggle against Germany and
Austro-Hungary, especially that the forces of the Balkan League were weakened
in the struggle against Turkey. Russia had to retreat [8].
Whereas we can
suppose that those events didn't bring to German-Russian friendly relationship,
but the opposite: the forced concessions made Russia only to conclude that they
need to make a more large-scale preparations so that to break Germany's and
Austria's resistance. Apparently, Russia turned to its allied France, demanding
and insisting that the triannial service in the army should be restored in
France. France, increasing its army's potential up to 800.000 at the peacetime in case of a war against Germany, until the general mobilization of its allieds' powers, France would act with a numeral surpass.
Theodore Shiman repeatedly highlighted
that the triannial service in the army had been restored not by France's wish,
but under Russia's pressure, on the assumption of federative obligations. He
pointed out that Russia's requirements were of acute character, and seemed that
the latter threaten to leave the union, if France didn't accept the
requirement. Russia was obliged to
improve its railways of strategic importance in the West, its armament and
especially preparing mobilization of the troops against Germany, and France
agreed to provide Russia with unprecedented 2.5 million franc [9].
The events which
were discussed above brought to the result that we also had to supplement the
number of our army. We could avoid all that, if we gave Armenia to Russia, and
the whole Asia Minor altogether- up to the Mediterranean Sea. In that case
Asian Turkey would be presented with the following image: the boundaries of the
Turkish Empire would limit with the area which lays between the two straits, it
is possible only if being satisfied with Eregli or Sinop up to Angora and
Smirna. The Russian boundaries would pass through Armenia, Kurdistan, covering
the whole Eastern Anatolia up to Kilikia and the Alexandretta Strait which is
situated in front of Syprus. This is
the reason why the Turkish western slight part wouldn't be able to show both
political and military resistence to
Russia by itself. The Meditterenean, Babylon, Arabia would be separated from
under the Turkish domination and would
pass under the English domination in case if France was satisfied with
Syria. In this way an Anglo- Arabian
calipate might be created together with Cairo, Jerusalem and Mecca under the
domination of England. If it was of great significance to England and Germany,
they could get a slight part in Asia Minor.
So it was vivid that with the downfall of Turkey and the division of its
area between its powers without the participation of Germany an end would be
given to German world-occupying policy. The contemporary situation in Europe
and Germany's vital interests demand the maintainance of integrity and the
continual prosperity and strenghtening of Turkey. They
can't be submitted to Russia's
approval, that is to say to have an exit to the seashore of Kilikia [10].
If Russia goes on
realizing its world occupying program than in the mentioned areas the conflicts
resolutions will be found only by military means. Already in the period of the
creation of the Balkan League the political trends of Russia were to bring to
England's factual opposition. The policy of England was always remarkable for
big clairvoyant predicting the future events. The evidence of that was the capture of Cyprus in 1978. In the Berlin Conference England guaranteed
the immunity of Turkey's Asian areas of the time. But as a reward it demanded the governance of Cyprus.
Cyprus was of strategic importance for England, which would defend it from the
Russian invasion, if the least conquered Armenia and moved on to Kilikia. Even
if the Russian plot is ever able to enter into struggle with an aim to defend
Egypt against the English plot which was in the Mediterranean Sea, nevertheless
the Russian power in the eastern parts of Ararat and the Mediterranean Sea
would bring to a number of obstacles
both on the land and in the sea [11].
In that way the advancement of Russia to the
Mediterranean Sea brought to the unexpected improvement and strenghtening of
the relationship between England and Germany. If the Balkan League, which was
created with the initiative and authority of Russia, by its victory against
Turkey brought to the counterpoise in the Balkan peninsula for the benefit of
Russia, then such kind of situation would also consolidate Russian positions in
the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea basins. Especially if the
Turkish-Bulgarian boundaries passed Constantinople and Dardanelles, which had
been planned beforehand, then it's not difficult to imagine that in the
critical point closing Bosphorus and Dardanelles would be done in favor of
Russia, which was undesirable for England particularly. The more clear became
Russia's aspirations of conquering Asia Minor from Armenia to the Meditterenean
Sea, the more Anglo-Russian relations sharped and the English policy was being
more inclined to Germany connected to the maintenance of Turkey's integrity [12].
Comparing the
current situation of Europe with the one in 1908 and 1909, we may record a
number of changes. The problem with the European and particularly German policy
is already shown not as a rivalry between Germany and England, but between
Germany and Russia. For either long or short period of time England refused its
policy of Germany's isolation. In this period an important problem was the
danger of Russia's policy of penetration to the East, which brought to a very
serious challenge for the European safety and peace. The clarification of these
issues and the clarification of the Europe's policy mostly lays in the
detection and interpretation of Russian current policy [13].
Thereby, studying
P. Rohrbach's "The War and
Germany's Policy" concept, we come to the conclusion that Western Armenia
was an area of major importance to the German Empire, based on which the German
wanted to strike Russia ruinously. The latter was considered to be one of
primary opponents for both Germany and Ottoman Turkey, especially from the
perspective of the realization of German colonial program. The local population
was considered to prevent Germany's far-sighted goals, which subsequently
contributed to Germany's "mute" agreement to the Young Turks'
committed the mass extermination of the Western Armenians.
Literature
1.
Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung
Westasiens . Halle: Gebauer-Schwetschke, 1908, S. 3-9.
2.
Album
academicum der Kaiserlichen Universität Dorpat, Dorpat, 1889, (¹ 13 519),
S. 865; Walgenbach K, "Die weisse Frau als Trägerin deutscher
Kultur": koloniale Diskurse über Geschlecht, "Rasse" und
Klasse im Kaiserreich, Frankfurt a/ Main, 2005, S. 295.
3.
The Northern part of Armenian
Taurus, the area of modern Batman and Shirvan, to the south west from the Lake
Tsovk, to the south east from Harput, Current Arcana Ridge,
which has been famous for being rich with iron mines from ancient times.
4.
Rohrbach P., The War and German
Policy, M., 1915, p 62-63.
5.
Ibid, p. 64.
6.
Rohrbach P., Vom Kaukazus zum Mittelmeer, Berlin, 1903, S.
115-117.
7.
Rohrbach P., The War and German Policy,
p. 64.
8.
Ibid.
9.
Ibid, p. 65.
10.
Rohrbach P., Vom Kaukazus zum Mittelmeer, S. 120.
11.
Rohrbach P., The War and Germany’s
Policy, p. 65-66
12.
Ibid.
13.
Ibid, p.66.