к.ф.н. Шингарева М.Ю., магистрант Айдарова А.А.

Региональный социально-инновационный университет

Categorisation as a linguistic phenomenon

To be able to understand the world and interact with it, we sort our experiences, as it were, into boxes. This on-going sorting process, which for the most part is unconscious, is usually termed categorisation. As Lakoff (1987: 5-6) points out, categorisation is the basis for our ability to think, act and speak:

Every time we see something as a kind of thing, for example, a tree, we are categorizing. Whenever we reason about kinds of things—chairs, nations, illnesses, emotions, any kind of thing at all—we are employing categories. Whenever we intentionally perform any kind of action, say something as mundane as writing with a pencil, hammering with a hammer, or ironing clothes, we are using categories. The particular action we perform on that occasion is a kind of motor activity (e.g., writing, hammering, ironing), that is, it is in a particular category of motor actions. They are never done in exactly the same way, yet despite the differences in particular movements, they are all movements of a kind, and we know how to make movements of that kind.

Thus, from this point of view, categorisation is pivotal to any understanding of how our minds work and in particular how language works since there is an explicit link between categorisation on the one hand and thinking and understanding on the other. A crucial claim made by cognitive linguistics is that categories are formed through our interaction with the world. This interaction is experienced through our bodies and as a result categories are ultimately grounded in bodily experiences. This highly egocentric position has been named experiential realism by Lakoff (1987:xv).

According to experiential realism, our conceptual system grows out of and is constrained by the limitations set by our bodies to experience in terms of perception, movement, and physical and social interaction. Consequently, abstract thinking and imagination, which are not directly grounded in bodily experience, are considered to be based on bodily experiences mediated through metaphor, metonymy or analogy. As an example, consider our understanding of time, which is frequently metaphorically understood as movement; thus we can talk about the conceptual metaphor +TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT+ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 42) - our notion of moving objects being experientially based.

Another consequence of the theory of experiential realism is that structural principles are also viewed as being ultimately grounded in bodily experiences. Johnson (1987) suggests that there is a set of image schemata which serves as structures for the organisation of our experience and of our understanding of the world. He (1987: 29) defines an image schema as consisting of a small number of parts and relations, by virtue of which it can structure indefinitely many perceptions, images and events. In sum, image schemata operate at a level of mental organisation that falls between abstract propositional structures, on the one side, and particular concrete images, on the other.

The view we are proposing is this: in order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason about, there must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, these ongoing ordering activities.

In what follows we will attempt to give a summary of Langacker’s view of categorisation, a view to which we will adhere in our discussion of categorisation. Langacker makes a distinction between two types of categorisation: by prototype and by schema. The two modes of categorisation are viewed as intimately linked, but emphasise different aspects of the same phenomenon. It is important not to confuse Langacker’s schema with Johnson’s image schemata. Langacker (1987: 371) defines a schema as an abstract characterization that is fully compatible with all the members of the category it defines (so membership is not a matter of degree); it is an integrated structure that embodies the commonality of its members, which are conceptions of greater specificity and detail that elaborate the schema in contrasting ways.

Langacker observes that “although their relative importance varies from one category to the next, schemas and prototypes are both essential to category structure, reflecting different aspects of a unified phenomenon.” Extensions typically occur when we categorise a new experience that deviates slightly from previous experiences of a category as belonging to that category. Langacker claims that extensions are characteristically made from the prototype.

Some researchers, for example Dirven and Verspoor (1998), seem to have blended the ideas of radial structure and network into the term radial network.

Another feature of the network model is that a network is supposed to be dynamic and not static - it is constantly elaborated through the input of usage and experience. We are concerned here with the cognitive notion of entrenchment. Langacker (1999:93) describes it as a general psychological phenomenon characterised by the fact that the occurrence of psychological events leaves some kind of trace that facilitates their re-occurrence. Through repetition, even a highly complex event can coalesce into a well-rehearsed routine that is easily elicited and reliably executed.

Thus, continued activation of certain parts of the network (certain schemas, extensions or prototypes) will entrench these and may, as a consequence, restructure the network. For instance, the category COMPUTER has probably been restructured continually during the past twenty years, for the language users who have been part of the development.

It should be pointed out that, at first sight, Langacker’s idea of network does not seem to be entirely compatible with Wittgenstein’s and later Rosch and Mervis’ idea of family resemblances. Discussing the category Spiel (“game”), Wittgenstein could demonstrate that there seems to be no property that is shared by all the instances of this category. Instead the category is kept together through a chain of properties: the structure could be described as forming a set of items of the form AB, BC, CD, DE. That is, each item has at least one, and probably several, elements in common with one or more items, but no, or few, elements are common to all items. (Rosch and Mervis 1975:575)

It is important to note that the highest order schema of any network is supposed to represent the commonalities of the entire concept of game. Given the lack of common properties, such a schema would have to be very general. Taylor (1995) rejects Langacker’s notion of schema for this very reason claiming that it is not meaningful to talk about abstract schemata which are almost empty. However, to my mind, the dynamic character of the network makes it possible to accommodate family resemblance structures within the network metaphor. For instance, the network model can take other forms than that of a radial category.

In conclusion, the gist of categorisation in cognitive linguistics can be summarised as follows: categorisation is a mental phenomenon through which we organise our understanding of the world, categorisation is grounded in our bodily experience of the world, categorisation creates cognitive categories or concepts which are typically complex structures.

Literature:

1. Lakoff, G. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

2. Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

3. Johnson, M. 1987. The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

4. Langacker, R.W. Dirven, R. and M. Verspoor 1998. Cognitive Exploration of Language and Linguistics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins (Cognitive Linguistics in Practice 1).

5. Dirven, R. and M. Verspoor 1998. Cognitive Exploration of Language and Linguistics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins (Cognitive Linguistics in Practice 1).

6. Langacker, R.W. 1999. Grammar and Conceptualisation. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

7. Rosch, E., C.B. Mervis, W.D. Gray, D.M. Johnson and P. Boyes-Braem 1976. Basic Objects in Natural Categories. Cognitive Psychology, vol. 8, 382-439

8. Taylor, J.R. 1995. Linguistic Categorization: Prototypes in Linguistic Theory. 2^nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon.