Pavliuk O. I.

Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University, Ukraine

THE U. S. POLICY CONCERNING IRAN UNDER NIXON DOCTRINE

After Second World War, the US developed a concept known as «conservation theory», according to it the United States should reduce its own production of raw materials and acumulate its forces to search for oil resources abroad. Since the detection of oil fields in the Persian Gulf, they immediately became the object of US interests, as could meet the needs of its industrial development.

The preservation of stability and independence of the states in the Middle East and contain the threat of Islamic fundamentalism were also the main interest in the region fro American leaders in the 60-70s XX century. But these threats were derived and considered in conjunction with such problems as oil and containment of the USSR as a permanent threat to US foreign policy.

While American interests in the Persian Gulf apparent during the Second World War, US started a direct impact on process in the region only since 1971. [1, p.11]. Until that time responsible for security in the region lay on the UK and the United States gave only its support. [3, p. 21] However, January 18, 1968, British Prime Minister  H. Wilson announced in the House of Commons that the British decided to withdraw its troops from the Gulf by the end of 1971. This situation has given impetus to the future presence of US in the region. US policy in the Near and Middle East gradually expanded during the administration of R. Nixon and based on his foreign policy agenda, which became known as the «Nixon Doctrine».

The doctrine stated that the United States will provide military and economic assistance to people whose freedom is threatened, but also hope that these countries will assume primary responsibility for its own defense. [2] The US felt a threat, if not to adopt a concept of regulation of relations before the presence of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, the dangerous vacuum of power will be created in the region. Although Nixon administration was troubled by security in the Gulf region, it is recognized that the American military presence in Vietnam was excessive and that the American public already disturbed by war, will not support an active US involvement in the Middle East. Thus, in August 1972 Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, J. Sisco said before Congress that US Middle East vector and basic directions of relations with the countries of the region in accordance with the «Nixon Doctrine» were as follows: 1) maintaining political development and regional cooperation; 2) to provide support to local governments to promote their independence and peace without US intervention in internal affairs; 3) encourage Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the smaller states to actively cooperate with each other to ensure security in the region; 4) to assist in the modernization of the armed forces of Iran and Saudi Arabia, to enable them to effectively provide their own security and to contribute to security in the region as a whole; 5) expand Washington's diplomatic presence in the region; 6) to extend the presence of marine troops in Bahrain. [1, p. 100]

The fourth principle was key in American policy towards the Gulf region by President R. Nixon became known as the concept of «twin pillar». Iran and Saudi Arabia were appointed substituted for US security and the presence of American national interests in the region. Nixon Administration recognized that the growing military power of Iran in conjunction with financial assets of Saudi Arabia, supported by rising oil prices represent a formidable, albeit indirectly, a tool of US policy in the Persian Gulf.

Iran was certainly more convergent partner due to its much more numerous population, relatively more developed economies, and more powerful armed forces [2]. US gave to Shah carte blanche to the procurement of arms, exept nuclear weapons. Iran has received an unprecedented number of high level of technology and weapons that the US supplied to it in the 70’s. In addition, the main objectives of US policy on Iran included:

- maintain an independent and sovereign Iran

- maintain close ties with Iran, especially with Shah

- ensure vigilance Iranian leadership relatively Soviet long-term goals.

- support facilities for communication and intelligence and privileges the use of airspace for flights over Iran.

- influence the policy of Iran to enhance security and stability in the Middle East

- support access to the West of Iranian oil, protect and expand US investment, get the maximum share of the growing Iranian market [2].

However, a range of events in the region since 1979 prevented the introduction Nixon Doctrine and led to the rise of a more aggressive US policy toward the Persian Gulf. The fall of the Shah’s regime in Iran and the Islamic Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the war on the border between North and South Yemen, the start of the Iran-Iraq war - showed high levels of tension and conflict in the Middle East. The fall of the Shah’s regime in early 1979 had the greatest impact on US policy in the region [3, p.50]. Without the Shah regime Nixon Doctrine was ineffective as Saudi Arabia failed to adopt this role itself.

Thus, the US was actively developing Middle East vector in its foreign policy in the 70s XX century, which was based on the Nixon Doctrine. Regarding to the economic, political, military, strategic and monetary and financial interests of the United States, the concept of «twin pillar» effectively was introduced in the Middle East, but the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the sudden and complete collapse of the Shah’s regime in Iran put an end to ten-year strategy for the United States in the Persian Gulf.

References:

1.     Bradley P. Recent United States policy in the Persian Gulf (1971-1982) / Paul Bradley. – NY: Thompson Rutter, 1982. – 289 p.

2.     Bell R. Expansion of American Persian Gulf policy by three presidents [Åëåêòðîííèé ðåñóðñ] // Global Security. – Ðåæèì äîñòóïó: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/BRB.htm

3.     Gordon M. Conflict in the Persian Gulf / Murray Gordon. – NY: Fact on File, 1981. – 192 p.