Prof. Valery V.Mykhaylenko

Bukovyna State Finance Academy

Chernivtsi, Ukraine

On Discourse Information And Utterer’s Intention

The problems of discourse information (intra- and extra-linguistic types) and utterer’s intention are in the focus of our investigation. There is a multilayer structure of discourse information due to its synergy of verbal non-verbal contents. We consider discourse to be a continuum, for example an author’s discourse, discourse of a certain epoch, or of a certain generation, these terms can determine one and the same construct – hypertext. In the Columbia Encyclopedia hypertext is defined as technique for organizing computer databases or documents to facilitate the non-sequential retrieval of information. Related pieces of information are connected by pre-established or user-created links that allow a user to follow associative trails across the database. When more formats than text are linked together, we believe that the technique can be referred to as megadiscourse which applications offer a variety of tools for very rapid searches for specific information. The discourse information quantors or author’s modi constitute the object of the present analysis to further correlate the type of discourse and the type of discourse information represented by the discourse information quantors, for example: I reckon, I guess, I believe, I think, I understand, etc.

Update semantics embodies a radical view on the relation between context and interpretation. The meaning of a sentence is identified with its context change potential, where contexts are identified with information states. The recursive definition of semantic interpretation is stated in terms of a process of updating an information state with a sentence. A fundamental distinction is made between two kinds of information: information about the world, and discourse information. In general, discourse information concerns matters which are relevant to the linguistic interpretation process as such. It is subservient to the primary goal of gathering information about the world. Discourse information is typically of a temporary nature: once (part of) the discourse is closed, it can be discarded. And, under the assumption that all participants in a conversation have equal, and full, access to which utterances are made and by whom, discourse information is typically shared knowledge that cannot fail to be part of the common ground. Since the object language is a logical language, and assuming that the participants conversing in it are competent speakers, there can be no doubt or disagreement about matters of discourse information. One can look upon discourse information as contextual information in the strict sense of the word: it is linguistic information about the verbal means.

Meanwhile, as an activity progresses, further problem-solving and negotiation may be required to address outstanding goals. Collaborators’ intentions in dialogue must address these meta-level tasks in addition to real-world tasks. Characteristic problem-solving activities include identifying goals that need to be achieved, identifying subtasks to perform and selecting suitable parameters for them, allocating them to individual agents, and jointly assessing the results once agents have acted. Modeling this problem-solving means recognizing the indirect role utterances play in achieving real-world goals (Litman and Allen, 1990; Lambert and Carberry, 1991; Carberry and Lambert, 1999) and the explicitly collaborative stake participants have in problem-solving discourse as well as real-world action (Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Lochbaum, 1998; Blaylock et al.).The starting point for this exploration is Grice’s proposal that interpretation is a species of intention. For H.Grice, a pragmatic interpretation simply represents what the speaker was trying to do with an utterance; to understand an utterance, language users must simply construct an appropriate such representation.

This idea might be taken as an almost tautological restatement of our problem - to understand an utterance, language users must recognize what the utterer intended , in this case the utterer’s intention quantors can give the clue. Indeed, when we speak of the intended analysis of an ambiguous expression, or the intended referent of a pronoun, or other intended aspects of utterance interpretation, we rarely stop to consider our implicit appeal to Grice’s theory [1,147-177]. Grice’s proposal suggests that we must develop an account of interpretation by drawing on independent accounts of intention. This means that the utterer’s intention quantors must instruct the interlocutor what an utterer was trying to do with an utterance. Likewise, H.Grice’s proposal suggests that interlocutors must frame an account of processes in conversation in terms of independent accounts of deliberation and collaboration. This means that we must explain the work interlocutors do to understand one another with the same constructs we use to account for other interactions among people working together in dynamic and unpredictable environments.

Any English report of mental state describes both the content of an individual’s attitude and the cognitive representations behind it. However, it is impossible to describe the objective meaning of an individual’s mental state, as natural languages appear to do, while still reporting individuals’ representations exactly; representations with equivalent objective content can have important differences, for example in the form in which they are represented. Due to this, semantic accounts of mental-state sentences require substantial flexibility in linking content and representations. Intentions such as these are the objects of interlocutors’ deliberation and coordination in conversation. For example, in offering an utterance in conversation as part of a specific plan or intention, the utterer is committed that the circumstances and conditions laid out in the plan obtain, and that the outcome envisaged in the plan is advantageous. These commitments are a standard feature of formal analyses in the speech act tradition. Yet even though these commitments can be derived from the role of intentions in deliberation (Cohen and Levesque, 1990), prior analyses have not offered representations of intentions that abstract away from these commitments in a general way. Meanwhile, since the conversation is a collaboration, the utterer must also ensure that the intention behind the utterance will be recognizable to the other interlocutors. At the same time, collaboration allows the utterer to presume that interlocutors maintain coordinated attention and intentions toward the ongoing task, and it allows the utterer to presume that interlocutors will recognize the plan and pursue it, by carrying its actions through and by grounding its success or failure.

A cognitive science of language use is responsible not only to explain an individual conversation, but also to elucidate its relationship to other cognitive abilities in ourselves and other species. It plays into a tradition beginning with Aristotle and continuing with such work as (Sperber, 2000) in linking human language to a representational understanding of one’s own and others’ mental states that is uniquely human. Meanwhile, intention-based pragmatic representations seem necessary to underline the rich view of language acquisition that theorists increasingly adopt - see (Gillette et al., 1999; Seidenberg and MacDonald, 1999; Bloom, 2000) - acquisition of language depends on integrating multiple sources of evidence, including not only observed utterances and innate constraints of grammar but also learners’ understanding of and interaction with the people whose language they learn [2; 4].

The relationship between thoughts (e.g. desires, beliefs and intentions) and actions has been investigated by philosophers through the ages, and characterized in very different ways. Under one theory (Bratman, 1987), which answers many previously unresolved questions, and has received some empirical backing from cognitive psychology (Moses Malle and Baldwin, 2001), plans and intentions are mental states that we develop rationally in order to enable the fulfillment of our desires, given our beliefs [2; 4]. A plan is a higher-level intention. Once we have committed to a plan, we form more specific lower-level intentions enabling us to carry it through, and perform the actions necessary to fulfilling each level of intentions. This planning process is critical to our functioning both as rational individuals and as social beings, because it projects our attitudes and beliefs into time and social space, allowing them to affect our actions beyond the present and enabling us to coordinate our actions with those of others (Bratman, 1987).

While intention has been shown to be central to human communication, the critical role in social interaction of intentions beyond communicative intention has not been much studied within Relevance Theory (RT).

Marie-Odile Taillard & Wilson (1986, 1995) argued that two levels of intentions are involved in ostensive communication: the informative intention and the communicative intention. The speaker’s informative intention is to inform the audience of something (e.g. to induce a belief in the audience).

From the production perspective, utterer’s intention to communicate results directly from utterer’s intention to fulfill his/her informative intention, i.e. to make the audience believe something. From the recovery point of view, unless the audience correctly recognizes the utterer’s informative intention, communication has failed. This clearly illustrates the hierarchical structure of intentions. We can take the example one step further. One’s intention to share his/her enthusiasm for the scenery might, for instance, serve to fulfill, and be best understood (by others) in the light of the utterer’s underlying intention to cause the hearer, having adopted the same attitude, to stay awake while driving. [4; 5]. In this case, isolating the communicator’s informative and communicative intentions (to share his/her appreciation for the scenery) does not reveal to the audience the communicator’s higher-order intention (to keep the driver awake), which might nonetheless have some relevance for them. The higher-level intentions that the audience brings to this particular interaction will also help determine the extent to which the communicator’s higher-level intentions are explored, and the cognitive resources mobilized to do so.

Reference:

1. Grice H. P. Utterer’s Meaning and Intention. // Philosophical Review, 1969. - 78(2). - Pp.147–177.

2. Кornilov О.А.Yazykovye kartiny mira kak proizvodnyie natsionalnyl mentalitetov. - Мoscow: ЧеРо, 2003. - 349 p.

3. Lochbaum K. E. A Collaborative Planning Model of Intentional Structure. // Computational Linguistics -1998. -24(4). - Pp.525–572.

4. Selivanova O. Suchasna Linguistica. Terminologichna Entsyclopedia. - Poltava: Dovkillia - K, 2006. - 716 p.

5. Wierzbicka Ann. English: Meaning and Culture. - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. - 352p.