История/2.Общая история

PhD Dadabaeva G.R.

Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research,

Almaty, Kazakhstan

The establishment of state nationalism

in independent Kazakhstan

The growth of nationalism and nation-state which could be lately observed all over the world makes us to know what processes and how determines these changes. There are many predictions of the demise of the nation-state in the face of globalization, provided by the emergence of the global civil society. This process seems to show how flows of investment, technology, communication across national boundaries are the most striking symptoms of global challenge to the nation-state in its regulative and control functions or bargaining or conflict between nations.

But is it true ? The main point of the work is to show how complicated and uneven is interdependence of developed and developing world and how this process has been accelerated by the emergence of newly established states. The main examples of these processes became revival of nationalism and persistence of ethnicity. The growth of interest of social scientists to these issues after the demise of the Soviet Union just enhanced the field of application of different theoretical approaches and academic explanations of this phenomenon whether it’s an appeal to E. Gellner’s idea of homogenization of culture along with the state’s political borders (Gellner E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell), or construction of nation-state under the guidance of political elite, trying to reach a civic unification of it’s diverse, ethnically, linguistically and by other factors, population (C. Geerz, 1963). Some scholars have connected the sensitivity of these problems with the possibility for the representatives of different groups to get and, which is more important, to keep control over the economic and political spheres of influences (Horowitz D., 1985).

Kazakhstan as a nation-state:

The demise of the Soviet Union in early 1990-s was clearly marked with the two opposite to each other processes:

1) growth of nationalistic aspirations, especially in Baltic and Slavic republics, partly covered the territories of Central Asian republics, including Kazakhstan. The events of December 1986 defined by Central Committee of CPSU as “Kazakh nationalism” were the striking signs of the beginning of new period in history of our state;

2) but suddenly when the USSR had collapsed Kazakhstan as other Central Asian republics expressed it’s unwillingness to leave the Union. Kazakhstan was the last republic declaring it independence after disintegration of the Soviet Union.

What the real reasons were laying under the surface of these contradictory processes in which Kazakhstan was involved?

In Kazakhstan appeared new political force – Kazakh nationalists convinced that indigenous population has to keep complete political control in republic. The period when Kunaev was the first secretary of Kazakh Communist party (1964-86) became the beginning of the process of nationalism growth under political leadership patronage [1]. As the power of nation grew nationalism became the principal basis of political legitimacy. People began to realize their interests as citizens of certain national territorial unit different from the interests of center. But the December events (1986) showed the other things – the state became inseparable from the dominant national group has to represent its own interests. So, the real political force in early 1990-s was state and its leadership. In search of a new ideology the government gave preferences to state nationalism which looks more appropriate to claim politics of sovereign, independent Kazakhstan.

In the meantime, M.S. Gorbachev’s reforms “created favorable conditions for mass political mobilization whose most potent base was ethnic rather than political” [2]. The latter factors turned the focus of state interests to the demands of nationalists. The interests of Kazakh nationalists and political elite thus became closer opposite to Russian population who had no idea how the Russian nationalism would work in independent Kazakhstan. So, in early 1990-s, the whole Soviet ideology and doctrine... evaporated with the collapse of the USSR. Only state remained [3].

The process of coming nearer views and ideas of state leadership and Kazakh nationalists happened mainly due to fear of territorial and border disputes, social disorder as consequence of economic crisis and natural desire of local political elite to keep the power. In these circumstances political leadership saw a strong state as the means to prevent all negative consequences of independence. For its own political purposes government supported the idea that “core nation” is a legitimate “owner” of the state, which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation.

State Reforms and nationalizing language politics

Kazakhstan political reforms proceeded in a number of clearly delineated stages. During this period the country leadership abandoned communist ideology and Soviet social political and economic institutions and developed a version of independent, secular state based on market economic relations and principles of international law.

One of main obstacles on this way was the task to create in a short amount of time unified and distinctive nation and the easiest way was the using of the claims of Kazakh nationalists to fulfill this task. Political elite of Kazakhstan just sorted and collected from their claims those issues which were appropriate for the state tasks.

In 1989-90-s “State Program…” and “Law on Languages” were adopted in the atmosphere of expectations of quick changes in favor of titular nation. In order to press the republican supporters of close relations with Moscow the government encouraged the sharp discussions on Kazakh people misfortunes during Soviet period. The government defined in “Declaration of Independence” (1991) [4] the status of Kazakh language in a very limited scale along with “the rebirth and development of culture, traditions …of the Kazakh nation.” The last point became the most important for agreement between government and Kazakh nationalists.

During this period he Kazakh nationalists were unable to overwhelm the government due of their “backwardness” in comparison to the nationalists of other post-Soviet republics and Third world countries. So, the state could use the most sensible for the majority of country population issues and along with this process to create its own ideology of state nationalism.

The first state Constitution adopted in 1993 expressed the state desire to keep under control the process of nation- and state building completely in “Soviet style”. Kazakh language was defined as a “state” language and Russian as a language of “interethnic communication”. “Republic of Kazakhstan” – was defined – “as a state system self-determined by the Kazakh nation” relegating all non-Kazakh to an inferior position within the state.

So, these ethnocultural issues became the driven factors in government reform that included dominance of ethnic Kazakhs in high level positions, particularly executive positions at the government ministerial level and at the level of oblast governors.

The state didn’t need Russian population in former capacity, so the nationalists regards coincided with the state goals. Wave of disappointment of Kazakh nationalists by still existed “official” status of Russian language provided a great assistance for government in order to oust from the territory of the republic Russians and other Slavic ethnic groups. Due to all these factors massive migration to neighboring Russia, then Germany began. But even in this case the political leadership was not in risk to share the major part of power with Kazakh nationalists. Ethno-nationals were unable to get power, and moreover, to concentrate it in their hands. Main benefits in this case were taken by political leaders who quickly replaced the “communist ideology” by new one - “state nationalism”. In constructing new political and cultural identity state successfully used some notions of Kazakh nationalists and some claims from the side of Russian-speakers who became a minority group, especially after parliamentary crisis of 1994-95. The crisis helped the government to form the framework of interethnic relations that had to accommodate both sides. Here, beginning with the period of real political reforms since 1996-1997 we could notice the slow transformation of Kazakh nationalists from “suffering group’ of ethnic minority to a majority group of nation – builders.

But in spite of the fact that ethnic politics became a crucial factor in government reforms political elite needed a real economic support for making the regime not only legitimate but also strong enough to survive in hard times.

Kazakhstan authorities stressed support of regime by international community and international organizations opposite to claims of Russian-speaking population ideas to keep close relations with Russia. Kazakhstan readily accepted technical assistance of such international organizations as World Bank, IMF, etc. Nationalism of new emerging state needed to leave the orbit of Russian influence as soon as possible. Consequently, Kazakhstan was eager to be accepted to different international organizations to be sure in their rights to preserve the borders untouched.

Not surprisingly Kazakhstan leader expressed the idea that “state accepted the strategy of self-sufficiency in the post-colonial world paid a high price. “Modern independence implies integration in the international community, not withdrawal and self-reliance” [2, p.12].

However, president Nazarbaev demonstrated his ability to keep under control political situation in the country. He used both sides – Kazakh nationalists and Russian-speaking intelligentsia. Finally, by the end of 1993 when the process of privatization was over the majority of the Kazakhstan government was represented by Kazakhs.

With the adoption of new Constitution in 1995 the problems of the state language appeared in a more contradictory way. This process was preceded by political crisis of 1994-1995 that led to “crystallization of two broad elite alliances, called nationalists and cosmopolitans” [5].

But crisis made clear not only language problems but also such issues as tensions over results of privatization and discontent by massive migration of Russian-speaking population, reaching in 1994-96 1,200,000 people [6]. Thus, the government was provided an opportunity to implement language policy, free from the extreme excesses of Kazakh nationalists. In a new Constitution (1995) the Russian language was granted a higher status of “official” instead of “language of inter-ethnic communication”. During the same period Russia became more active in promoting a new campaign to protect the interests of the Russian population “in near abroad”.

The leader of Kazakhstan again proved his abilities to keep control over the situation and even to manipulate with the forces represented the possible threats for the state stable future. The president administration used every opportunity to marginalize extreme Kazakh and Russian nationalist organizations.

Next step was made by Russian-speaking Kazakhs led by prominent representatives of Kazakh intelligentsia who appealed for keeping close relations with Russia [7]. In response, president Nazarbaev in spring of 1994 suggested the idea of organization of Eurasian Union. In spite of the fact it seemed to be a shift to a side of Russian – speaking population in reality it provided for the president an opportunity to split of the broad alliance of supporters of Russia - Kazakhstan union.

The next steps of the government went in the direction of making language policy more appropriate for the international community with the goal of further improving the economic situation and to lessen the negative consequences of the exodus of Russian-speaking population.

Conclusion

The main outcomes of state policy in 1990-s has shown that it was a result of mutual influence and interconnection between three powerful groups: state, Russian – speaking population and Kazakh nationalists.

Russian nationalism claims made the position of Russians in Kazakhstan weaker that in would be possible in early 1990-s. Russia like Kazakhstan was also trapped into difficult position, trying to establish a territorial nation and following the inheritance of previous Soviet national politics when dominant ethnic group has to occupy the certain territory as political unit and to establish it’s language as dominant. Russia’s attitude towards her Slavic kinsmen in 1990-s provided at least a moral support for their claims, but the problem was that Russia was not ready to accept them as newcomers to their territories because of her own economic troubles.

As for Kazakhstan government the leadership tried to solve the problem seemed to be impossible. Like any other new independent state Kazakhstan was and still, at least by words, is eager to create the territorial nation united by civic citizenship, meaning the inclusive principle of nation and state - building. The claims that all the citizens of the republic are Kazakhstani have shown the leadership intentions to follow the experience of Western European nationalism of XVIII-XIX centuries. But really the government accepted nationalism close to post – colonial cases, using ethnopolitics to make ruling regime legitimate and stronger. The leadership was trapped into double sized task: to use inclusive principle in order to create territorial nation, and to use ethnic policy to exclude some part of the population from the forming nation. At this stage state successfully decided this problem, mainly because of inability of both Kazakh and Russian nationalism to defend their interests. But with time the next clusters of problems for the republic would be: could Kazakh nationalism be stronger without state support and independent enough to form it’s own political program, would Russian-speaking population be united by their own slogans and how the state would answer to all these claims.

References:

1. Шац Е., Дадабаева Г. К проблеме «трайбализма» в казахском обществе // Отан тарихы, 1998, № 3, с. 81-86.

2. Zaslavsky, Victor. The Soviet Union in “After Empire”. – Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, p. 84.

3. Gleason, Gregory. The Central Asian States. Discovering Independence. – Colorado: Westview Press, 1997, p. 16.

4. О государственной независимости // Казахстанская правда, 1991, 16 декабря.

5. Surucu, Cengiz. Modernity, Nationalism, Resistance: Identity Politics in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan // Central Asia Survey, 2002, 21 (4), p. 385-402.

6. Dave, Bhavna. A Shrinking Reach of the State? Language Policy and Implementation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan // Transformation of Central Asia: State and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence / ed. Pauline J. Luong. – Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 131.

7. Амрекулов Н., Масанов Н. Казахстан не имеет будущего без России // Караван, 1994, 4 февраля.