FIGHT FOR TURKMENISTAN BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GREAT

BRITAIN 1872-1885

Shabanov E. I. , Оtarbaeva G. K.

c. h. s., senior teacher, head of chair «International relations», M. Auezov SKSU

Need to ensure safety and improvement of the Central Asian suburbs of Russia and to open new ways to Central Asia for the Russian trade the Imperial government induced to care about consolidation of the influence in the east from the Caspian Sea. The first decisive step in this direction was taken at the end of 1869 by occupation of Krasnovodsk, which didn’t slow down to put us in direct contact with one of the most numerous Turkmen tribes - tekines, had been famous for a long time for the impudent attacks on neighboring countries and, in particular, on northeast areas of Persia. Our diligence to put an end to predatoriness of tekines by moral impact on them didn't lead to desirable result, and so our private military reconnaissances directed to Akhal – the teke oasis had not enough success. Promoting strengthening of belief of tekes in their invincibility, these half measures only aggravated their impudence, and, for a settlement the order and safety in steppes, we came to be at last in need to resort to the only possible means in relation to the Central Asian predatory population - to final occupation of their country. This goal was reached in January, 1881 by a capture of Geok-Tepe.

Starting the device of again occupied edge, the Imperial government found necessary to take care about reducing the donations which were required on this subject; and as for this purpose first of all it was necessary not too to move boders of new area, and Baba Durmaz was decided to be recognized the extreme east point. As for the Turkmen lands lying in the east from this point, the ensuring of tranquillity in them was necessary to reach by means of the vigilant supervision supported by military demonstrations. These measures had had to seem especially sufficient because of soil conditions in Atek and on coast of Tejen were more favored to development of agriculture which in case of establishment of tranquillity and order, had to satisfy the requirements rather not numerous and besides the different races of Turkmen population which had settled in these districts. As for the population of the Merv oasis separated from our suburbs by extensive and partly by waterless steppes, it seemed that a strict penalty to which Akhaltekins underwent, had to influence by a sobering way on the marked population and to moderate its injurious bents. At the beginning circumstances weren't slow down to justify fidelity of this calculation, and in September, 1881 the statements began to act from separate foremen of Merv sorts for their readiness to recognize the Supreme power of the Sovereign of the Emperor over themselves and desire to provide protection of Russia for itself. These statements were responded under a condition of the termination of robberies by Turkmens, the protection wouldn’t be refused to them, but for clarification of the relations with Russia, they should address to the nearest Russian authorities directly. And at the same time from Merv two deputations were sent which one went to Askhabad and another through Khiva to Petro-Aleksandrovsk, the project of conditions was reported to chiefs of Zakaspian area and Amu-Daryan department on the basis of which they were allowed to enter the agreement with Merv foremen.

Owing to these conditions, the signing both in Askhabad, and in Petro-Aleksandrovsk took place almost at the same time, foremen promised on behalf of their sent sort:

1) never and under any pretext not to take up the arms against Russians and to obey orders and councils of the Russian chiefs;

2) to stop forever robberies of passing through Merv and other lands of caravans, and inhabitants of the neighboring Turkmen and other countries, and also the Persian lands. In case of a causing the robberies by anyone of tribes, guilty should be inflicted by punishments and all stolen property should be returned to the victim, and, if it was impossibility to execute it, to compensate injured the cost robbed and, in these cases, certainly to carry out decisions of the Russian authorities;

3) to stop forever trade in slaves;

4) to accept with honor persons who would be sent from time to time to Merv from the Russian authorities and to send from itself from time to time special messengers to the nearest Russian authorities;

5) to give protection for the established payment to the Russian trade caravans, and also the caravans of other next people passing through Merv to Khiva, Bukhara and Persia; besides, collection of existing custom gatherings from caravans was allowed. The amount of this gathering, and also payment for protection of caravans was defined under the agreement with the chief of Zakaspian area;

6) not allow to the lands the agents from other governments except Russian messengers;

7) to give horses with guides, for the established payment, for couriers who would be sent from the Russian chiefs.

From one side, chiefs of Zakaspian area and Amu-Daryan department, owing to the instructions given to them, promised on behalf of the Russian government to Merv foremen, under a condition of exact implementation of the above obligations by them: not to break neither religions, nor customs, an order of the management, existing in Merv, not to appoint special Russian chiefs in Merv, not to impose any taxes on Mervs and to render protection to Merv Turkmens in the Russian borders which was from the Russian government the citizen of Bukhara Emir and the Khivan Khan. Some others were in Askhabad after the first deputation, the agreement with which was concluded on absolutely identical conditions. Due to the device of Zakaspian area there was also a question of boundary definition between area and the northeast provinces of Persia - Asterabad and Khorasan.

At the end of 1869, soon after the occupation of Krasnovodsk, the Imperial office was included with the Persian government into the agreement on the basis of which the river Atrek was recognized as a northern bound of possession of the Shah. As, after the next research of boundary space, it was found out that in headwaters of Atrek both of its coasts were occupied with the Persian settlements, so it was necessary to explain misunderstanding following from this and, at the same time, to prolong a boundary to east suburb of Zakaspian area.

Negotiations on this subject led to the conclusion of the convention on December 9, 1881 in which 1st article the direction of the Russian-Persian border from Atrek's mouth to Baba Durmaz is defined. For the type of interest which a situation was represented for Persia in the countries stretching to the east from this point, we didn't fail to warn the Persian government with frankness about the action program developed by us, and expressed firm intention to care about providing suburbs of Khorasan from attacks of independent Turkmens. The Russian-Persian convention of December 9, 1881wasn't slow to be the cause of statements from Great Britain’s government. During the visit with our ambassador on January 20, 1882 lord Granvill told him that existing quite friendship between England and Russia seemed more favorable for explanations on questions which subsequently could be the cause of disagreements and misunderstanding between two governments, and that for elimination of fears with which the English public opinion belonged to the last successes of the Russian weapon, it would be desirable to enter into the agreement concerning policy and position of powers in Central Asia, and what agreement would serve as addition to the former agreement of 1872-1873 on those points which weren't mentioned by the last. According to the lord Granvill a question of northeast border of Persia from Baba Durmaz to the point where it adjoined to the Afghan border, near Hari Rud belonged to a number of the questions demanding an explanation. The English secretary of state of foreign affairs believed it to be useful if England, Russia and Persia were included into negotiations.

At the following visits of the prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, both with the lord Granvill, and with the secretary of state the lord Gartington for India, English ministers stated the opinion of a situation in Central Asia in more certain form. According to them, the last territorial acquisitions of Russia inspired alarm to the Afghan Emir and caused anxiety the Indian government; they could induce the Emir to demand an increase received by him from England a subsidy to give the chance to him to take the measures caused by future accidents.

If, for ensuring the possession and messages from robberies of the Turkmens, Russia appeared to be compelled to occupy all territory to Baba Durmaz, subsequently the same reasons could induce it to put forward the border further till Serakhs or its vicinities. In that case, attack on the Russian territory of the Turkmen gang which would be behind this within Afghanistan, could demand a parcel of the Russian group for prosecution of predators, what circumstance wouldn't fail to cause difficulty between Russia and Afghanistan, or it was rather between Russia and England to which influence Afghanistan submitted. Means to elimination of these difficulties consisted in prevention of direct contact of Russia with Afghanistan. Invasion from Merv Turkmens could threaten to the Russian possession who in order to avoid transitions on waterless steppes, could go to the Russian border only by one way just was from Merv in the southwest direction till Serakhs and turned from there to the northwest and followed then in some distance from Tejen along the country, lying at a sole of mountains and known under Atek's name.

Russia could provide itself from attacks of Merv Turkmens if it decided to enter with England into the agreement concerning the boundary definition between Persia and the Turkmen steppe; owing to such agreement it should followed to recognize the rights of Shah unliable to any doubt on the processed strips of the earth between Baba Durmaz and Serakhs, and also on a coast of Tejen and to oblige the shah’s government to build forts within the territory and to contain in it armies in quantity, sufficient for reflection of hostile attempts from Turkmens. In a word, according to English ministers, Persia had to assume a role of a stronghold of safety of the Russian possession, but such combination was not so joint with the dignity of Russia. Despite the friendship connecting it with Persia, Russia couldn't assign protection of the possession to this power as by long experience it was proved that Persia was not in forces to protect from attacks of the Turkmen gangs even own possession; ruins of settlements with which suburbs of Khorasan were covered, served eloquent to that as the proof. As for the rights of Persia on Atek and coasts of Tejen, actually we had them especially the bases to doubt that, during our expedition to Akhalteke oasis, a numerous assemblage of Merv Turkmens constantly went the way described above to the aid of akhalets, and that the Persian government didn't accept and was not in forces to take any measures to blockage the way to the remembered assemblage.

Under such circumstances, acceptance of combination offered us by the London office, depriving us the opportunity to complete the business of a pacification undertaken by us, would lead only to perpetuating of anarchy in these regions, and Russia couldn't reconcile with such prospect, that brought considerable victims in types of a settlement in Central Asia of an order and tranquillity. These reasons didn't permit us to enter with Great Britain’s government into negotiations on the bases offered by them; but, to prove to English ministers our readiness to take care of the prevention in the future of difficulties which could damage to the kind relations between two powers, the Imperial office considered useful, from its side to suggest them to start completion of the agreement of 1872-1873 on those beginnings which formed the basis. As this agreement with a known accuracy defined northeast border of Afghanistan from Sary-Kul lake till Hodge-Saleh, on Amu-Darya, and to the west from the last point the Afghan borders were outlined only in general, that, according to the Imperial government, the new agreement between it and an English office had to have a subject more exact determination of demarcation line from Hodge-Saleh till Serakhs or the point next to it on Hari Rud. In a type of extreme scarcity being available at that time at the disposal of its data concerning the territory within which it was necessary to draw demarcation line, the Imperial office was compelled to refrain even from the approximate indication of the direction of the marked line and believed to accept ethnographic conditions which, in his opinion, had paramount value in Central Asia in the differentiation basis. These conditions demanded association of Turkmen tribes. According to the above, our ambassador in London was offered to be guided by the following reasons during the explanations with English ministers:

1) to take the agreement of 1872-1873 for a starting point of negotiations;

2) to declare to Great Britain’s government the boundary definition between our possession and Persia till Baba Durmaz and from there between Khorasan and Atek till Serakhs could concern only Russia and Persia and made a question in which we couldn't allow foreign intervention;

3) to find out that negotiations on borders between Russia, Persia and Afghanistan had to be reduced to determination of line between Hodge-Saleh and Serakhs;

4) to offer the line from Hodge-Saleh till Serakhs in case of a consent of the English government to such point of view, passing on border which would separate its east part the Afghan province Char-vilayet from Turkmens independent from Afghanistan, and, in western, tribes Jemishdi and Khezare from the Turkmen tribes: Salors and Saryks;

5) at the same time with this offer to declare to the London office that in relation to the Turkmen tribes Russia pursued the same aim which Great Britain pursued in relation to boundary with India, to tribes of Afghanistan and Balochistan, that was strong ensuring the Asian possession and establishment of these possession of a peace situation on borders.

Our view of a situation of that time in Central Asia was too discordant with views of the English government and, in a consequence of that, hardly begun explanations weren't slow to stop.

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