Политология/2. Политическая конфликтология

Polyakov E.M.

Voronezh State University, Russia

Comparative analysis of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republic with Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

Introduction. Events in Ukraine began to develop rapidly in the spring of 2014, perhaps, after the proclamation of independence the so-called Lugansk and Donetsk people’s republics (hereinafter – L&D PR) in the South-east of the country, and outlined Ukraine's transition into the category of “failed state” [1]. At least, the government is experiencing significant difficulties with the control of the area with a population of approximately 4.0-4.5 million people or about 9% of the total Ukraine population. “Nation-building” in the L&D PR faced a number of typical post-Soviet breakaway republics problems: the lack of state apparatus, low effectiveness of political leaders, non-capable government institutions (parliament, government, the courts, the army, the tax authorities, etc.) and marginal legal status. The closest analogy would be L.Chibirov’s times in the South Ossetia or even Ichkeria led by Dzh.Dudaev. In addition to administrative and political problems should probably mention the “hanging” legitimacy (in many respects – a legacy of V.Yanukovych’s regime), the presence of refugees and internally displaced persons (hereinafter – R&IDP) mixed ethnic composition of the population. These problems are typical for post-Soviet breakaway republics [2]. I should try to explain the major traits, namely construction of the state, leadership and the legitimacy (internal and external), refugees and IDPs, as well as ethno-linguistic balance.

Let's start with the fourth paragraph, which is last, but not least. According to the fund “Russian world” (Head – Vyacheslav Nikonov), 10 years ago in Ukraine was 17% Russian, and Russian language was used by 60% of the population [3]. Let me remind you that according to the Census of Ukraine, conducted in 2001, Russian was 8.3 million, and in the last Soviet census – over 11 million.

To become clearer in the language of self-determination convention issues identified in the census and / or other sociological studies, cite follow data. Fund “Eurasia Heritage” in the survey (autumn 2007) conducted in 12 countries of the CIS, try to find, how many people knew the Russian language. Summary data from the responses to “freely speak, write, read”, “freely speak and read, but I write with mistakes” and “in principle, can be attributed to people speaking in Russian”, was 99% in Belarus, Kazakhstan – 95 % and in Ukraine - 93%. But it was almost also high in Kyrgyzstan – 79% and in Tajikistan – 75%, where aren’t so many Russian speakers, as in Belarus [4].

Refugees and displaced persons. One of the most important indicators of “consistency” of any state is the amount R&IDP on its territory. According to Russian media reports, from Ukraine to Russia came from several thousand to several tens of thousands of thousand R&IDP that does not allow us to talk about the mass exodus of civilians. Let me remind you that the population of L&D PR has several million people and refugees became not more than 1% of this figure. Conversely, ethnic conflicts and local wars in the post-status R&IDP, albeit at a time, to give half of the inhabitants of the territories concerned. On the other hand, UN experts have counted more than 40,000 R&IDP from the Crimea and the Southeast in Ukraine itself [5]. Of course, the armed conflict in the south-east of Ukraine continues just few months, but the duration of a power struggle does not play a fundamental role. In particular, the so-called “Five days (the Russo-Georgian War)” in August 2008 became refugees, according to various estimates, from 15 to 30 thousand people, and an estimated population of South Ossetia is 50-70 thousand people. Similar scale, we could observe during the first Chechen war (1994-1996): the maximum rated R&IDP during this conflict reached 400 thousand people, and even more, despite the fact that the pre-war population of Chechnya was less than a million.

A similar situation was in Karabakh, Transnistria and Abkhazia. Consequently, in the Ukrainian case we can not we talk about ethnic cleansing, genocide, or even mass exodus of civilians (at least not yet), although in the above conflicts such a question would have been, though very debatable, but it is quite natural. Further, so to speak, the qualitative composition of refugees. Again, the post-Soviet experience shows that mainly run family. It happens that the first leave parents, leaving children with relatives and / or neighbors, or vice versa, that is not the whole family leaves, and often, but not often that massively leaving women and children, and men were. In the case of L&D PR we have this variant.

For example, the number of refugees arriving in the Voronezh region, according to media reports, the men (i.e. the entire adult male population, including retirees) not constitute about 30-35% and 15-20% [6]. This suggests exported outside the conflict zones close to combatants people, for example, neighbors and relatives. These things are not just practiced Chechen, Karabakh and Ossetian warlords, exporting their relatives in Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia or Russia respectively.

The link to the duration of the conflict as an indicator of intensity and a necessary condition for the existence of a large number of R&IDP proportionate in terms of age and gender did not withstand an elementary test of facts. Namely, two post-Soviet armed conflicts – the already mentioned “Five-day war” and the Ossetian-Ingush conflict [7] – lasted only a few days, and the situation with R&IDP was the same as in the “solid” conflicts such as Chechnya or Nagorno-Karabakh: tens of percent from prewar population left conflict zones.

Distinguishes between these two types of conflicts, in fact, is one thing: ethnic cleansing. In Karabakh, Chechnya, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, armed actions were the method for ethnic cleansing. All these regions have lost (partially or completely) of the population, whose side was “defeated”. Even the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in this sense, is no exception: the refugee problem is not been solved until now.

In L&D PR actually ethnic component of the conflict is absent. And with that, and on the other hand, we have both Ukrainians and Russian (albeit in different proportions). Ethnic cleansing is not (although the web repeatedly there were reports that they have already implemented or planned), and the battle over disputed territory in general is conducted not by ethnic, but by national (statist) slogans.

Leaders and Warlords. Official Kiev says that in Lugansk and Donetsk entrenched terrorists. Terrorism – is a weapon for the weak, and South-eastern Ukraine is definitely weak, otherwise I.Girkin is not traded regularly to the Russian leadership for help. However, it is not so. Even if one of the parties uses terrorist methods of warfare (and according to some reports [8], warlords L&D PR and not shun such tactics), call them terrorists correctly. Moreover, terrorist means and methods of warfare require a certain anonymity and uncertainty of location management, at least if the goal is the national liberation struggle.

On the other hand, Internet is full of official appeals to the people and to the other parties of the conflict by separatist leaders. This is similar to the virtual presence of leaders “Caucasus Emirate”, but it was not typical for quasi-state leaders that have arisen in the conflict zones on the territory of the former USSR. On the contrary, as well Girkin and Boroday as Tsarev and Dobkin are active participants in the “information war”, which makes them similar to terrorists.

Obviously, manual L&D PR in its substantiality “filling” is worth somewhere between the leaders of terrorist organizations (such as “Hamas”) or separatist movements, on the one hand, and national liberation movements, on the other hand. The second well-known fact that is widely used terrorist methods of struggle and claim the crucial role of public sentiment spokesman of the oppressed people, declaring all “dissenters” enemies and traitors [9].

Something similar I.Girkin had demonstrated by the practice of "human shields" and outlawed some L&D PR leaders followed a “punishment for apostasy”. The prospect of political evolution top L&D PR in expanding SIC very negative: further marginalization and radicalization. This contributes to an important internal factor, namely the social origins of separatist leaders: politician with a criminal record (Dobkin), head of the financial pyramid (Pushilin) monarchist (Girkin). These characters were typical for almost all post-Soviet breakaway states.

For example, the coming to power of E.Kokoity contributed by militants (and concurrently, Liquor merchants) named Tedeyev brothers, leaders of Abkhazian separatism supported by local “tsehoviki”, and one of the pillars for Dudayev were Chechen criminal authorities, that allowed to cash money (the case of the so-called “Chechen AVISO”). Actually, it seems to me, it was the experience of CRI is useful in the analysis of the present and future L&D PR [10]. In contemporary “Ichkeria”, which is increasingly becoming an L&D PR occur and hostage taking (including, not only for the sake of public relations, but also for the enrichment), looting of property (primarily affected small businesses), and integration the power semi criminal layers.

State building. In order to be considered self-proclaimed states as political entities, they must have the institutional infrastructure, primarily legally competent authorities and control. In this sense, a short “experience” L&D PR gives much food for thought and, again, was very similar to the path traveled by other unrecognized republics. First, is the creation of parallel bodies of power and administration, the main task – to crush legitimacy of state structures and officials and paralyzing bureaucracy, which in conditions of uncertainty and dual power become ineffective. Thus, the population instilled the idea that the authorities were forgotten and left to fend for themselves, and the only instrument of salvation – in the hands of those who control informal structures. Secondly, after being replaced official administrative structures to informal, partial co-optation the old regime. Thirdly, symbolic renunciation, i.e. replacing symbols declarative acts mythologizing the past. If we take a closer look at the daily practice of L&D PR, we see all these signs.

To begin with, were declared “Supreme Soviets” among “catechumens” folk gatherings and partially – former deputies of regional councils. Then, regional councils and the State Administration officials were invited to either be “on the side of the people”, or resign, but until then all their acts were declared legally and politically insignificant. Subsequent acts of the declaration of independence and state sovereignty (with the introduction of constitutions, emblems, flags) issued a final break with the Ukrainian statehood.

Similar events took place in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR and South Ossetia autonomic region during 1989-1992 years. In South Ossetia, the duration of the transitional period was due to the war with Georgia, and in Chechnya - relative treaty-separatist leaders (at least they did not proclaim the impossibility of negotiating with Moscow). Similarity of events almost verbatim until invitations to senior positions “outlanders” (Boroday and Dudayev) militants armed seizure of administrative buildings (town halls and offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), kills some deputies (Gorlivka and Grozny) and an “elections” and “referendum” in the conditions paralysis of law enforcement and election commissions [11].

So, in November 1990, Dz. Dudayev was introduced to the Board of Joint Committee of the Chechen people (an analogue of the “Movement of the Southeast”, headed by O.Tsarev), in June 1991 – was elected chairman of the Board, in September 1991 from the number of deputies of Supreme Soviet of Republic and Joint Committee members was “elected” Provisional Supreme Council, and than Joint Committee dismissed the PSC and took over full power. Conducted October 27 “elections” of CRI president and parliament (with a turnout of 10-12%), the central government were deemed illegal for the following reasons: the elections were held on the territory of arbitrarily delineated as a territory of the Chechen Republic did not exist; elections were held in a manifestly insufficient for a full two weeks of the election campaign; due to the lack of control by the observers were numerous violations of the standard procedure of the election [12]. Analogy with South Ossetia is not so strong, but also very demonstrative. As in L&D PR in RSO significant part of the power unit were Russian citizens (not only Ossetians with Russian passports, but also so-called “indigenous”, ethnic Russians), including three of the five former Ministers of Defense, as well as one of the ministers of Defense and also Emergencies, Finance and Prime Ministers.

Conclusion. Discussed in the article the problem of construction of “independence” L&D PR suggest the collapse of “states” in the medium term (5-15 months) and / or co-opt them into more successful state. Which name will it have – Ukraine or Russia – is not important. At least from the perspective of leaders L&D PR, as they will in both cases, at best, political oblivion, and at worst – the physical removal, what was already happened with many leaders of the “independent states” first wave in early 1990’s. For the inhabitants of these territories the situation could be even worse: if the L&D PR will not “co-opted”, the residents will fall under special legal regime and external (with respect to a given territory) control, as it was in Chechnya in early 2000’s. The second option means lawlessness of “siloviki” and the uncontrolled growth of corruption. While Chechnya has a bit “lucky”: there was formed an authoritarian ethnocratic regime, what partly offset these problems; in the south-east of Ukraine, whoever “won”, Ethnocracy will not work.

References:
1. For more details see: Rada P. Rebuilding of Failed States. Budapest, 2007.

2. Markedonov S.M. The Unrecognized States of Eurasia as a Phenomenon of the USSR's Dissolution // Demokratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. 2012. – Vol. 20. – No 2.

3. Yatsenko E.B. “The Russian language in the NIS” as a result of desk and field research // Do we need a Russian language in a New Independent States? Proceedings of the conference, February 29, 2008. – Moscow, 2008. – P.13.

4. Zadorin I.V. Main results of the opinion poll “The position of the Russian language in the Newly Independent States (CIS and Baltic countries)” // Do we need a Russian language in a New Independent States? Proceedings of the conference, February 29, 2008. – Moscow, 2008. – P.18.

5. UN counted more than 46,000 refugees in Ukraine. - Electronic resource. Mode of access: http://news.mail.ru/politics/18659070/?frommail=1/ Access Date: 06.24.2014.
6. Nearly 700 refugees from Ukraine arrived in Voronezh region. - Electronic resource. Mode of access: http://news.mail.ru/inregions/center/36/society/18592407/ Access Date 06/21/14.

7. Zdravomyslov A.G. Ossetian-Ingush conflict. – M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. – P.71-74.
8. Barabanov I. Armed Republic // Kommersant Vlast. – 2014. – No.21. – P.9.
9. Polyakov E.M. From Nationalism to terrorism: the path of radical movements in different parts of the world // Scientific statements BSU. – 2012. – No7. – P.263-270.

10. Chechen tragedy. Who is to blame? – M.: RIA “Novosti”, 1995. – P.29-37.

11. Invasion in Russia. – M.: Publishing Centre “Eksprint”, 2003. – P.52-53.

12. Chechen tragedy. Who is to blame? - M.: RIA “Novosti”, 1995. – P.16-18.