Economics/ 14. Economic Theory
Grazhevska
Anna
Taras
Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine
Transformation
of rent relations in information society
Rent theory is an important part of
economic theory as it reflects fundamental changes in the functioning of modern
economic systems. At the early stage of scientific research, it revealed
patterns in thedevelopment of agricultural economics where land as a factor of
production had priority due to its scarcity. The representative of the
classical political economy, David Ricardo, defined rent as a part of a product
of land resources, which a tenant pays to a landowner for the use of the soil
[1, p.112].Transition to an industrial society was accompanied by the
introduction of the scientific concept of quasi-rent
and interpretation of a rentas a category related to the new phenomena that
arise from a productive use of capital and labour.Alfred Marshall, the founder
of the neoclassical economic theory, claimed that land rent is not unique as
there exists a continuous transition from the actual rent as an income received
from the free factors of production and an income derived from the use of
buildings, factories, steam engines and less durable goods [2, p.590].
Post-industrial changes and evolution of
theinformation society contributed to the further development of rent relations
and appearance of new theoretical concepts in this area. Neo-institutional
economists definedthe rent as an additional income that is received by economic
agents through the establishment of a monopoly or exclusive right to use rare
resources while limiting access to them for other agents.They argue that ifthe
mainprecondition for receiving a rent is to control access to resources through
clear specification and securitisation of property rights, then the rent,received
from the use of administrative powers is associated with different sorts of
barriers and restrictions.In addition, the representatives of neo-institutional
economics suggested a theory of rent-seeking
[3] and drew attention to the dualism of the rent-seeking behaviour of
economic agents [4, p.294; 5, p.230].
Modern
researchers interpret rent relations as a complex system of economic
interactions that occur between economic actors on the basis offormation,
distribution (redistribution), appropriation and use of rental resources and
revenues. These relations directly affect the dynamics of economic growth,
macroeconomic proportions and macroeconomic balance. At the same time, they are
directly or indirectly influenced by socio-economic transformations on the
national and global levels. The main areas of transformation of rent relations
under conditions of transition to an information society are:
a
significant change in the conditions of formation of rental
income;acknowledging that along with natural factors of production, an
increasingly important role in this field is played by technological,
informational and institutional factors.With reference to that, the modern
economic literature distinguishes: (1) natural rent - permanent additional
income earned from the use of non-renewable natural resources (land, mining,
water, timber rent etc.); (2) unnatural rent a temporary additional income
resulting from the use of unnatural reproducible resources (intellectual,
informational, technological, administrative, political rent etc.);
an absolute and
relative increase in the proportion of rental income, generated in the
secondary and tertiary economic sectors (technological, intellectual and
information quasi-rent). These types of rental income are recognised as
socially desirable as they stimulate innovations, investment and economic
growth. For example, monopolistic ownership of intellectual property allows
receiving additional income (intellectual rent). The development and efficient
use of this rentis an important incentive that stimulates innovation activity
of economic entities;
expansion
of the range of subjects of rent relations through monopolization of political
and administrative power under conditions of theinstitutional incompleteness of
themarket economy, legal uncertainty and the possibility of different
interpretation of provided legislation. According to McChesney, politicians and
bureaucrats are not passive actors that choose which of the competing proposals
will maximise their profits, but an active welfare-maximisers. They exercise
pressure on opponents by providing the interest parties with
informationregarding the threats of implementation of regulations that can
worsen the economic situation of the latest.An expected worsening of theeconomic
situation stimulates economic actors to pay bureaucrats for the rejection of
the planned activities [6 p.181-182];
formation
of the rentier economy, which is characterized by unproductive use of resources
on the restructuring of ownership rights in favour of interest groups; increase
in transaction costs of legitimization (registration, licensing, certification,
standardization) and individualization of entrepreneurship;degradation of
innovative and labour potentials; diversion of resources from economic
circulation and their unproductive use for bribery and lobbying.
Under these circumstances, an appropriate
rental policy becomes more and more necessary. It must represent a system of
state economic regulation of relations associated with identification,
accumulation, extraction and use of rental income. The main areas of
improvement of such a policy in the information society should be:
avoidance of the narrow interpretation
of rent asan income associated with theuse of natural resources; recognition of
thecomplexity of rent relations that involve both productive and
counterproductive rent-seeking behaviour of economic actors;
expansion of the possibilities for
productive rent seeking through improvement of the system of production,
distribution (redistribution) and use of effective rents in strategic economic
sectors along with creation and development of the national innovation system;
restriction of the counterproductive rent-seeking behaviour of economic actors
through clear specification of property rights, consolidation of the control
over legislation compliance, limitation of administrative interferences in
economic processes, simplification and increase of officials transparency,
formation of a civil society and independent judiciary.
1. Rikardo D.
Nachala politicheskoy ekonomii i nalogovogo oblozheniya. Izbrannoye. M.:
Eksmo, 2007. 960 s.
2. Marshall A.
Osnovy ekonomicheskoy nauki. M.: Eksmo, 2007. 832 s.
3. Buchanan J.
M. Rent seeking and profit seeking // Toward a theory of the rent seeking
society / Eds. by J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison, G. Tullock. College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, Series 4, 1980. P. 3-15.
4. Krueger A.O.
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society // American Economic Review.
1974. Vol. 64. P. 291-303.
5. Tullock G.
The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft // Western Economic Journal.
1967. Vol. 5. Π. 224-232.
6.
McChesney T. Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the
Economic Theory Of Regulation // The Political Economy of Rent Seeking / C.
Rowley, R. Tollison, G. Tallock, eds. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers,1988.
P. 179-196.