KAZAKH NATIONALISM IN EURASIAN
CONTEXT
G. R. Dadabayeva, Doctor of
Sciences, KIMEP, Almaty
This abstract has concerned primarily with the new look to the stages of
post-Soviet Kazakh nationalism development embedded in context of Eurasian
concept. Could we prove true widely held predictions about future strengthening
of nationalists’ position in post – crisis country? As we state, opposite to
above mentioned ideas, the more Kazakhstan would be involved in to Russian
politics orbit which means further movement to Eurasian “path” the more
undermined should be Kazakh nationalists conventional certainties. More over,
one of the world crisis consequences could be displayed in leadership
authoritarian tendencies strengthening. The latter undoubtedly ought to erode
Kazakh nationalists’ position.
I always have been saying:
“First - is an economy, and then – politics”.
N. Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s path,
2006.
“Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy is not just a subjective will
or “doctrine” of Nursultan Nazarbayev, but, apparently, the result of
geographical position of the young independent state, appearance of a new
geopolitical reality in the world politics – Central Asia”.
Y. Yertisbayev, Kazakhstan and
Nazarbayev,- logics of changes, 2001.
Nationalism Development
in Post – Soviet Kazakhstan
Nationalism
growth and its strengthening in Kazakhstan could be divided into several
stages. The first one (1991-1994) is directly connected with the disintegration
of the USSR and direct threat to the country’s territorial integrity. The Russian-speaking population composed
nearly half of the republic population and in light of these above mentioned
factors was doomed to be ousted from its previous positions. The economic
crisis advent in early 1990-s became the main reason of the Slavic people
exodus from Kazakhstan. The latter occupied the majority of the working places
in Kazakhstan industrial sector and thus had become the target of nationalist
claims to promote Kazakh language as the state one. In a case of Slavic people disappearance from republic territory
the Kazakhs thus would be given a special status alongside with privileges as
for the most suffering side during the Soviet time [1].
The
early Kazakh nationalism problem when independence came was its inability to be
some kind of driven factor in political processes opposite to nationalist
movements in other countries as Turkey, China and India. What we could observe
in these countries was connected with the anti-colonial struggle of indigenous
population against foreigners – Indians were fighting for self-determination,
Turks were trying to construct their nation-state after empire demise using
nationalism as the state ideology, Chinese were cleaning country off any traces
of great powers interference. On contrast, Kazakh nationalists couldn’t
comprise the previous picture due to different nature of their program.
First,
their attempt to withdraw finally Russian-speaking population was doomed from
the very beginning. Widely spread Soviet culture along with Russian language
long before the independence came had been splitting the Kazakh society into
two groups: Kazakh - and Russian-speaking. And nationalism was not an ideology
around which they could unite. Meanwhile in India English was an elite language
opposite to intensive Russification process had taken place during Soviet
regime. Second, if we take the events
of 1986 as the beginning of nationalist movement we have to realize it was
suppressed after few days of their first steps on the political arena.
Consequently it indicates that society attitude towards problems of future
nation-state still had been unclear and unstable. Majority of Russian speaking
population preferred to stay under Moscow mainly due to close integration of
Kazakhstan and Russian economics. And,
finally, if Chinese were quite successful on the way of “purging” their country
from foreign influence (what in reality was not strong at all) in Kazakhstan
this situation would not be possible due to long lasting dominance of Russian
culture familiar to nearly everyone.
Precisely,
combination of all these factors provided the foundation for insisting on non –
powerful enough for nation-building character of “Kazakh nationalism”. The main
problem of the situation became question to what extent political nationalism could be powerful within the process of nation-state
building. Unfortunately, the nationalists had no their own original program
except claims for improving Kazakh language and population position especially
in sphere of culture (history, literature, etc.). These claims were mainly
driven by the necessity not to find against the foreign dominance but to oust
Russians from their working places.
Moreover,
they even didn’t think about the necessity to create a special program. Due to
the latter circumstances all of their principal suggestions were later used as
the agitation slogans by more influential political forces including political
elite of independent Kazakhstan [2].
The
political alliance of ruling elite and Kazakh nationalists reached its turning
point in 1994-95 due mainly to such factors as parliament crisis and its later
resignation. The crisis provoked adoption of a new constitution with more power
concentrated in hands of president and working up to now days. Exactly from
this moment one could say about the emergence of presidential republic in
Kazakhstan, whose leader began to decrease the sphere of opposition activity,
including Kazakh nationalists. One of the reasons of appearance of such
political situation was the weakness of Kazakh nationalism.
Eurasian strategy for
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan
– Russian relations include various factors, such as political/national security,
economic/natural reserves (oil reserves), and ethnic/national identity [3].
There is an obvious need in a strong Central Asian security system, which is
impossible to maintain without intense Kazakhstan and Russian involvement.
Kazakhstan’s ethnic composition and “identity factor” are also among the
factors that had a number of determining trends within foreign and national
policy of the country.
In
1995 the president began campaign for the creation of Eurasian Union. The idea
was initiated by some members of parliament who had expressed the wishes for
real and effectively working alliance with Russia. From one side this part of
the politicians expressed the interests of Russian speaking population,
including Kazakhs, and from the other side they really had been promoted more
stable balance between president and parliament.
This
parliamentary crisis had finished by the victory of presidential team but in
order to consolidate Kazakhstan society and to quite Russian speaking
population the president himself declared formation of Eurasian Union as the
most desired institute for improving economic situation. Reaction of Russian
side was quite predictable. Russian elite quickly realized the real backside of
Kazakhstan leader’s initiative. There was no any real essence within these
steps of Kazakh government; it was a political stet made for strengthening
president positions. But Russia was unable to reject it in order to avoid
disappointment from Russian speaking people side in Kazakhstan and thus began first
gradual movement forward.
The
“Eurasian” idea in Kazakhstan has multidimensional character and was standing
far away from simplification often seeing in our analytical works. Let us look at the positive and negative
consequences of this union.
Kazakhstan
-Russian alliance would immediately give an opportunity to solve all problems
connected with borders questions and ethnic conflicts; as for cooperation in
military sphere it would provide some space for maneuver towards Middle Asian
republics;
for Kazakhstan
political elite it was a chance to come to an agreement with Kazakh and Russian
speaking people;
the perspectives
of economic cooperation of both republics are to work for mutual benefits of
Kazakhstan as for Russian side;
the process of
Russian people exodus from the territory of republic that took place in early
1990-s stopped due to several reasons; it could be explained not only by
growing economic conditions but also because the president had become the main
guarantor of interethnic concord;
as for negative
consequences, one could suggest that the part of Kazakh nationalists saw the
alliance with Russia as an obstacle on its way to become a real mono - ethnic
republic; probably the result of the alliance would be the new wave of Russian
language and literature growth. The latter means lessening of the working
places for Kazakh speaking population unable to compete with Russian speaking
specialists. For the certain part of Kazakh people it was the keeping the same
outsider position in their own society. But this is true concerning the
situation in early 1990-s, now 20 years after Kazakh language provides an
advantageous position for those seeking
job in public sector;
The alliance with
Russia anyway is working against the idea of ethnic nation. For those who think
strategically it represents a double-folded question in sphere of nation-state
building – to form an ethnic nation on the basis of ‘self-determined Kazakh
people” and territorial nation when all citizens of Kazakhstan are Kazakhstani;
However,
nationalists were not always in line with president representing opposition
views. In a case of moving closer towards Kazakhstan-Russian alliance and thus
providing support to the ruling regime Kazakh leadership would get additional
points in a game against opposition. Paradoxically, but the union with Russia
means the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies in Kazakhstan because the
Russian leaders never criticize its politics [4].
The
economic crisis was one of the reasons to concentrate more power in their
hands. Stagnation in industrial sector, growth of unemployment and social
tension were laying in the foundation of the nationalist’s popularity [5]. The
rural districts where mainly the Kazakh population is concentrated are going
through bad times. In the South where the number of Kazakh people also
overwhelmed the situation is far from optimistic prognosis. In order to keep
control over the situation and to avoid the “Kyrgyz variant” the republic
leadership was trying to concentrate the whole power n their hands.
But
the main condition for strengthening government positions was to get a real
support from the population. He latter at least in the context the sharp
political and economic crisis had become less achievable target. As for common people
their attitude towards government activity looked to be more critical due to as
mentioned before deep crisis. The
president in these circumstances decided to play a card without risk of loss.
Ethnic
concord and peace in Kazakhstan is a main guarantee for co-existence of all
nationalities and peoples on the territory of republic. For the political elite
the problem of ethnic co-existence has turned to a choice between two
strategies – is it necessary to support the claims of Kazakh population consists
of half or even more among the inhabitants of republic or maybe to keep further
the balance between different ethnic groups and so far to follow keeping
previously accepted approach for solving political problems. As for situation
today one can observe the rather declining of present elite to a second
variant. The Forum of Kazakhstan People’s Assembly held October 20, 2010 has
shown the intention of the president to use with some changes second variant.
During this political event he was talking about the necessity to keep
political stability, tolerance and concord among various groups of the
population and at the end of his speech he pointed out very important factor:
ethnic agreement for Kazakhstan now means an opportunity effectively solve
economic problems and furthermore to continue successful development. But when
some of the speakers raised the question of “improving the situation with
studies of Kazakh language” he immediately expressed his agreement with this
statement. The dominance of Kazakh language in the administrative structures
provides for a state an opportunity to keep status of Kazakh population as
nation-forming meaning politically dominated group. Thus nationalists would
have no any pretext to be disappointed by government actions. In context of avoiding social tensions however
paradoxically it seems to look the disappointment of rural Kazakhs or those who
have recently moved to cities and towns
would be neutralized by support of other ethnic groups in exchange for
political stability and opportunities for further developing their culture and
language. President also
suggested to declare the present 2011, coincided with 20-s anniversary of
republic independence, as a year of friendship of Kazakhstan peoples. His
speech accurately reflected his loyalty to the previously accepted course.
Without
any troubles one could reveal the fact that the majority of Russian speaking
Kazakhs alongside with the representatives of other ethnic groups represent the
core of “well-to-do” people in Kazakhstan. We could call them somewhat middle
class of the republic due to their better economic doing in compassion with
Kazakh speaking groups. Their support provides for the president now existing
status and moreover it is a possible source of strengthening his positions
because he could play with contradictions between different groups.
Partly,
crisis has led to those results which strengthened economic dependence of
Kazakhstan from China. Chinese growing
interest into further developing of Kazakhstan energy resources marketing to
the territory of People’s Republic has made unclear the question of its
political independence. So far, we can suggest that “Eurasian” strategy of
president has become one of the opportunities to keep the balance of powers in republic
between China and Russia. In this
context the claims of Kazakh nationalists to further “kazakhization” of the
country seems to move opposite to president course. Russian Federation is
enlarging its military presence in the region not due to security issues
especially interesting to her but also because this strategy could be used for
cementing economic ties with Kazakhstan. Russian “Eurasian” course inevitably
means a turn to the idea of military - strategic supremacy on the territory of
Central Asia. In the light of these perceptions Kazakhstan is to become the
main strategic partner of Russia. The more European Union would press Russia
concerning European problems the more Russia would press Central Asian
countries including Kazakhstan, partly due to fact that energy resources
marketing from this region are mainly in hands of RF. For Kazakhstan it is
quite profitable variant because it will provide for the republic an
opportunity to avoid complete economic dependence from China.
The
crisis also gave an opportunity to the western clans to strengthen their
positions in the leadership of the country. Western region is situated closer
to the Russian territory and their domain represents the main deposits of
energy recourses. In fact, the latter circumstances are laying in the
foundation of their claims to occupy the key posts in the government. Thus the
turn in the present political course is indicating to the needs of the moment.
The mass losses by southern clans their leading positions and ministerial seats
could be seen as reflection of the tendency.
Southern
clans are more depending from the Chinese demands because through southern
borders is delivered the major part of the consumer goods from People’s
Republic to Kazakhstan. More over, southern clans representing the interests of
“Kazakh” regions are especially interested in further “kazakhization” of the
country. It seems that strict positions of other clans towards the southern
kinsmen could be mainly explained by these political reasons, including usual
rivalry between representatives of different tribal groups. It’s possible to
suppose that president’s accusation in criminalization of part of political
apparatus and consequently strict anti-corruption company initiated by top
administration have the roots in this phenomenon. Now we can observe that
representatives of southern clans are leaving state administration.
Conclusion: How far are
lasting the intentions and wishes of clans in order to realize their plans?
Probably, president will strengthen his position and concentrate more power in
his hands. This is the most realistic variant of country’s further political
development. He wants to keep existing balance, trying at the same time to
avoid a situation when one the clans would be more successful in order to
obtain more influence and thus to break the existing system.
LITERATURE:
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4
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